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This dissertation presents three essays in a variety of areas within development economics. 
In the first essay, Colonial Institutions and Public Education in India, I provide micro-evidence on 
the persistent adverse impacts of oppressive colonial institutions on present day education 
outcomes in India. Using rich primary survey data from nearly 1,000 villages, I find that villages 
that were endowed with landlord systems in the 1800s continue to have significantly worse 
primary school performance in present day. There are remarkable differences in school inputs as 
well, although these do not explain fully the variation in outcomes. In further analysis, I show that 
the lack of accountability and political representation at the local level is the main channel through 
with the landlord effect persists. Finally, I also show that the private sector steps in as an alternative 
to the poor quality of public education and offers significantly better inputs and produces much 
higher outputs in landlord areas.  
The second essay, Aspirations and Financial Decisions: Experimental Evidence from the 
Philippines, is co-authored with Dean Yang and David McKenzie. In this paper, we present results 
from a randomized experiment among poor entrepreneurs testing the impact of exogenously 
inducing higher financial aspirations. In theory, raising aspirations could have positive effects by 
inducing higher effort, but could also reduce effort if unmet aspirations lead to frustration.  We 
find that treatment resulted in more ambitious savings goals, but nearly all individuals fell far short 
of reaching these goals. Two years later, treated individuals had not saved more, and actually had 
lower borrowing and business investments. Treatment also reduced belief in the amount of control 
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over one’s life. The results from the chapter suggest that setting aspirations too high can lead to 
frustration, leading individuals to reduce their economic investments. 
In the third essay, Poverty and Well-Being of the Elderly in Latin America: The Role of 
Health, Pensions and Private Transfers, I leverage 44 existing household survey datasets from 17 
countries in the Latin America and the Caribbean region to document patterns in poverty, well-
being and living arrangements of the elderly in the region. I also examine elderly’s access to health 
care services  and the burden of out-of-pocket health expenditures. In most countries included in 
the study, I find that health insurance plays a significant role in increasing utilization of health 
services and reduction of financial burden. Finally, I also examine the availability of pensions and 
private transfers, and their role in improving the well-being of the elderly.  
My dissertation contributes to the empiricial knowledge base in development economics 
in areas of economic history, education, health, household finance, demography, and poverty. The 
three essays aim to shed some light on key development issues facing countries in East Asia, South 









India has the largest public primary education system in the world, catering to nearly 200 million 
children. Over the last two decades, massive increases in education expenditures have led to near 
universal primary school enrollment, nevertheless, education outcomes remain poor. In 2018, only 
44 percent of fifth grade students could read a second grade level text (ASER, 2019). This is partly 
because the education system is characterized by weak accountability and representation – teachers 
and students are frequently absent, poor performance is seldom penalized, and parents have little 
influence on local education policy decisions (Chaudhury et al., 2006; Muralidharan et al., 2017). 
As a response to poor public sector performance, private sector enrollment in primary education 
in India has increased steadily to 35.2 percent in 2017 from 16.5 percent in 2001 (Kingdon, 2020; 
Kremer & Muralidharan, 2008; UNESCO, 2020). Education outcomes also vary substantially 
across and within states as measured by international benchmarking tests, therefore it is not 
surprising that Indian students are represented both in the top and bottom of the test scores 
distribution worldwide (Das & Zajonc, 2010). To make sense of these patterns observed in the 
literature, it is necessary to understand why there is variation in public sector accountability and 
performance in the first place, and if improvements in school inputs or accountability alone can 
improve outcomes. Similarly, there is little direct understanding as to what extent the shift to 
private education reflects households’ response to poor public sector performance as opposed to 
preferences.  
 
Recent literature in economics has established that the quality of historical institutions can shape 
current period economic, social and education outcomes. Informal and formal institutions provide 
the incentive structure of an economy, and the economy’s growth (or decline) depends on the 
history of evolution of that structure (North, 1991). Across and within countries, research has 
shown that exploitative and extractive colonial institutions can affect current outcomes through 
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multiple channels, including, inequality and distribution of wealth, lack of political representation 
and power, weak property rights, and poor human capital (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Banerjee & Iyer, 
2005; Bruhn & Gallego, 2012; Engerman & Sokoloff, 1997; Glaeser et al., 2004). Colonial 
institutions have also been shown to affect present day education outcomes, although evidence on 
the on the channels of impact is limited (Musacchio et al., 2014; Pandey, 2010). In India, Banerjee 
& Iyer (2005) argues that the type of land tenure systems (landlord vs. non-landlord) established 
during the British rule (1858-1947) continues to have persistent effects on current economic 
outcomes. The main channel in their analysis is political environment and representation. This 
chapter answers the question whether the same historical institution (land tenure system during the 
British era) affects current education outcomes, and if yes, if the effects persist through similar 
channels. It also examines the private sector response to the “landlord effect” and documents 
differential effects in landlord and non-landlord villages. 
 
To provide micro-evidence on these questions, I use a rich nationwide survey data from 3,000 
schools, 15,000 teachers and 25,000 households in rural India implemented in 2009-2010. The 
surveys were fielded as a follow-up to the 2004 World Development Report which, using surveys 
of schools and teachers in 1,900 villages, found that 23.6 percent of public-school teachers were 
absent on any given day (World Bank, 2003). The surveys included both public and private schools 
and the 2009-2010 round expanded the surveys to add modules for households, local leaders 
(chairperson of the Gram Panchayat,1 GP) and heads of local education governance body (Village 
Education Committee, VEC). Households and local leaders were asked to enumerate their 
preferences about education and their participation in local governance, which form important 
inputs for this chapter. School finances and governance related data was collected from heads of 
VECs as well as GP leaders. Standardized tests for mathematics and language were also 
administered for fourth grade students. The results of these tests are the main measure of education 
outcomes used in this chapter. I combine these rich micro-data on education with colonial land 
tenure data from Banerjee & Iyer (2005). The land tenure data contain district-level (third level of 
 
 
1 Gram Panchayat is the terminology used for village level local governance in India. It consists of a village or a group 
of villages or wards, where each ward elect or nominates a representative, or “Panch.” The head of the Panchayat or 
“Sarpanch” is elected by the representatives for a period of five years.  
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public administration, following central and state level) information on the system of land revenue 
collection – landlord vs. non-landlord – as well as a range of other district level variables. During 
the colonial era, these systems were introduced to facilitate land revenue collection – in landlord 
areas, a single landlord was made responsible for the setting and collection of rents from individual 
cultivators, whereas in non-landlord areas the revenue liability was determined centrally and 
updated regularly, and the responsibility was with individual cultivators or with village bodies. 
Closely following Banerjee & Iyer (2005), my hypothesis is that landlord systems were oppressive 
and extractive, and areas with such systems continue to have worse education outcomes, even 
though reforms abolished landlord systems in the 1950s.  
 
I find large and persistent effects of historical land tenure systems. After controlling for a range of 
district and village characteristics (and adding state fixed effects), villages that had landlord 
systems during the colonial era score 0.31 to 0.35 standard deviations lower in standardized tests 
of mathematics and language. This impact is economically meaningful, and is equivalent to almost 
1.5 years of learning (Evans & Yuan, 2019). The chapter also reports large differences in teacher 
quality and school inputs including infrastructure and pupil-teacher ratios (PTRs), however, these 
gaps alone do not fully explain the observed differences in outcomes. I provide suggestive 
evidence that schools in landlord villages are unable to convert education production factors into 
outputs or outcomes. That is, in these villages, key school inputs such as quality of teachers, 
infrastructure, and low pupil-teacher ratios are uncorrelated with outcomes in landlord villages. In 
contrast, in non-landlord villages, as theory would suggest, outcomes are positively correlated with 
infrastructure and teacher quality, and negatively correlated with PTRs. I examine two potential 
channels for the persistence of the landlord effect – within village inequality and accountability at 
the local level – and find evidence in support of the latter but not the former. These findings are 
consistent with other research examining the impact of colonial institutions in India (Banerjee & 
Iyer, 2005; Iyer, 2010; Pandey, 2010). Finally, I show that private sector growth in primary 
education is correlated with the poor performance of the public sector. In landlord and non-
landlord villages, private schools use similar or lower levels of inputs as public schools but produce 
much better outcomes. I also find that private schools face different entry barriers and decisions in 
landlord and non-landlord villages. In non-landlord villages, quality of public schools and village 
wealth are key predictors of private schools’ availability. In landlord villages, private schools’ 
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presence is correlated with within village inequality and village wealth, but not public schools’ 
quality. These patterns suggest that private schools may need to compete with the public sector in 
non-landlord areas where public school quality is better. In landlord areas with dismal state of the 
public sector, they can gain market share with far lesser effort.  
 
The findings of this chapter make three main contributions to the literature. First, it adds micro-
evidence to the literature on the persistent effects of historical institutions, which is primarily 
macro-focused and much of the evidence comes from cross-country or cross-region effects.2 For 
example, both Engerman & Sokoloff (1997) and Acemoglu et al. (2001) report cross country 
differences in productivity, although through different channels. The argument in the former is 
that differences in factor endowments led countries to engage in different economic activities 
(exploitative or non-exploitative) and in turn different growth paths, while the latter argues that 
property rights are correlated with economic outcomes, and differences in property rights at 
colonization predict differences in property rights today. Within countries studies have tended to 
focus on a specific institution. This means that the set of confounders and concerns about omitted 
variables is relatively smaller than that in cross-country studies. Still, many of these studies exploit 
and explain regional variations and outcomes, and the focus is typically on a broad set of economic 
outcomes (rather than education specifically). Banerjee & Iyer (2005) is mainly concerned with 
agricultural productivity at the district level in India.3 Similarly, in Bruhn et al., (2012) the main 
result is that GDP per capita is 20.3 to 26.3 percent lower in regions with worse colonial institutions 
in 17 countries in the Americas. One exception4 is Pandey (2010), who examines education 
outcomes in just one state of India (Uttar Pradesh). The paper finds similar effects as those reported 
in this chapter but has limited analysis on the possible channels of impact. This chapter adds to the 
literature by providing micro-evidence to the overall literature, extending previous education 




2 See Nunn (2009) and Sokoloff & Engerman (2000) for reviews of the literature. 
3 They do report on number of schools and health facilities at the district level. 
4 Another related paper in education is Musacchio et al. (2014). Their focus is somewhat different and shows that 
policies to break persistent long-run effects of colonial institutions have heterogenous impacts. 
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Second, this chapter contributes to our understanding of the organization and performance of the 
private system of education in India. Private schools are ubiquitous in rural and urban India, 
nevertheless, the growth of the private sector in education is often vilified as a “neo-liberal” agenda 
(Mehrotra & Panchamukhi, 2007). The argument usually rests on comparing the quality of high-
end private schools in states’ capitals and cities to poor states of “low-cost” private schools in 
villages. However, there is little direct evidence on the quality of outcomes in private schools. Due 
to the lack of test scores data for private sector, research has been limited to documenting private 
schools’ growth in areas with inputs-based measures of public schools performance (Kingdon, 
2020; Kremer & Muralidharan, 2008). Previous research has also argued that private schools can 
operate at low cost partly because of the high availability of talented graduates willing to work as 
teachers as market clearing wages, rather than administratively determined bureaucrats’ wages. 
Thus, private school growth in India and other countries has been shown to coincide with public 
school growth precisely because of the production of a pool of teachers in the public sector 
(Andrabi et al., 2013; Khanna, 2020). This chapter adds to the literature on private education in 
India by providing direct evidence on the quality of outcomes in private schools, and by showing 
that in addition to increased supply and affordability of private schools, households’ response to 
poor quality of public schools is also a key reason behind increased private schools’ enrollment 
share.  
 
Finally, this chapter also contributes to the overall research and policy debate on education in 
India. In the past two decades, several empirical studies have focused on identifying the causes of 
poor learning outcomes, and carefully conducted randomized evaluations have identified effective 
policy interventions that causally improve school inputs and outcomes. In the context of poor 
accountability and outcomes, researchers have evaluated impacts of camera-based teacher 
attendance and performance monitoring and teacher performance pay on education inputs and 
outcomes (Duflo et al., 2012; Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011), and remedial education and 
technology-aided instruction on learning (Banerjee et al., 2007; Muralidharan et al., 2019). 
However, large-scale of adoption and scale-ups of these tested interventions has been rather 
limited. As argued in Banerjee, et al. (2017), market equilibrium effects, context dependence, 
political reactions, corruption, and changing costs of implementation are some of the main 
challenges to scale-up. In India and other developing countries, low levels of accountability has 
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been argued as a key bottleneck to improving learning outcomes (Mbiti, 2016). In the same vein, 
an earlier paper using the same data as that in this chapter found that teacher absence alone costs 
the Indian system $1.5 billion per year, and that frequent monitoring of schools is strongly 
correlated with lower teacher absence (Muralidharan et al., 2017). Nevertheless, the paper 
provided little evidence on why there is variation in monitoring in the first place. This chapter 
contributes to the literature by generating evidence on one source of accountability differences – 
historical persistence of oppressive institutions. It identifies the causes and consequences of 
accountability, highlighting the need for future research in the education space to design and test 
interventions to improve accountability. The findings from this chapter could also be used to adapt 
and contextualize effective policy interventions to overcome complex political economy 
challenges of scaling-up.  
 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides a brief background of the 
education sector in India. In Section 1.3, I present the historical institution of interest – land tenure 
system – and describe why it matters. This section also discusses exogeneity of this main 
explanatory variable. Section 1.4 describes the data and key summary statistics, and Section 1.5 
the empirical strategy. Section 1.6 presents the main empirical results on the landlord effect. In 
Section 1.7, I explore some of the underlying mechanisms explaining the results, and in Section 
1.8, I present results on the private sector’s response. Section 1.9 concludes with a discussion of 
policy implications.  
 
1.2 Education in India 
India has made substantial progress in increasing the access to primary education to its population. 
Through series of reforms starting from the 1990s, net primary school enrollment (grades 1 to 5, 
or ages 6 to 10)5 increased from 92.3 percent in 2013 from 77.1 percent in 1990. Politically, the 
concept of compulsory and free education was largely ignored and even opposed during the 
 
 
5 The school system in India is divided into four levels – lower primary (ages 6 to 10), upper primary (ages 11 and 
12), high (ages 13 to 15) and higher secondary (ages 17 and 18). In most states, these correspond to grades 1st to 5th 
for primary level, 6th, and 7th for upper primary, 8th to 10th for high and 11th and 12th for higher secondary. In some 
states like Gujarat, ages 10 to 12 (grades 5th to 7th) are considered upper primary years. 
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colonial era, although sometimes attempts were made to expand access to education (Mondal, 
2017). Free and compulsory primary education became a reality only in the last two decades. At 
the time of the passage of the of Constitution of India (1950), Article 45 stated, “the state shall 
endeavor to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of this constitution, for 
free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years” (own 
emphasis). It was not until 2002, when the 86th amendment to the Constitution introduced Article 
21(a) which stated that “the State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of 
the age six to fourteen years in such a manner as the State may, by law, determine” (own emphasis). 
Following this amendment and after some delays, a Right to Education (RtE) was enacted at the 
central level in 2006 and it was adopted by all states’ legislatures by 2012. 
 
Since independence from the British in 1947, the Indian government has implemented several 
reforms and undertaken large investments to universalize education. In 1968, the Government of 
India (GoI) announced the first National Policy on Education, which called for a radical 
restructuring of the education sector and proposed equal education opportunities for all population. 
In 1986, a new National Policy on Education called for special emphasis to remove the disparities 
in access especially for scheduled caste (SC) and scheduled tribes (ST) communities, and women.6 
To expand access to education among marginalized populations, in 1994, the District Primary 
Education Project (DPEP) was introduced in 271 of 600 districts with low literacy rates. It created 
160,000 new schools and trained about 1 million teachers (Azam & Saing, 2016; Khanna, 2020). 
In 2003, the GoI launched the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (Education for All, SSA) with the goal of 
achieving universal enrollment through upper primary ages by 2010. SSA was financed by a 
special education tax, equivalent to 2-3 percent of all taxes and increased education funding by 
three-folds (Kingdon, 2007; Muralidharan et al., 2017). The goals were to improve school 
enrollment to reduce out-of-school share of children, fund civil works and additional teachers to 
improve school inputs. On the demand side, the SSA sought to reverse historical caste and gender-
based inequities by including free textbooks and grants for low-caste and female students. Finally, 
 
 
6 Scheduled castes (SC) and scheduled tribes (ST) are among the most disadvantaged groups in India. The terms are 
officially recognized in the Constitution of India, and these groups have far worse social and economic outcomes 




another notable reform is the mid-day meal program. In 2001, the Supreme Court mandated the 
national and state governments to provide mid-day meals with a minimum content of 300 calories 
to every child in government schools and government-assisted schools. Under this program, the 
central government covers the costs of food, transportation, and preparation, while the state 
government is responsible for providing the physical infrastructure for cooking the meals. 
Although there has been documented evidence of corruption, lack of quality and discrimination in 
mid-day meals supply, the program is overall considered successful and reached near universal 
coverage in 2006 (Farzana, 2005; Khera, 2006; PRS, 2013).  
 
These reforms were also accompanied with greater devolution of power and responsibilities to 
local governments. Education policy implementation in India is a complex process with frequent 
decentralization and recentralization of responsibilities between central and state governments, but 
the fundamental role of local governments is undisputed (Dyer, 1994). To promote local 
participation and mobilize and involve people in educational development, the National Policy on 
Education (1986) proposed the formation of “Village Education Committees (VECs)” at the GP 
level (Wankhede & Sengupta, 2005). VECs are headed by GP chairperson and consists of 14 
categories of members, including headmasters, teachers, two women, representatives of SC and 
ST populations, parents, and guardians of children in school. The roles of the VECs as well as the 
GPs have been strengthened through the reforms. The DPEP assigned several functions to the VEC 
including school-community networking and monitoring educational standards at school. 
Similarly, the SSA devolved the responsibility of utilization of funds to VECs and GPs (SSA, 
1999). Finally, the preparation of mid-day meals and its monitoring also lays with the GP. Thus, 
it is evident that local governments in India have a significant role to play in the delivery of 
education services to the population.  
 
1.3 The role of colonial institutions 
In this section, I provide a brief history of the land revenue collection process in India and describe 
the origins and reasons behind prevalence of different types of landlord systems. I also discuss 
why this particular system matters for present day intra-village socio-political dynamics. To 
establish causality between land tenure system and education outcomes, we also need the 
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assignment of land tenure system to be exogenous. In the final part of this section, I argue for the 
exogeneity of land tenure systems based on historical evidence and previous literature.  
1.3.1 Land revenue collection in India 
 
The British came to India in 1613 as the “East India Trading Company.” They started gaining 
political control of India after the battles of Plassey and Buxar in 1757 and 1764 respectively, and 
by 1818 they were a major political power in India. By the year 1860, they had conquered a large 
part of modern-day India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Eastern states such as West Bengal were 
conquered in 1765 while parts of Mughal states like Uttar Pradesh were not conquered until 1856. 
In 1841, land revenue alone accounted for 60 percent of all British revenues, so it is not surprising 
that land revenue collection was a major policy debate for the British empire in India. Banerjee & 
Iyer (2005) describe four reasons for variation in land revenue collection system. First, in areas 
with a pre-existing landlord class, it was easier for the British to install a landlord-based revenue 
collection system. The second reason is the influence of individual administrators who lobbied 
London in favor of either systems. The third reason is the date on conquest, with the argument 
being that starting from 1820 onwards it was easier to put non-landlord systems in place because 
there were existing precedents from India, and because of the general mentality shift after the 
French revolution of the 1820s. Prior to 1820s, the British were more likely to choose landlord 
systems because these were administratively easier to implement. The final reason is a subsequent 
policy reversal in 1857 after the Sepoy Mutiny (a violent uprising against the British empire). 
Consequently, all areas conquered after 1857 were endowed with landlord systems.  
 
Landlord and non-landlord areas differ in how land revenues were collected. In landlord areas, the 
responsibility of collecting rents from individual cultivators was typically assigned to a single 
landlord. The landlord could set revenues and terms for the cultivators and dispossess persons who 
did not pay (Banerjee & Iyer, 2005). In non-landlord areas, land revenues were either collected 
through a village body or directly from individual cultivators. In the village-based systems, village 
bodies had joint ownership of land and joint liability of revenue. Finally, in some other areas, 
revenue collection was done directly from cultivators. In these latter two systems, a land cadastral 
survey was completed in the village to determine land holdings of cultivators. The level of revenue 
was determined based on output, as opposed to landlord villages. In landlord villages the British 
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fixed the rates for the landlord while the landlords were free to set rates on their own. Thus, colonial 
land revenue collection systems created different political structures with different socio-economic 
conditions in Indian villages and districts in the 1800s.  
 
1.3.2 Why should land tenure matter? 
Inequality in the distribution of land ownership has been shown to affect human capital 
accumulation, labor supply and income, political representation, as well as economic inequality 
(Bardhan et al., 2014; Bruhn & Gallego, 2012; Field, 2007; Galor et al., 2009). In the context of 
India, colonial land tenure could matter for education for several reasons. First, landlord systems 
created different hierarchies within villages which makes local organization and collective action 
extremely difficult. As discussed earlier, local participation and coordination are necessary for the 
delivery of public education (and other social services). One of the main responsibilities of local 
governments and communities is to ascertain accountability in policy implementation. In this 
sense, the main challenge that could emerge is that landlord villages is that they are more likely to 
be politically controlled by elites belonging to upper castes who may have little stake in the quality 
of public service delivery in the village (Pandey, 2010). Furthermore, the hierarchies created by 
the landlord systems may also disempower the voices of the marginalized communities in 
improving education quality, and their only viable choice may become exiting the public system 
and seek options in the private sector.  
 
Another reason land tenure may matter is that policy priorities and incentives for reforms in 
landlord areas may be different from those in non-landlord areas. As Banerjee & Iyer (2005) show, 
this is evident from the fact that between independence and present, landlord areas on average 
passed 90 percent more land reforms than non-landlord areas. In addition to education policies, 
GPs are responsible for implementation of dozens of other policies in other sectors. Beyond the 
VECs, GPs also oversee Village Finance Committees, Village Beneficiaries Committees, Village 
Forest Committees, and Village Health Committees, to name a few. Similarly, political leaders 
may also prioritize reforms that benefit them first. For example, in the case of West Bengal, land 
reforms are often explained by electoral competition rather than redistribution (Bardhan et al., 
2014). Finally, the landlord effect could also operate through the creation of inequal societies, 
which makes collective action difficult to achieve (Banerjee & Iyer, 2005). Inequality has been 
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argued as the main channel for the persistence of historical institutions in other contexts as well 
(Easterly, 2007; Engerman & Sokoloff, 1997; Kourtellos et al., 2013). These issues are examined 
empirically in Section 1.7 of the chapter.  
 
1.3.3 Exogeneity of land tenure system 
Following Banerjee & Iyer (2005) and Pandey (2010), I argue for exogeneity of land tenure system 
based on historical evidence. As discussed earlier, non-landlord systems were mostly introduced 
in the span of roughly 35 years between 1820s and 1857 due to political environment. In the case 
of the state of Uttar Pradesh for instance, the first annexation of territory occurred in 1773, when 
the British acquired land from the Nawab of Oudh, and these areas were endowed with landlord 
systems, while non-landlord systems were put in place in areas that were acquired after 1800  
(Pandey, 2010). In another systematic extension started in 1850, and by this time the British 
government had instructed the East India Company to make village bodies control possession of 
land. The year 1857 saw the Sepoy mutiny by the Indian regiment of British army, which was 
followed by widespread civilian rebellion and uprising (Chandra et al., 1988). To prevent future 
uprisings, the British government sought to take control of local aristocracy, and from this time 
subsequently annexed districts were endowed with landlord systems. Since the policy was reversed 
by a one-time exogenous political event, I argue that land tenure can be treated as exogenous. 
Based on this history, Banerjee & Iyer (2005) also use the year of conquest as an instrumental 
variable for landlord status. Since districts and villages were more likely to be endowed as with 
non-landlord systems for pure political regions between the period of 1820 and 1857, a binary 
indicator of conquest within this period is highly negatively correlated with landlord status and 
can be used as an instrument. Nevertheless, due to sample size issues, results from the instrumental 
variables specifications are less precisely estimated, and in this chapter, I focus on the results of 




1.4 Data and summary statistics 
1.4.1 Land tenure data 
The land tenure data used in this chapter comes from Banerjee & Iyer (2005) and is available for 
download from the American Economic Review’s website. Data are available at the district level 
and contain variables on the proportion of landlord areas in each district, the date of British 
conquest of the district. The districts and states are mapped to 1961 census boundaries so all 
analysis in this chapter uses those boundaries. Along with these key variables, the data also 
contains information on geographic characteristics of the districts – altitude, latitude, longitude, 
soil type, indicator for coastal districts and rainfall. Panel A in Table 1.1 below reports the 
summary statistics for these key variables. Landlord districts are on average located at a lower 
altitude (285 meters vs. 419 meters) and have greater rainfall (1,498 mm per year vs. 1,128 mm 
per year). These districts also have greater quality soil as measured by fraction of red soil (0.33 vs. 
0.14). These patterns make landlord districts mode conducive to agriculture. Since these 
geographic factors are relatively time invariant, and these factors favor landlord districts, I can be 
reasonably certain that landlord districts did not start at a disadvantage compared to non-landlord 
districts. In all regression results reported in this chapter, I control of these characteristics. 
 
Panel B of Table 1.1 reports on current socio-economic characteristics of the study villages in 
landlord and non-landlord districts. Typically, landlord areas tend to be bigger in population and 
have greater population density. But as the villages in this study come from a sample consisting of 
villages with less than 10,000 inhabitants in the 2001 census (described in the next sub-section), 
size differences between villages in landlord areas and non-landlord areas are small. The 
population of the average village is about 2,500 and in both types of villages, 27 percent of the 
population belongs to SC and ST categories. Given the size and heterogeneity, issues of political 
participation and representation are likely to be central in all villages. Landlord areas do have a 
smaller fraction of population that belongs to SC communities but have a greater share of ST 
population. On the other hand, the differences in literacy rates, wealth and inequality are quite 
stark. As measured by the 2001 census, literacy rate in landlord villages is 48 percent while it is 
54 percent in non-landlord villages. To measure assets and inequality, I use household survey data. 
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Landlord villages are poorer and have higher levels of inequality than non-landlord villages. These 
results are consistent with those previously reported in the literature (Banerjee & Iyer, 2005).  
 
Table 1.1: Average characteristics of landlord and non-landlord districts and villages 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Landlord villages Non-Landlord 
villages 
Difference 
Panel A: District Characteristics    
Altitude (m) 285.51 419.14 133.63*** 
Latitude 366.41 148.14 93.64*** 
Coastal (1=Yes) 0.19 0.19 0.01 
Annual rainfall (mm) 1,498.19 1,127.78 -370.41*** 
Soil type (1=Black) 0.12 0.24 0.12* 
Soil type (1=Saline and Alkaline) 0.44 0.61 0.17** 
Soil type (1=Red) 0.33 0.14 -0.19*** 
Number of districts 115  
Panel B: Village Characteristics    
Population 2,531.86 2,715.56 183.70 
Fraction SC 0.17 0.20 0.03*** 
Fraction ST 0.10 0.07 -0.03*** 
Fraction Literate 0.48 0.54 0.06*** 
Households assets index -0.57 0.17 0.73*** 
Gini coefficient on wealth 0.27 0.24 -0.04*** 
Number of villages 976  
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%  
 
1.4.2 Education data 
The education data used in this chapter were collected as a follow-up work to the 2003 World 
Development Report, which reported teacher absence rates across 17 countries, including India. 
In the original surveys fielded in India in 2002-2003, a nationally representative sample of nearly 
2,000 villages and cities (sampling units, with up to three randomly sampled schools per unit) were 
visited to collect detailed data on schools and teacher characteristics, key inputs and teachers’ 
absence (Chaudhury et al., 2006; Kremer et al., 2010). Absence was measured with spot 
verification over three unannounced visits. For each school, a school survey was implemented with 
the headmaster to collect information on school resources, student enrollment, monitoring and 
accountability indicators, etc. An individual survey was administered to each teacher to collect 




The focus of the 2010 study was on rural India, and we revisited a nationally representative sample 
1,650 rural villages. Of these, 1,300 villages were from the original 2002-2003 study. This time, 
instead of sampling up to three schools randomly for further data collection, we first conducted a 
short census of all public and private schools operating in the village. This census collected basic 
data on school enrollment, inputs, and teachers. Importantly, this census provides data on the 
number and enrollment shares of private schools in study villages. From there, we randomly 
sampled up to two public and one private school per village for further investigation. Each school 
was revisited three more times to collect data on teacher absence, and in these visits a detailed 
school survey and teacher surveys were also administered.7 In the detailed surveys of schools, data 
was collected on infrastructure, frequency of monitoring by district education offices, parents-
teachers associations, etc. Teacher surveys collected information on teachers’ education, 
socioeconomic background, salaries, etc. Finally, mathematics and languages tests were 
administered to fourth grade students in all sampled schools. The two tests contained 42 and 35 
items respectively and were designed to allow for benchmarking with Trends in International 
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and Progress in International Reading Literacy Study 
(PIRLS). Tests were scored using Item Response Theory (Hambleton et al., 1991). 
 
In contrast to the 2003 study, the 2010 study also expanded data collection to include households’ 
surveys, and surveys of GPs’ and VECs’ leaders. In each village, we sampled 15 households 
randomly and administered a brief survey. Households were asked to list all school-age children 
and if and where they went to school, and households’ ratings of the schools. They were also asked 
about their involvement in GPs and VECs, as well as their perspectives on the effectiveness of the 
functioning of these institutions in their villages. Finally, they were also asked about their 
socioeconomic characteristics which allows me to construct village level wealth and inequalities 
measures. Similarly, GP surveys enumerated local governments’ involvement and perspectives in 
education. Since VECs are headed by GP leaders, the VEC surveys were administered to the 
headmasters, who also serve on the VEC. 
 
 





Combining the two data sets on land tenure and education, the final sample used in this analysis 
represents 976 villages from 186 districts in 17 states (2001 census). These correspond to 115 
districts from 13 states in 1961 census. Further details of data collection and construction is 
available in Muralidharan et al. (2017). Clearly, the 2010 data contains a lot more details than the 
2003 data. For this reason, most of the chapter below focuses on the 2010 data, and I also report 
results for 2003 data where available. This serves two purposes – first, although the time difference 
is only seven years, it allows me to comment on the continued persistence of the landlord effect. 
Second, it allows me to examine if the SSA, which was implemented from 2003 onwards, was 
successful in closing gaps between underserved and developed areas.  
 
1.5 Empirical strategy and regression specifications 
Our main question is if the colonial land tenure system has a continued persistent impact on current 
outcomes and I examine this in a regression framework with the proportion of landlord area in a 
district as the key explanatory variable. This empirical strategy employed in this chapter relies on 
the exogeneity of the land tenure variable. If exogeneity holds, in a linear regression with land 
tenure system as the independent variable, the regression coefficient on land tenure is identified. 
As discussed earlier, exogeneity of this variable is already argued for in the literature. 
Nevertheless, since there are substantial differences between landlord and non-landlord areas (with 
landlord areas being better) in terms of climate and geography, I control for these in all regressions. 
In addition to climate and geography controls, I also add GP level controls for log of population, 
fraction of population that belongs to SC caste, fraction of population that belongs to ST case, and 
the fraction of population that is literate. Thus, the coefficient on the landlord variable captures 
differences among villages that are similar along these geographical and GP characteristics.  
 
The regression specification I use is: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑖 + 𝑋𝑗𝜃1 + 𝑍𝑖𝑗𝛿1 + 𝜆 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is the outcome of interest in village 𝑗 in district 𝑖. 𝐿𝑖 is the proportion of non-landlord 
area in district 𝑖. 𝑋𝑗 is a vector of district controls, 𝑍𝑖𝑗 is a vector of village controls, and 𝜆 
represents state fixed effects. 𝛽1 is the coefficient of interest and represents the “landlord effect”. 
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Where the data are available, I estimate these regressions separately for the year 2003. All analysis 
is done at the village level, i.e., education data were collapsed at the village level. 
 
I report results with and without the inclusion of GP controls and state fixed effects. On one hand, 
the inclusion of state fixed effects is important because much of education policy decisions lay 
with the state and there may be systematic policy differences that may drive some of the impacts. 
On the other hand, as discussed earlier, education policy in India has seen a certain level of 
recentralization with the central government taking over a greater level of control on education 
policy in recent years. One problem with inclusion of state fixed effects is that due to limited 
variation in the landlord variable at the state level, the sample size is greatly reduced (which 
reduces statistical power). In the states of Bihar, Jharkhand, Rajasthan and West Bengal, all 
villages belong to landlord districts. In the states of Gujarat and Karnataka, all villages are non-
landlord areas. This effectively drops 303 of the 976 villages from analysis. This should be kept 
in mind when interpreting results with state fixed effects.  
 
1.6 Main results 
1.6.1 Student outcomes 
As described earlier, student outcomes were measured by comprehensive mathematics and 
language tests that were scored using Item Response Theory which produces a standardized score 
representing the underlying ability of test takers. Figure 1.1 graphically shows the relationship 
between the combined score of mathematics and languages tests on the y-axis and on the main 
variable of interest – proportion of landlord areas – on the x-axis. The pattern is stark – areas with 
landlord systems have substantially lower student outcomes (as measured by test scores) than areas 
with non-landlord systems. Table 1.2 then reports regression results of the average difference in 
student outcomes in landlord and non-landlord areas. Including all district controls described 
earlier, landlord villages score 0.39 standard deviations lower on average than non-landlord 
villages. The difference is 0.34 standard deviations in mathematics tests and 0.40 standard 
deviations in language tests (both results are significant at the 5 percent level, Column 2). Column 
3 then adds village level controls in addition to district level controls. Controlling for village 
characteristics reduces the differences somewhat, but the effects are still large and statistically 
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significant – 0.31 standard deviation on average. Finally, column 5 reports results including state 
fixed effects. Recall that adding state fixed effects has the implication that data from only those 
states that have variation in landlord status within states are included in the regression. Although 
this drastically reduces the sample size, the landlord effect is comparable and is 0.35 standard 
deviations on average.  
Figure 1.1: Student outcomes in landlord and non-landlord areas 
 
 
Table 1.2: Average difference in education outcomes in landlord and non-landlord villages, 
public schools 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Mean Coefficient on proportion landlord 






+ State FE 
Standardized score -0.12 -0.39** -0.31** -0.35** 
  (0.17) (0.15) (0.18) 
Math standardized score -0.12 -0.34** -0.29* -0.35** 
  (0.16) (0.15) (0.17) 
Language standardized score -0.11 -0.40** -0.29* -0.31* 
  (0.18) (0.15) (0.17) 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level are in parenthesis. All regressions include district 
level controls for altitude, coastal district, climate and soil type. GP controls add village level controls for log 
population, percentage SC population, percentage ST population, and literacy rate. *** Significant at 1%, ** 




To put these results in perspective, consider that an average student gains between 0.15 to 0.21 
standard deviations in learning for each business-as-usual school year (Evans & Yuan, 2019). That 
is, if the students were given the same test every year, one should expect to find average increases 
in this range. Using the upper bound of 0.21 standard deviations, this would imply that fourth grade 
students in landlord villages are almost 1.5 years behind in learning than their counterparts in non-
landlord villages. The effect is also larger than the impacts of successful randomized policy 
interventions evaluated in controlled settings. In Duflo, et al. (2012), camera based monitoring of 
teachers and financial incentives for a full year increased test scores by 0.17 standard deviations. 
In Muralidharan & Sundararaman (2011), performance pay intervention where teachers received 
an annual bonus of 3 percent of pay increased mathematics and language test scores by 0.28 and 
0.16 standard deviations, respectively (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011). Hypothetically 
speaking, in comparison to these interventions, moving the average fourth grader (or their family) 
from a village that had a landlord system historically to a village with non-landlord system would 
have a higher impact on learning outcomes.  
 
1.6.2 Education inputs 
Given the large differences in test scores documented above, the natural question to ask is if these 
are driven by differences in school inputs. I report results for school inputs for years 2003 and 
2010 in Table 1.3. Panel A reports results on teacher qualifications as measured by fraction of 
teachers with bachelors’ degrees and with teacher training training, teacher experience (proxied 
by age), salaries and absence rates. Between 2003 and 2010 there has been a substantial increase 
in the fraction of teachers with college degrees – from 40 percent to 59 percent. In fact, results 
show that landlord areas in 2003 had 12.9 to 14.1 percentage points more teachers than non-
landlord areas, and this gap was closed by 2010. This is in line with the objectives of the SSA 
which undertook massive investments to improve teacher quantity and quality. On the other hand, 
landlord areas have fewer teachers with teacher training in both years, and the effect is statistically 
significant for 2010 even after controlling for state fixed effects. The lower rate of teacher training 
in landlord villages is partly explained by greater use of contract teachers in landlord areas. 
Contract teachers are hired at the school level by VECs and they typically have high school or 
college degrees, but no formal teacher training. Unlike regular teachers who have permanent 
contracts, the contracts of these teachers are renewable annually and they are paid less than one-
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fifth of the annual salaries of that of regular teachers. Contract teachers have been shown to more, 
if not equally, effective as regular teachers. They are less likely to be absent, exert greater effort 
in teaching, and generate better learning outcomes (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2013). In 
2010, schools in landlord areas were 60-70 percent more likely to have contract teachers, although 
most of this variation comes from across states than within states.  
 
Table 1.3: Average difference in teacher and school inputs in landlord and non-landlord villages, 
public schools 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Mean Year 2010, coefficient on proportion 
landlord 
Mean Year 2003, Coefficient on proportion 
landlord 
















Panel A: Teacher inputs         
Have college degree (%) 59.38 2.20 2.43 -6.69** 39.98 14.11*** 12.90*** 2.83 
  (4.56) (4.60) (3.35)  (4.31) (4.32) (4.42) 
Have teacher training (%) 72.40 -23.51*** -22.01*** -9.31** 78.97 -9.47* -10.88** -1.06 
  (3.91) (3.97) (4.14)  (5.66) (5.11) (5.35) 
Average age (years) 39.58 -0.06 0.41 -0.41 39.60 0.23 0.87 -2.29* 
  (0.87) (0.84) (0.88)  (1.14) (1.12) (1.18) 
Are contract teachers (%) 27.33 20.33*** 18.39*** 4.97 4.93 2.76 1.57 7.48*** 
  (5.35) (5.20) (3.32)  (2.17) (2.17) (2.52) 
Are native to the village (%) 18.11 3.98 3.00 5.11 20.21 1.45 4.07 1.74 
  (2.79) (2.58) (3.19)  (3.66) (3.42) (4.53) 
Log of monthly salary 12,888.63 -1,547.9* -1,127.9 -323.9 - - - - 
  (828.0) (777.5) (858.0)     
Absence rate (%) 20.69 5.22** 4.04* 6.35* 26.59 5.06** 4.11 0.59 
  (2.27) (2.36) (3.24)  (2.48) (2.52) (2.83) 
Actively teaching (%) 58.77 -5.18 -3.31 -5.70 47.02 -9.42* -8.74* -0.76 
  (3.28) (3.23) (4.63)  (5.05) (4.95) (4.45) 
Panel B: School inputs         
Log of pupil-teacher ratio 3.44 0.33*** 0.28*** 0.12* 3.59 0.31*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)  (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Infrastructure index 3.62 -0.88*** -0.72*** 0.05 2.25 -0.75*** -0.65*** -0.01 
  (0.19) (0.17) (0.16)  (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) 
Has toilets 0.87 -0.08 -0.07 0.02 0.42 -0.07 -0.05 -0.01 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Has electricity 0.75 -0.20*** -0.15*** -0.06 0.54 -0.26*** -0.25*** -0.12 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Has a library 0.51 -0.30*** -0.26*** 0.03 0.15 -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.03 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Mid-day meals 0.82 0.03 0.04 -0.07 0.19 0.03 0.03 -0.08 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)  (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) 
Panel C: Student inputs         
Student attendance 69.32 -10.07*** -7.18** -2.10 - - - - 
  (3.77) (3.44) (4.02)     
Takes private tuitions 21.10 11.20*** 13.56*** 9.59*** - - - - 
  (3.73) (3.77) (2.95)     
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level are in parenthesis. All regressions include district level controls for altitude, 
coastal district, climate and soil type. GP controls add village level controls for log population, percentage SC population, percentage ST 




In terms of teacher effort and accountability, I find that teachers in landlord areas are 19.5 to 30.7 
percent more absent. The average absence rate in my sample is 20.7 percent. Assuming a 200 days’ 
school year, teachers in landlord areas are 8 to 12 days more absent than those in non-landlord 
areas. The effects are statistically significant in all specifications for the year 2010. Similarly, the 
percentage of teacher actively teaching, defined as present at the time of spot verification and 
actively engaged with students is also lower in landlord areas, although the differences are not 
statistically significant. Finally, there are no statistically significant differences in salaries earned 
by teachers in landlord and non-landlord areas, although the coefficient on landlord variable is 
negative. Taken together, I conclude that teacher inputs are substantially lower in landlord villages 
than non-landlord villages. Furthermore, if contract teachers are indeed more effective in general, 
and landlord villages are more likely to have contract teachers, we would expect students in 
landlord villages to perform better in standardized tests. But this is not what I find suggesting that 
there may be systematic differences in the productivity of inputs between these two types of 
villages.  
 
Another key input for student learning is the ratio of pupils per teacher (PTR). First note that during 
the implementation period of the SSA, PTR declined only modestly. Although there have been 
large increases in number of teachers in this period, net primary school enrollment also increased 
from 84 percent in 2002 to 91 percent in 2010 which may explain the lack of improvement in 
PTRs. I find that landlord villages had PTRs that were 22 to 31 percent higher than non-landlord 
villages in 2003 and these differences persisted through 2010 (Table 1.3, Panel B). The effects are 
statistically significant and robust to inclusion of controls and state fixed effects. In terms of school 
infrastructure, landlord villages have substantially lower infrastructure in both 2003 and 2010, 
although the effects become statistically insignificant once across state heterogeneity is controlled 
for. Finally, I find no differences in the likelihood of villages offering mid-day meals. Between 
2003 and 2010, the proportion of villages offering mid-day meals increased from 19 percent to 82 
percent, confirming the findings from previous research (Khera, 2006). 
 
Panel C of Table 1.3 reports on student inputs. Student effort, as measured by attendance rate of 
fourth graders, is also lower in landlord areas. It is worth noting that average student attendance in 
the sample is only 69 percent, which it itself alarming. The landlord effect is large and significant 
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(between 10.3 and 14.5 percent) but is substantially reduced and becomes insignificant when state 
fixed effects are added (3.0 percent). Public school students in landlord areas are also significantly 
more likely to take private tuitions outside of school. Overall 21.1 percent of students said that 
they take private tuitions, and in landlord areas, students are 9.6 to 13.6 percentage points more 
likely to take private tuitions.   
 
Considering the stated goals of the SSA was to achieve universal enrollment and close the gaps in 
access, through the provisioning of budget for strengthening vital areas of education provision, 
these patterns evidence to muted impacts of the SSA. In Appendix Table 1.10, I examine the 
differences in the flow of SSA funding to landlord and non-landlord areas. Results suggest that 
SSA was successful at directing more funding to historically worse performing landlord areas. The 
average allocation in 2010 as reported by VECs was Rs.59,323, and landlord areas received nearly 
1.5 more funds than non-landlord areas. The effects are statistically significant in regression 
including district and village controls (Columns 2 and 3). Although adding state fixed effects 
reduces statistical precision, the coefficient is similar in magnitude to the ones estimated without 
state fixed effects. Similarly, the effect on per-pupil SSA allocation is in the range of 24 to 35 
percent, but the results are not statistically significant. These patterns again suggest that the reason 
for lack of improvement may not be the availability of funding or inputs but the ability of villages 
to productively utilize these inputs. That is, landlord areas may be less capable in effectively and 
efficiently executing resources. It is also possible that landlord villages are investing in less 
productive inputs than non-landlord areas. Unfortunately, disaggregated funding data for each 
input is not available, although I do find that landlord areas tend to invest more in construction 
projects than filling teacher vacancies (Appendix Table 1.10).  
 
1.6.3 Monitoring and governance 
The empowerment and participation of local communities in local policy decision making and 
implementation has been a central policy agenda since at least 1959 when the three-tier system of 
Panchayati Raj (district, block, and village level) came into effect in the state of Rajasthan. The 
modern Panchayati Raj system was introduced in India in 1993 through the 73rd constitutional 
amendment. And throughout the post-independence period, as described earlier, education policy 
has sought to empower and leverage local governments for implementation. These public 
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institutions are responsible for the formation and operation of VECs and PTAs, which in turn have 
prominent roles in school management.  
 
The first variable of interest in this system of local governance is top-down monitoring from the 
district and block level. Frequent monitoring of schools has been shown to be robustly correlated 
with lower teacher absence. Using panel data and a series of specifications, Muralidharan et al. 
(2017) finds that regular (three-monthly) monitoring of schools is correlated with 27 to 35 percent 
reduction in teacher absence. In the across state results, I find that schools in landlord areas are 
inspected 11.4 to 13.1 percent less often than landlord areas (Table 1.4). Adding state fixed effects 
reverses the sign of the coefficient on landlord status but the effect is statistically insignificant.  
Noting that 19 percent of all positions are vacant in district education offices, Muralidharan et al. 
(2017) speculate that one reason for variation in top-down monitoring is the availability of 
inspectors. While I do not have vacancy data for inspectors’ positions, the results obtained for 
teachers’ vacancies are consistent with this explanation. Areas that suffer from weak governance 
and accountability are also likely to be areas that have harder time filling positions. In addition, 
since the responsibility because filling vacancies at the district level is the responsibility of state 
governments, it also makes sense that the effects are only significant in regressions without state 





Table 1.4: Average difference in governance and monitoring indicators in landlord and non-
landlord villages, public schools 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Mean Year 2010, 
coefficient on 
proportion landlord 
Mean Year 2003, 
Coefficient on 
proportion landlord 


















School was inspected in last 
3 months 
0.61 -0.08** -0.07* 0.06 0.43 -0.08 -0.08 0.06 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
PTA exists 0.74 -0.06 -0.03 0.08* 0.69 -0.34*** -0.32*** -0.07 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
PTA met in last 3 months 0.48 0.02 0.03 0.13** 0.34 -0.15** -0.12** -0.05 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) 
Village has an education 
committee (VEC) 
0.88 -0.11** -0.09* -0.01 - - - - 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)     
Number of VEC meetings in 
past 1 year 
5.15 -0.21 0.15 0.83 - - - - 
  (0.75) (0.69) (0.76)     
Frequency of DEO office 
visits 
0.57 -0.07 -0.06 0.02 - - - - 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)     
Number of times audited in 
last 1 year 
1.16 -0.02 -0.06 -0.15 - - - - 
  (0.18) (0.16) (0.13)     
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level are in parenthesis. All regressions include district level controls 
for altitude, coastal district, climate and soil type. GP controls add village level controls for log population, percentage SC 
population, percentage ST population, and literacy rate. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
 
The responsibility of bottom-up monitoring lays with PTAs and VECs. In 2003, landlord villages 
were nearly half as likely as non-landlord villages to have PTAs. This gap closed nearly fully 
between 2003 and 2010. In 2010, the landlord effect is small and negative, but is statistically not 
significant. Similarly, gaps in frequency of PTA meetings also closed between 2003 and 2010. 
Data on VEC existence and meeting frequency is only available for 2010. In landlord areas, VECs 
exist in 12 percent fewer villages, and the effect is statistically significant in regressions without 
state fixed effects. The frequency of VEC meetings is similar in landlord and non-landlord areas. 
Similarly, landlord areas are no less likely to be visited by district education offices for auditing 




1.6.4 The education production function 
The earlier results show that school inputs and outputs are lower in landlord villages. In this 
section, I examine if the ability to convert inputs to outputs also differs by landlord status. To do 
this, the idea is to estimate a simple education production function. Evidence from previous studies 
estimating the impact of school inputs on outcomes have found mixed impacts, with some studies 
finding robust relationships between inputs and outputs and others not (Hanushek, 2003). In more 
carefully conducted evaluations, lower pupil-teacher ratios, better school infrastructure, and 
technology have shown to causally improve student learning (Angrist & Lavy, 1999; Barrett et al., 
2019; Krueger, 1999). This had led researchers to argue that the lack of robust effects more likely 
reflects inefficiencies in education production, rather than misspecification of the production 
function itself (Hanushek, 2008). In this sense, a failure to find correlations between inputs and 
outputs would signal the inability of school administrators and management to convert inputs into 
outputs.  
 
Figure 1.2: Components of the education production function in landlord and non-landlord areas 
 
Figure 1.2 plots key inputs on the horizontal axis and standardized test scores on the vertical axis 
separately for landlord and non-landlord areas. The relationship between teacher quality (as 
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measured by fraction of teachers with college degree) and students’ test scores are similar in 
landlord and non-landlord areas. In contrast, student performance declines significantly over the 
PTR distribution for non-landlord areas, while the relationship in landlord areas is flat. That is, 
lower PTR seems to have a positive effect on test scores in landlord areas, but not in landlord areas. 
Similarly, school infrastructure and student attendance are positively correlated with student 
performance in non-landlord areas but not in non-landlord areas. These patterns indeed support 
the hypothesis that landlord areas may be inefficient in converting inputs into outputs.  
 
Table 1.5: Correlates of student outcomes in landlord and non-landlord villages 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Non-landlord villages  Landlord villages  
Teachers with college degrees (%) 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Teachers with teacher training (%) 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.005** 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Absence rate of teachers (%) -0.008** -0.007** -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Log of pupil-teacher ratios -0.234** -0.230** -0.094 0.076 0.129 0.109 
 (0.105) (0.108) (0.095) (0.127) (0.135) (0.145) 
School infrastructure index 0.290*** 0.285*** -0.000 0.045 0.022 0.024 
 (0.058) (0.061) (0.063) (0.051) (0.050) (0.047) 
School inspected in past 3 months 0.080 0.091 0.148 0.254 0.283 0.352* 
 (0.183) (0.184) (0.149) (0.193) (0.190) (0.200) 
Number of PTA meetings in past 3 
months 
-0.022 -0.029 -0.123 -0.186 -0.182 -0.167 
 (0.109) (0.107) (0.112) (0.117) (0.121) (0.121) 
Village has an education committee 
(VEC) 
-0.033 -0.066 0.238 0.086 0.024 0.012 
 (0.145) (0.142) (0.153) (0.159) (0.169) (0.189) 
Number of VEC meetings in past 1 
year 
0.012 0.014 -0.009 0.016 0.012 -0.002 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) 
Student attendance rate (%) 0.005** 0.005** 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
R-squared 0.251 0.263 0.479 0.035 0.055 0.089 
Number of observations 462 462 462 243 243 243 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level are in parenthesis. All regressions include district level controls for altitude, 
coastal district, climate and soil type. GP controls add village level controls for log population, percentage SC population, percentage ST 




Table 1.5 separately reports correlations between student outcomes and school inputs in a 
multivariate regression framework for landlord and non-landlord villages. In non-landlord 
villages, the share of teachers with teacher training, school infrastructure and student attendance 
are robustly correlated with learning outcomes (Columns 1 to 3). Similarly, outcomes are also 
correlated with lower absence rates of teachers and PTR. The coefficient on school inspections is 
positive but fails short of statistical significance. In contrast, there are no statistically significant 
relationships between these inputs and outcomes in landlord areas (Columns 4 to 6). The estimated 
coefficients and standard errors on teacher training, infrastructure, teacher absence, student 
attendance, and PTRs are small, suggesting that these inputs are indeed uncorrelated with 
outcomes. Notice that the coefficient on school inspections and existence of VEC is sharply 
increased, suggesting that monitoring may have a relatively larger effect on learning in landlord 
areas, although these effects are not statistically significant. Although I find significant differences 
in school inputs between landlord and non-landlord areas, these patterns strongly suggest that the 
culprit behind poor performance in landlord areas is not the lack of inputs, but rather the ability to 
convert these inputs into outcomes. Why this is so is the subject of the next section.   
 
1.7 Mechanisms  
In this section, I examine accountability and political representation, elite participation in public 
education, and inequality as possible mechanisms through which the landlord effect may be 
operating. These channels have been found to be salient in different contexts in the literature on 
impacts of historical institutions. Our VEC leader (school headmaster) and GP leader surveys 
asked respondents to rate the roles and effectiveness of the VECs along seven dimensions – 
identifying and addressing the needs of schools, use of education funds and construction 
management, promotion of student enrollment, students’ monitoring and retention, teacher hiring, 
teacher monitoring, and mid-day meals implementation. On each dimension, respondents were 
asked to report VEC’s effectiveness on a 1 to 5 Likert scale. From this measure, I construct an 
index of VEC effectiveness by averaging the responses to the individual items. Table 1.6 reports 
the regression results examining differences in VEC effectiveness in landlord and non-landlord 
villages. In the regressions without state fixed effects leaders rated VEC effectiveness 16 to 17 




Table 1.6: Possible mechanisms of landlord effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Mean Year 2010, coefficient on proportion 
landlord 









VEC effectiveness index 3.68 -0.62*** -0.59** 0.36 
  (0.24) (0.23) (0.25) 
VEC members with 10th grade or more (%) 58.25 3.70 4.96 -1.47 
  (5.67) (5.05) (3.97) 
VEC members from SC/ST castes (%) 27.64 -5.96* -5.31* -1.11 
  (3.60) (2.85) (3.47) 
SC/ST represented in GP leadership 0.52 -0.05 -0.01 -0.13** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
GP leaders' children go to public schools 0.55 0.09 0.06 0.13 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
SC/ST enrollment share as a fraction of population share 2.78 1.27 0.73 0.63 
  (0.85) (0.75) (1.20) 
Gini coefficient 0.25 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level are in parenthesis. All regressions include district 
level controls for altitude, coastal district, climate and soil type. GP controls add village level controls for log 
population, percentage SC population, percentage ST population, and literacy rate. *** Significant at 1%, ** 
Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
 
In Appendix Table 1.11, I report the effects on each individual dimension as well as responses 
from both school headmasters and GP leaders. The dimensions where the landlord impact is 
highest are identifying and addressing the needs of schools, promotion of students’ enrollment, 
and students’ and teachers monitoring. Interestingly, although there are no differences in overall 
average scores as reported by headmasters and GP leaders, the landlord effect is bigger in the 
responses provided by headmasters. Considering that the VEC is headed by the chairperson of the 
GP, these results suggest that GP leaders in landlord villages may be overstating the effectiveness 
of VECs. In any case, VEC effectiveness is lower in landlord villages, which suggests that 
accountability may be an important channel of impact. 
 
Poor accountability could also be a result of the lack of political representation. SC and ST 
population also tend to be underrepresented in VECs. Recall that in both landlord and non-landlord 
villages the percentage of population belonging to SC or ST communities was 27 percent. 
Although the average share of SC/ST members in VECs is similar in population share (27.6 
percent), landlord villages have significantly lower representation of SC/ST communities in VECs. 
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Likewise, compared to non-landlord villages, SC/ST populations are also less likely to be 
represented in GP leadership. In contrast, the lack of elite interest does not seem be a driving factor. 
To check for this, I examine if SC/ST population is more likely to be enrolled in public schools in 
landlord villages and if GP leaders’ children attend private schools. Although SC/ST population 
is 2.8 times overrepresented in public education relative to their population share, the landlord 
effect is statistically insignificant. In the study sample, 55 percent of GP leaders’ (chairperson, 
vice-chairperson, and secretary) children go to public schools, and there are no statistically 
significant differences between landlord and non-landlord areas. Table 1.6 also reports the landlord 
effect on village level inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient of household wealth within 
villages. I find that there are no systematic differences in inequality levels between landlord and 
non-landlord villages, suggesting that inequality is not the relevant channel of impact.     
 
Finally, in landlord villages, households are also less likely to be aware about the existence of 
VECs and they are less likely to have taken up matters with VEC (Appendix Table 1.12). Our 
surveys also asked households about their ratings of public sector performance and priorities for 
education. Table 1.12 also shows that households’ rate public schools’ quality to be lower in 
landlord villages. This is not because households’ priorities for education in landlord villages are 
different. They are more likely to report that quantity and quality of teachers and school 
infrastructure as priorities. The landlord effect is also present in households’ rating of GP’s 
competence and GP’s commitment to education. In landlord villages, households view GPs as less 
competent and less committed to education. Overall, these results suggest that the key drivers of 
the landlord effect on education outcomes may be the lack of accountability and political 
representation, rather than elite interest and inequality.   
 
1.8 Private sector response 
In this section, I investigate the private sector response to the patterns described above, focusing 
on differences between landlord and non-landlord areas. The rise of private schools in primary 
education in India is well documented (Kingdon, 2007). One branch of research has established 
that private school prevalence is higher in areas with poor public schools’ performance suggesting 
that private and public schools are substitutes (Kingdon, 2020; Kremer & Muralidharan, 2008). 
Another branch of research examines the supply of private schools and finds that the private 
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schooling phenomenon complements expansions of public schooling, in part because increased 
education creates a greater pool of potential teacher candidates at the local level (Khanna, 2020). 
Results from my analysis are more nuanced and show that private schools may be operating as 
complements to public schooling and competing with public schools in well performing non-
landlord areas. In landlord areas, where public school performance is dismal, they appear to be 
operating as substitutes and easily getting higher market shares.  
 
1.8.1 Availability of private schools 
Just over one-third of the village in the sample has a private school within the village and the 
average number of private schools is 0.6 (Table 1.7). Conditional on having a private school, 
villages have 1.7 private schools on average. In terms of private school availability, the estimated 
coefficients on the landlord variable are sizeable (8-10 percentage points, 23-29 percent), but not 
statistically significant. In my sample, private school enrollment share as measured by data from 
the census of schools sampled villages is 17.6 percent which is lower than national estimates of 
35.2 percent reported by Kingdon (2020). There are two main reasons for these differences. First, 
the national estimates includes both urban and rural areas, and private schooling is more prevalent 
in urban areas. The villages in my data are in fact are sampled from the lower side of the population 
size distribution of villages, which may explain the difference. Second, the school census data only 
capture relative shares from the pool of students that go to school within village boundaries and 
fail to capture school choice of students that may be traveling outside the villages for schooling. 
Indeed, villages in India are well connected with urban highway clusters and small towns, and a 
substantial portion of the population travels outside to obtain better quality social services (Das et 





Table 1.7: Private schools' availability in landlord and non-landlord villages 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Mean Year 2010, coefficient on proportion 
landlord 






+ State FE 
Has a private school inside village 0.34 0.08 0.10 0.01 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Number of private schools inside village 0.58 0.16 0.20 -0.04 
  (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
Private schools' enrolment share inside village (%) 17.63 0.39 1.03 -0.75 
  (4.26) (4.44) (4.29) 
Private schools' enrolment share (%) 24.09 -5.78 -5.06 0.94 
  (3.63) (3.75) (3.97) 
Share of enrollment within village 67.81 3.51 2.74 -2.32 
  (3.19) (3.19) (3.82) 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level are in parenthesis. All regressions include district level controls for altitude, 
coastal district, climate and soil type. GP controls add village level controls for log population, percentage SC population, percentage ST 
population, and literacy rate. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
 
Fortunately, the household survey asked parents to schooling choices all children inside and 
outside the villages, and 32.2 percent of primary grade children are enrolled in schools outside 
village boundaries. Note that this is not because of the lack of availability of primary schools. All 
villages in my sample have at least one school (public or private) and only 19 villages do not have 
a public school. Thus, enrollment of children outside village more likely reflects parents’ 
preferences for education rather than supply constraints. The share of private enrollment calculated 
from household surveys is 24.1 percent which is much higher than the within village share 
calculated from school census and closer to the national estimate. Nevertheless, I do not find 
evidence for higher private enrollment share in landlord areas. The coefficient on landlord variable 
is negative but is not statistically significant. Since private school enrollment also depends on 
households’ ability and willingness to pay, and because landlord villages are substantially poorer 
than non-landlord villages, it is possible that enrollment share is lower because there are fewer 
people who are willing to pay in landlord areas. The next sub-section examines in greater detail 




1.8.2 Placement decisions of private schools  
I begin by visualizing the predictors of private school presence in Indian villages in Figure 1.3. 
The likelihood of having a private school is correlated with increased PTRs – at the lower end of 
the public PTR distribution, there are 0.2 private schools on average and at the higher end there 
are 1.2 private schools. Similarly, at the lower end of the public schools’ test scores distribution 
there are 1.2 private schools, and this number falls to nearly zero at the higher end. These patterns 
are consistent with the notion that the rise of private schooling is response to poor public sector 
performance. In contrast, public school infrastructure is positively correlated with number of 
private schools which is consistent with competition. Finally, private schools’ prevalence is 
positively correlated with village wealth, which makes sense as profit-maximizing private schools 
are more likely to enter areas where people would have the ability and willingness to pay. 
 
Figure 1.3: Correlates of private schools’ prevalence 
 
 
Table 1.8 then presents results from regressions of private schools’ availability and market shares 
in landlord and non-landlord areas. As expected, in both landlord and non-landlord villages private 
schools’ availability is correlated with village population and wealth, underscoring the importance 
of a sizeable population with willingness to pay as important factors for entry decision. Similarly, 
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private schools’ enrollment share is also positively correlated with village population and wealth, 
which is consistent with entry decision. That is, private schools can command greater market share 
in areas with willingness to pay.  
 
Table 1.8: Correlates of private school availability and enrolment shares in landlord and non-
landlord villages 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Outcome variable: 
Village has a private school (1=yes) 
Outcome variable: 




Landlord villages Non-landlord 
villages 
Landlord villages 
Number of public schools 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -2.48 -2.14 -2.51** -2.58** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (1.53) (1.56) (1.28) (1.17) 
Log of PTR in public schools 0.19** 0.05 0.02 -0.02 2.65 -1.86 -3.97* -2.86 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (2.89) (3.32) (2.20) (2.55) 
Infrastructure index of public 
schools 
-0.10** -0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -1.73 0.47 0.33 -0.33 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (1.51) (1.48) (0.94) (0.95) 
Test scores in public schools -0.14*** -0.11** 0.02 0.03 -3.00** -3.35** -2.77** -3.03** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (1.45) (1.58) (1.30) (1.41) 
Village households' assets 0.28*** 0.24** 0.35*** 0.38*** 4.85** 2.74 6.31** 6.70** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.14) (2.28) (1.97) (2.55) (2.64) 
Gini coefficient on village wealth 0.21 -0.09 1.44** 1.06* -4.93 -10.91 40.22*** 31.14** 
 (0.52) (0.54) (0.63) (0.56) (18.09) (19.74) (14.96) (14.99) 
Village population (thousands) 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.14** 0.16*** 4.05*** 3.72*** 2.00** 2.12** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.64) (0.61) (0.97) (0.87) 
SC population (%) 0.20 0.05 -0.12 -0.12 3.31 -2.91 -1.79 -1.63 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.27) (0.28) (8.63) (9.40) (6.07) (6.55) 
ST population (%) -0.10 0.37* -0.05 0.05 -7.11 8.98** -3.75 -3.71 
 (0.20) (0.22) (0.18) (0.20) (5.93) (4.23) (4.52) (4.90) 
Literacy rate (%) 0.36 0.76 -0.45 -0.11 10.28 25.58** -16.90 -14.78 
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.54) (0.53) (11.99) (11.77) (12.63) (12.00) 
R-squared 0.363 0.425 0.173 0.205 0.227 0.326 0.173 0.216 
Number of observations 490 490 265 265 489 489 265 265 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level are in parenthesis. All regressions include district level controls 
for altitude, coastal district, climate and soil type. GP controls add village level controls for log population, percentage SC 
population, percentage ST population, and literacy rate. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
 
 
On the other hand, landlord and non-landlord villages differ substantially in how private school 
availability relates to the quality of public schools. In non-landlord villages, the availability of 
private schools is strongly correlated with higher PTR, poorer school infrastructure and lower test 
scores (although the coefficient on PTR and infrastructure is not statistically significant after 
controlling for across state variation, Columns 1 to 4). In contrast, private school availability 
appears to be uncorrelated with public school quality in landlord villages. Instead, the most robust 
correlation is with the Gini-index of village wealth. Moving from full equality (a Gini value to 0) 
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to full inequality (a Gini value of 1), is correlated with 1.1 to 1.4 more private schools (a 190 to 
240 percent increase). Regressions results with share of private sector enrollment as the outcome 
variable are in line with the hypothesis above (Table 1.8, Columns 5 to 8). Here I find that 
enrollment share is correlated with test scores in public schools in landlord villages as well. The 
correlation between Gini coefficient and enrollment share is large and statistically significant and 
moving from full equality to full inequality is likely to increase private sector enrollment share by 
31.1 to 40.2 percentage points.  
 
These differences suggest that entry decisions of private school may be quite different in landlord 
and non-landlord areas. In both landlord areas, the decision to enter and operate in a rural village 
first and foremost depends on the availability of a sizeable population (school aged children) and 
households’ willingness and ability to pay (as measured by village level wealth). In non-landlord 
areas, private school availability and enrollment is also negatively correlated with quality of public 
schools, suggesting that in such villages, private schools can only successfully operate when public 
school quality is poor. In contrast, in landlord villages, the absence on correlation between 
availability of private schools and quality of public schools suggest that competitive market forces 
may be less at play in these villages. In contrast, the strong correlations with village inequality 
suggests that success of private schools in landlord villages depends more social and political 
factors.  
   
1.8.3 Performance and productivity of private schools 
This final section of the chapter analyzes performance and productivity of private schools in 
landlord areas and non-landlord areas. If private schools faced stronger competition from public 
schools in non-landlord areas, we would expect to see higher, in not equal, levels of inputs and 
outputs in those areas. Figure 1.4 displays correlations of school inputs and outcomes on 
proportion landlord variable separately for public and private schools. In both types of villages, 
the gap in inputs and outcomes between public and private schools increases with proportion of 
landlord areas. It is not that private school deliver better inputs and outcomes in landlord areas, 
but that the drops in public school quality is far greater than that of private schools. In order words, 
relative to non-landlord areas, private schools in landlord areas have an easier time competing with 




Patterns in Figure 1.4 also point to substantial productivity differences between private schools 
themselves. Relative to non-landlord villages, school infrastructure and student attendance is 
substantially lower in landlord areas, yet test scores are similar suggesting that private schools are 
more productive in landlord areas. In Table 1.9, I examine productivity differences among private 
schools in a regression framework. Panel A reports test scores and finds that there are indeed no 
statistically significant differences among private schools in landlord and non-landlord areas. In 
all three columns with and without controls and state fixed effects, the estimated coefficient is 
small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. On the other hand, there are substantial 
differences in teacher and school inputs, at least across states. Teachers’ education and training 
levels are lower in landlord areas and it is perhaps for this reason, teacher salaries are also nearly 
50 percent lower.8 Similarly, there are large and meaningful differences in school inputs such as 
PTR and infrastructure index. In contrast, I find no differences in student and household inputs. 




8 Teachers’ salary could also be lower because market equilibrium wages are very different in these areas.  
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Table 1.9: Average difference in private schools in landlord and non-landlord villages, public 
schools 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Year 2010    
 Mean Landlord Landlord + GP 
controls 
Landlord + GP 
controls + State 
FE 
Panel A: Outcomes     
Standardized score -0.11 -0.01 -0.01 0.15 
  (0.24) (0.23) (0.32) 
Math standardized score -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 0.15 
  (0.24) (0.23) (0.35) 
Language standardized score -0.11 0.08 0.09 0.12 
  (0.23) (0.23) (0.28) 
Panel B: Teacher inputs     
Teachers with college degree (%) 60.83 -11.29** -8.19 -4.96 
  (5.27) (5.96) (6.47) 
Teachers with teacher training (%) 32.27 -24.24*** -23.70*** 1.95 
  (6.34) (6.28) (5.26) 
Log of monthly salary of teachers 3,009.54 -1,622.58** -1,610.56** -331.47 
  (784.17) (790.95) (755.67) 
Panel C: School inputs     
Log of pupil-teacher ratio 3.18 -0.08 -0.21* 0.01 
  (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) 
Infrastructure index 3.49 -0.78*** -0.64** -0.08 
  (0.28) (0.28) (0.42) 
Panel D: Student and household inputs     
Student attendance 75.90 -2.96 -0.74 1.61 
  (5.61) (4.81) (8.39) 
Takes additional tuition 0.22 0.07 0.10 -0.06 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
Father completed primary school 0.70 -0.01 0.02 0.05 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) 
Mother completed primary school 0.52 -0.10 -0.04 -0.06 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Log of yearly expenditures 2,582.22 127.44 259.48 106.25 
  (398.80) (400.47) (439.56) 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level are in parenthesis. All regressions include district level 
controls for altitude, coastal district, climate and soil type. GP controls add village level controls for log population, 
percentage SC population, percentage ST population, and literacy rate. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * 
Significant at 10%. 
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The final piece of evidence is on monthly fees charged by private schools. Since private schools 
in landlord villages use fewer inputs, fees charged should also be lower. Additionally, if schools 
are charging according to parents’ ability to pay, fees in landlord villages could be lower due to 
low levels of wealth as well. The analysis is fees is confounded by one additional factor which 
should be kept in mind. As described earlier, and as discussed by Kremer and Muralidharan (2008) 
and Kingdon (2020), private schools charge equilibrium market wages which are much lower than 
public schools’ salaries. Market wages may differ systematically across landlord and non-landlord 
areas because landlord areas are substantially less productive than non-landlord areas (Banerjee & 
Iyer, 2005). Figure 1.5 plots the correlation between monthly fees charged by private schools to 
fourth grade students and proportion landlord variable. Results show that private schools in non-
landlord villages charge nearly twice as much as private schools in landlord villages.  
 
  




Among social scientists and policymakers, there is enormous interest in studying and 
understanding the persistence effects of colonial institutions in present day economic outcomes. 
Recent literature in economics has shown that extractive and oppressive historical institutions can 
have persistent effects on current economic outcomes through a diverse set of channels. This 




In this chapter, I examined if the colonial land tenure system used in India during the British era 
can explain some of the differences observed in current education outcomes. Using detailed micro-
data from nearly 1,000 villages, I find that areas that had oppressive landlord systems continue to 
have significant worst outcomes today. The test score gap between landlord areas is 0.35 standard 
deviations which is large and economically meaningful. While some of this gap can be explained 
by differences in school inputs across landlord and non-landlord villages (with landlord villages 
having lower level of inputs), in my data, differences in inputs alone do not explain the test score 
gap. In further analysis, I show that relative to non-landlord villages, landlord villages are also 
unable to convert school inputs into outputs. In further analysis, I find that the likely channel of 
the persistence of landlord effect in the sample is the lack of accountability and poor representation 
at the village level. Local bodies in landlord villages are less active and have weaker oversight 
over public education, and similarly households are also less engaged in education delivery.  
 
Noting that the private sector for primary education in increasing rapidly in India, the chapter 
provides further insights behind this phenomenon. In all villages, the rise of the private sector is 
explained by poor public sector performance. Although I do not find differences in private schools’ 
existence in landlord and non-landlord village, I find that the private sector faces quite different 
entry barriers and market conditions in these two types of villages. In non-landlord areas, where 
public sector schools perform better, private sector schools provide better inputs that the public 
sector and produce marginally better results. In landlord villages, where public sector performance 
is already poor, the private sector can easily compete and provides better inputs and produces better 
outputs. In addition to contributing to the literature on historical institutions and their impacts on 
current economic outcomes, this chapter also contributes to our understanding of the functioning 
of the private sector for education in India. This chapter also contributes to the overall research 
and policy debate by showing the importance of local accountability and engagement for 
improving education outcomes. Finally, the findings from this chapter could also help 




1.10 Appendix: Additional results 
 
 
Table 1.10: Funding allocation in landlord and non-landlord villages, public schools 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Year 2010    




+ State FE 
Total SSA allocation (rupees) 59,323.04 34,975.91*** 33,064.20** 32,073.99 
  (12,901.00) (13,308.35) (20,878.56) 
Per pupil SSA allocation (rupees) 313.61 83.92 73.62 110.89 
  (73.80) (74.23) (109.51) 
Allocation adequate (1=yes) 0.38 -0.03 -0.04 0.05 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Number of construction projects in past 1 year 0.87 -0.02 -0.02 -0.20 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.13) 
Total cost of construction projects (rupees) 51,504.51 40,970.07** 39,763.30** 16,208.14 
  (16,425.81) (16,634.95) (19,788.12) 
Teacher vacancy rate (%) 7.81 5.19*** 4.86*** -0.55 
  (1.68) (1.60) (2.04) 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level are in parenthesis. All regressions include district 
level controls for altitude, coastal district, climate and soil type. GP controls add village level controls for log 
population, percentage SC population, percentage ST population, and literacy rate. *** Significant at 1%, ** 





Table 1.11: Average difference in monitoring indicators in landlord and non-landlord villages, 
public schools 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 GP responses   Headmaster 
responses 
  
















VEC effectiveness: Identifying 
needs of school 
3.49 -0.68** -0.57** 0.07 3.63 -0.70*** -0.68*** 0.37 
  (0.28) (0.26) (0.28)  (0.25) (0.24) (0.23) 
VEC effectiveness: 
Funds/construction management 
3.43 -0.69** -0.57** 0.21 3.64 -0.69*** -0.66*** 0.43* 
  (0.29) (0.27) (0.29)  (0.26) (0.26) (0.24) 
VEC effectiveness: Student 
enrolment 
3.35 -0.64** -0.58** 0.10 3.50 -0.88*** -0.85*** 0.38 
  (0.31) (0.29) (0.31)  (0.34) (0.33) (0.37) 
VEC effectiveness: Student 
monitoring 
3.47 -0.64** -0.51** 0.14 3.59 -0.66** -0.63** 0.37 
  (0.28) (0.25) (0.26)  (0.27) (0.26) (0.25) 
VEC effectiveness: Teacher 
hiring 
2.18 -0.80 -0.70 0.72 2.54 -1.40** -1.37** 0.50 
  (0.55) (0.52) (0.79)  (0.58) (0.57) (0.89) 
VEC effectiveness: Teacher 
monitoring 
3.36 -0.64** -0.52** -0.04 3.53 -0.85*** -0.83*** 0.24 
  (0.27) (0.24) (0.27)  (0.28) (0.28) (0.24) 
VEC effectiveness: Mid-day 
meals 
3.48 -0.63** -0.49** -0.03 3.58 -0.66** -0.63** 0.48* 
  (0.28) (0.25) (0.27)  (0.28) (0.27) (0.26) 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level are in parenthesis. Regressions in columns 3 and 7 adds district 
level controls for altitude, coastal district, climate and soil type, as well as village level controls for log population, percentage 
SC population, percentage ST population, and literacy rate, and household assets. Regression in columns 4 and 8 add state 







Table 1.12: Average difference in perceptions and preferences for education in landlord and non-
landlord villages, public schools 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Year 2010    







Panel A: Households' responses     
Village has an education committee (1=yes, 0=no/don't 
know) 
0.28 -0.16*** -0.14** -0.01 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) 
Is a member of education committee 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Has taken up matters with education committee 0.05 -0.03* -0.03* 0.01 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Rating of primary school infrastructure quality (1-5) 4.09 -0.18** -0.14* 0.10 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
Rating of primary schools' teaching quality (1-5) 4.07 -0.14 -0.10 0.10 
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Improvements in school quality over past 5 years (1-5) 3.82 0.01 0.05 0.13** 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Priority: more or better infrastructure 0.70 0.08** 0.09*** 0.09** 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Priority: free supplies (textbooks, uniform, etc.) 0.31 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Priority: more or better teachers 0.64 0.12** 0.11** 0.00 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) 
Rating of GP's overall competence (1-5) 3.69 -0.14 -0.09 -0.06 
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Rating of GP's commitment to education (1-5) 3.59 -0.18** -0.14* -0.09 
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) 
Panel B: Headmasters' responses     
Rating of primary school quality (1-5) 4.13 -0.08 -0.06 0.15* 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Rating of teacher absence problem (1-5) 2.05 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.12 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) 
Panel B: Gram Panchayat     
Rating of primary school quality (1-5) 4.02 -0.13 -0.10 -0.12 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) 
Rating of teacher absence problem (1-5) 2.40 0.09 0.08 -0.08 
  (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered at the district-level are in parenthesis. Regressions in columns 3 and 7 
adds district level controls for altitude, coastal district, climate and soil type, as well as village level controls for 
log population, percentage SC population, percentage ST population, and literacy rate, and household assets. 
Regression in columns 4 and 8 add state fixed effects in addition to controls. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant 




Chapter 2 Aspirations and Financial Decisions: Experimental Evidence from the 
Philippines 
 
This chapter is co-authored with David McKenzie (World Bank)  
and Dean Yang (University of Michigan) 
2.1 Introduction 
Can raising the aspirations of the poor help them escape poverty? Theoretically, sub-optimally low 
aspirations could arise through a behavioral bias (Dalton et al., 2016). Aspirations spur individuals 
to work harder, but when determining their effort level, people fail to account for how realized 
outcomes will affect future aspirations and hence future effort. This “aspirations failure” may 
cause a behavioral poverty trap: poverty begets lower aspirations, which keeps individuals in 
poverty. In the absence of other binding constraints, simply inducing the poor to set higher 
aspirations can help them break out of the poverty trap. This “mindset” approach has been the 
focus of bestselling financial self-help books such as Secrets of the Millionaire Mind (Eker, 2005) 
and Rich Dad, Poor Dad (Kiyosaki, 2017). In the developing country context, Appadurai (2004) 
highlights the potential for poverty traps due to sub-optimally low aspirations. 
 
There is, however, a potential downside to encouraging higher aspirations. If aspirations are set 
too high, individuals may fail to reach their goals, and become frustrated. This frustration could 
lead people to reduce their economic investments (Genicot & Ray, 2020). Furthermore, frustration 
could have lasting negative consequences if it affects consequential psychological factors, such as 
a reduction in perceived ability to control one’s life outcomes.  
 
We conducted a randomized experiment with over 2,600 small-scale entrepreneurs, who were 
clients of a microfinance institution in the Philippines, to study how raising aspirations affects 
financial decision-making and financial outcomes. The financial aspirations treatment was 
implemented with microcredit borrowing groups in eight weekly sessions, and encouraged 
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participants to set ambitious life goals, and choose savings targets associated with those goals. We 
also cross-randomized clients to a more traditional “knowledge” treatment that provided financial 
education about savings, budgeting, and planning. This enables benchmarking the impact of the 
aspirations treatment against impacts of an intervention that is more traditional in the microfinance 
context.  
 
We measure impacts of the aspirations and knowledge treatments with a survey two years later, 
alongside administrative microfinance institution data on savings and borrowing. We find the 
aspirations treatment leads individuals to set higher savings goals. However, individuals achieve 
only very small fractions (on average 5 percent) of their savings goals, and the aspirations 
treatment does not lead to higher savings. Instead, the aspirations treatment leads to less borrowing 
(a 15 percent reduction in debt) and less business investment (a 37 percent reduction). The finding 
of zero impact on savings and the reduction in borrowing is consistent across self-reported survey 
outcomes and administrative data. These results provide evidence for the theorized possibility of 
Genicot & Ray (2017) that if aspirations are set too high, they could lead to frustration and a 
reduction in economic investments. We also find an additional mechanism not included in their 
model: the survey data also reveals a reduction in respondents’ beliefs that they are in control of 
their own life outcomes, as measured by an index of internal locus of control.9  
 
Our paper is related to several other studies of the impact of raising aspirations on poverty. Prior 
research has shown that inducing higher aspirations can positively affect educational investments 
(Beaman et al., 2012; Bernard et al., 2019; Carlana et al., forthcoming; Mukherjee, 2017; Riley, 
2020), and induce higher savings and productive investments (Macours & Vakis, 2014; Seshan & 
Yang, 2014).  
 
Relative to this literature, our paper has several distinguishing features. First, ours is the first study 
of an intervention explicitly aimed at raising aspirations to influence financial decision-making 
regarding savings and credit. Second, we provide empirical confirmation of a “frustration” effect 
 
 
9 The knowledge treatment, on the other hand, has little impact on most of the outcomes examined, and we find little 
evidence of interactions between the two treatments. 
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from increasing aspirations, which can lead to reduced economic investment.10 Finally, our results 
reveal an additional mechanism through which a failure to reach aspirations may have enduring 
consequences on financial decision-making, even after aspirations may have returned to their 
original levels: a reduction in internal locus of control. If people respond to the experience of trying 
and failing to reach high aspirations by believing that they have less control over their own lives, 
this may change their financial decision-making in the future, potentially for the worse.  
 
Our work is also related to the economics literature on locus of control (Judge et al., 2002; Rotter, 
1954, 1966). Internal locus of control is positively associated with many economic outcomes, such 
as labor market performance and financial decision-making (Cobb-Clark, 2014; Ng et al., 2006; 
Salamanca et al., 2020). A smaller set of studies has found that locus of control is a pliable 
individual characteristic. Randomized treatments have been found to increase internal locus of 
control (Gottschalk, 2005; Pederson et al., 2015), while negative shocks in early life lead to lower 
internal locus of control in adulthood (Shoji, 2020). Relative to this literature, our contribution is 
to show that well-meaning interventions (such as the aspirations treatment we study) can 
inadvertently lead people to have less internal locus of control, with resulting real consequences 
for their future financial decision-making. 
 
This paper also contributes to a large literature on financial literacy. Poor financial knowledge is 
argued to be a key barrier to savings (Brown & Gartner, 2007; Lusardi, 2001), but research 
examining the impacts of financial literacy training alone has found mixed impacts on financial 
behaviors (Fernandes et al., 2014; Knowles, 2018). On the other hand, financial training combined 
with monetary incentives and subsidies have been shown to increase take-up and utilization of 
savings products (Cole et al., 2011). A few studies also combined financial education with goal 
setting and personalized financial counseling, and found significant impacts on real financial 
outcomes (Carpena et al., 2019). Our study tests the approach of trying to increase financial 
aspirations and compares it to the more traditional financial education approach of improving 
financial knowledge.  
 
 
10 Galiani et al. (2018) find that that exogenously raising aspirations does not affect housing investment; they do not, 
however, find reductions in investments, as we do. 
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2.2 Intervention and Experimental design 
2.2.1 Study setting and partner institution 
Our study takes place in the Sorsogon province, Philippines. Our partner institution, Peoples’ 
Alternative Livelihood Foundation of Sorsogon, Inc. (PALFSI), is a microfinance institution that 
was founded in 1995 and operates throughout the province. It offers savings accounts and group-
based microfinance loans to a client base mostly consisting of female subsistence entrepreneurs. 
Typical businesses are raising livestock (primarily hogs); small retail businesses selling items such 
as baked goods, fish, candies, or sodas; tricycle and boat rentals; hair dressing; and reselling scrap 
metal. Loans are typically one year in duration, with borrowers paying 2 percent fixed interest on 
the initial value of the loan each month throughout the duration of the loan.11  
 
For every loan a client takes on, 4 percent of the total value is withheld and deposited in a 
compulsory savings account, which the client can only access on graduation from PALFSI’s 
microcredit services. In addition, clients have access to a voluntary savings account that offers a 
five percent annual interest rate vested quarterly conditional on clients saving at least 500 pesos in 
their account. Before this savings account, clients had no formal access to free, flexible savings 
accounts. At baseline in 2012, take up of this product was low, with 43 percent of clients having 0 
dollars in savings, 31 percent between 0 and $2.50 (105.5 pesos) in savings, and 26 percent had 
more than this amount in savings.12  
2.2.2 Treatment assignment 
Our sample consists of PALFSI’s universe of 3,757 microfinance clients, who belong to 191 
microcredit borrowing groups, ranging in size from 6 to 47 members. We stratified these groups 
by: (i) PALFSI’s three physical branch locations; (ii) whether the group had more than 16 members 
(57% did); and (iii) whether the group had 80 percent or more of its members with voluntary 
savings balances of 100 pesos ($2.37) or less (59% did). Out of these 12 potential strata, one was 
 
 
11 For a year-long loan, this is equivalent to a 48 percent APR since the principal is paid back in weekly installments 
over the year. 
12 For all currency conversions in this paper, we use the average nominal exchange rate for the year 2012, US$1 = 
42.2 Philippine pesos. 
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empty, leaving eleven strata. Groups were then randomly assigned by computer within each 
stratum using a 2x2 design into a control group or one of three treatment groups – aspirations 
training only (T1), knowledge training only (T2), or both aspirations and knowledge training (T3).  
 
Prior to the launch of the intervention and randomization, we conducted a very short baseline 
survey collecting self-reported savings (in PALFSI as well as other institutions), follow-up contact 
information, and basic demographics. The 2,593 clients from 190 groups13 who completed this 
baseline survey are the sample of interest for this experiment. Randomization resulted in 48 groups 
in T1, 48 in T2, 48 in T3, and 46 in control (Figure 2.2 in the Appendix). We were then able to re-
interview 94.7 percent of these (2,464 clients) in a follow-up survey two years later. Sample 
attrition is uncorrelated with treatment status.14 We use this sample of 2,464 clients for all analysis 
in the paper: 586 in T1, 618 in T2, 634 in T3, and 626 in control.  
2.2.3 Baseline characteristics and balance tests 
We present summary statistics and tests of balance with respect to treatment assignment in Table 
2.5 in the Appendix. 92 percent of the participants in the control group were female and they were 
on average 47.1 years old. 81 percent are married, and 56 percent have high school education or 
above. The average client in the control group reported having 8,320 pesos in savings ($197). This 
represents 7.3 percent of GDP per capita of $2,694 in 2012 (World Bank, 2020a). Almost 60 
percent of savings are held in PALSFI accounts. 38.7 percent of the clients said that they made 
deposits on a weekly basis. Across all variables shown in Table 2.5, means in treatment groups are 
not statistically different from the control group means, with the exception of client gender 
(column 5): those in the knowledge group are statistically significantly more likely to be female 
(by 2.6 percentage points). This is roughly what would be expected to happen by chance. Overall, 




13 In one group, all 16 clients were inactive. 
14 Appendix Table 2.5, Panel A. 
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2.2.4 Training contents and delivery 
The two treatments were designed by PlaNet Finance, an international non-profit organization 
working to develop the microfinance sector that operates in more than 60 countries. Each treatment 
consisted of eight one-hour sessions. Here we summarize the contents of each treatment and 
provide further details in Appendix.  
 
The aspirations treatment sought to encourage and inspire clients to develop a long-term approach 
to personal and business finance. It used games to build self-confidence and exercises to help 
participants articulate long-term aspirations and define intermediate steps to reaching those 
aspirations. The first session helped participants identify obstacles to savings and empowering 
them to try to overcome these obstacles. The next two sessions asked participants to define their 
dreams and the steps required to reach these dreams. The fourth session introduced participants to 
the famous marshmallow experiment, to highlight the importance of delaying gratification to 
achieve future rewards. The next three sessions reviewed concepts from prior sessions, and asked 
participants to reflect on and express the motivations behind their dreams. Finally, the last session 
emphasized positive thinking and “thinking rich”. The training specifically focused on getting 
participants to dream and set big goals. Figure 2.6 in the Appendix provides an example – 
participants were told that if dreams are too small, they will only see the barriers blocking them, 
but a big dream will overpower the barriers. 
 
The knowledge treatment aimed to teach participants the financial skills needed to make savings 
and loan decisions. It emphasized learning about assets, liabilities, budgeting, and life cycle 
planning. The first session introduced microfinance clients to assets and liabilities to prepare them 
for the second session on assessing one’s net worth. The third session reviewed simple savings 
calculations and interest rates (“what happens if you save 1 dollar a day for 5 years and what 
happens if you save it in a bank account versus in your piggy bank?”). The fourth session focused 
on saving in advance for retirement savings goals. The fifth session extends the retirement planning 
course to life events including weddings and college education. This was followed by two sessions 




To maximize participation and integrate trainings into clients’ existing interactions with PALFSI, 
the training sessions were included once per month in the saving groups’ weekly meetings. PlaNet 
Finance, together with World Bank and Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) staff, trained 
PALSFI’s 19 loan officers, who then conducted trainings for their own groups. The aspirations 
module started in November 2012 for both T1 and T3 and concluded in August 2013. The 
knowledge module started in June 2013 and concluded in December 2013 (Figure 2.3 in the 
Appendix presents the study and intervention timeline).  
 
2.3 Intervention take-up, data and empirical strategy 
2.3.1 Take-up of the interventions 
Take-up of the interventions was high. In T1 (aspirations only), 95 percent of clients attended at 
least one session, with a mean of 73 percent of sessions and median of seven out of eight sessions 
attended. Thirty percent of clients attended all sessions. In T2 (knowledge only), 80 percent 
attended at least one session, with a mean of 64 percent of sessions and median of seven out of 
eight sessions attended, and 36 percent attending all sessions. Clients in the third treatment group 
(both aspirations and knowledge treatments) attended a median of 11 out of 16 sessions, with 93 
percent attending at least one aspirations training session, and 79 percent at least one knowledge 
training session, and a mean attendance rate of 64 percent of all sessions. 13 percent in this group 
attended all 16 sessions.15 
 
The fact that the treatment sessions were held during regular PALFSI group meetings likely 
contributed to achieving these high attendance rates, especially relative to many standalone 
financial education programs (Ibarra et al., 2019). Attendance rates are comparable to business 
training attendance rates when training has been provided by microfinance credit officers: 71 
percent in Field, et al. (2010), 50 percent in Giné and Mansuri (2020) and 76-88 percent in Karlan 




15 Appendix Figure 2.4 shows attendance by training session. 
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2.3.2 Survey and administrative data 
The primary outcomes of this study are savings and loan balances of study participants. We use 
both self-reported outcomes from our endline survey, as well as administrative outcomes from 
PALFSI’s financial records. The outcomes from administrative data are important to rule out 
possible reporting biases (experimenter demand effects) in survey data.16 The survey data provide 
insight into savings and borrowing from institutions other than PALFSI, helping to check whether 
any changes in these outcomes at PALFSI reflect shifting of financial activity to and from other 
institutions (we find no evidence of such shifting). 
 
The administrative data come from PALFSI’s electronic financial accounting system and are 
processed to measure average savings and loan balances during time periods relevant for the study.  
The correlation between the savings account balance in the administrative data and in our self-
reported survey data is nearly one, as can be seen in summary statistics reported in Table 2.2 and 
Appendix Table 2.5. 
 
We fielded our endline survey from May 2015 to September 2015, approximately two years after 
the end of the intervention. The survey collected detailed data on savings goals, financial 
knowledge, savings and borrowing (at PALFSI and other institutions), business activity, and 
household expenditures and assets. We also collected information on time preference and locus of 
control. The survey was fielded to all 2,593 clients who had valid baseline data with a completion 
rate of 94.7 percent (2,464 clients).  
2.3.3 Empirical specification 
We estimate intention-to-treat (ITT) effects by estimating the following treatment regression:  
 




16 We will see that findings turn out to be very similar across these survey-reported and administrative outcomes, 
suggesting that reporting biases in the survey data are not significant in this context. 
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where y𝑖𝑗 denotes the outcome of interest for client i in group j. 𝕀(⋅) denotes an indicator function 
that takes a value of 1 if the condition is satisfied, 0 otherwise. We include fixed effects for the 
eleven stratification cells (δs) in all regressions. ϵij is the individual error term. Standard errors are 
clustered at the borrowing group level.  
 
This specification maximizes statistical power by using what Muralidharan, et al. (2021) refer to 
as the “short model”. β1 and β2 then give the effects of being offered the aspirations and knowledge 
treatments in a sample in which half the individuals have also been offered the other treatment. 
We are underpowered to detect interaction effects, but the Appendix also report results from the 
“long model” in which separate indicators are included for each treatment. 
2.4 Empirical results 
2.4.1 Effect on retention of training concepts and savings goals 
We begin by examining participants’ retention of concepts taught in the training sessions. We 
fielded the endline survey two years after the interventions, so the impacts we measure will be 
those that persist over this timeframe. We are therefore capturing lasting impacts, rather than 
immediate recall right after training. 
 
We asked participants questions on material covered in the two treatments and calculate the percent 
of correct responses (the full list of these questions can be found in Appendix). We do this 
separately for questions related to the aspirations treatment (e.g., definitions of limiting beliefs and 
dream timelines) and those related to the knowledge treatment (e.g., definitions of assets, 
liabilities, and net worth).  
 
We estimate equation (1) for these outcomes and report results in Table 2.1, Panel A. Each 
treatment did lead to retention of concepts related to the training. The aspirations treatment leads 
to 1.99 percentage points higher share of correct responses on the aspirations questions, 
representing a 9 percent improvement relative to the control mean. The knowledge treatment raises 
the share of correct responses on the knowledge questions by 3.1 percentage points, an 8 percent 
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improvement over the control mean. As one should expect, the aspirations treatment does not raise 
correct responses to the knowledge questions, and vice versa. 
 
Table 2.1 Impact on retention of training concepts and savings goals 
 
 
We turn to examining impacts on savings goals in Panel B. The aspirations treatment specifically 
focused on getting participants to “dream” and set more ambitious savings goals. The knowledge-
based treatment emphasized the importance of planning for the future and considering future needs 
such as saving for education of one’s children, which could also lead to changes in respondents’ 
financial goals. We find that the aspirations treatment led to higher savings goals, and higher 
savings goals specifically for education. Education is the most frequently mentioned goal of 
savings, accounting for more than half of stated savings goals in money terms. The coefficient on 
the aspirations indicator is positive and large in magnitude for both outcomes, and statistically 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level for the education savings goals. Savings goals as 
a share of household income are also higher among individuals assigned to the aspirations 
treatment (coefficient significant at the 10% level). By contrast, there is no large or statistically 
significant impact of the knowledge treatment on these savings goal outcomes. 
 










Panel A: Training concepts retention
Aspirations related questions (3 questions) 2,464 22.2 1.99** -0.012 0.102
(0.880) (0.873)
Knowledge related questions (5 questions) 2,464 39.7 -0.756 3.08*** 0.011
(1.034) (1.056)
Panel B: Savings goals
Total savings goals (pesos) 2,464 29,643 5,372 -266 0.350
(4,224) (4,130)
Savings goal as share of annual income 2,454 0.240 0.097* -0.017 0.258
(0.056) (0.058)
Education savings goals (pesos) 2,464 14,753 7,116** -1,202 0.055
(2,932) (3,126)
Notes: Each row (dependent variable) reports results from a separate regression. Columns (3) and (4) report regressions coefficients from 
estimation Equation (1), where the treatments are pooled together into two categories (Aspirations = T1 or T3, and Knowledge = T2 or 
T3). All regressions include a constant and dummies for the sampling strata. Robust standard errors clustered at the center level are 
reported in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.
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These savings goal outcomes were measured roughly two years after the treatment. Respondents 
could have changed their aspirations by the time we surveyed them, compared to their aspirations 
immediately after treatment, two years before. We did not collect information about savings goals 
immediately after the treatment, so we cannot comment on the dynamics of the treatment effect on 
goals over time. But the results we are to discuss next suggest that these goals measured two years 
after treatment might be lower than the goals respondents originally set right after treatment. We 
will return to this point shortly.  
2.4.2 Impacts of financial outcomes 
The aspirations treatment led individuals to set more ambitious savings goals, so we now examine 
impacts on the primary financial outcomes: savings and borrowing. Most participants are very far 
from meeting their stated savings goals. In Table 2.2, Panel A, the average fraction of savings goal 
met in the control group is 0.050, and the average fraction of education savings goal met is 0.017.  
 
Panel B of Table 2.2 shows that neither treatment had a sizeable or statistically significant impact 
on meeting these goals, with point estimates below 1 percentage point.  Low achievement of goals, 
and the negligible impact of treatments on goal achievement, can also be seen in histograms of the 
distribution of the savings goal met by treatment status (Figure 2.1). The distributions are visually 
similar, and all have a significant probability mass at zero. 
 
We next turn to examining treatment effects on savings and borrowing. Panel B of Table 2.2 
reports impacts on savings balances, and Panel C on loan balances. The endline survey collected 
detailed loan and saving information for all accounts held at PALSFI, other banks and 
microfinance institutions, ROSCAs, money lenders, as well as savings and loans with informal 
sources such as family members and friends. From these survey responses, we calculate study 
participants’ savings balances and loan balances (the latter variable is the total remaining unpaid 
balance of loans outstanding). We also construct corresponding savings and loan balance outcomes 
from PALFSI’s administrative data for the same individuals, on average for the 4 months when 





Table 2.2 Impact on financial outcomes 
 
  










Panel A: Meeting savings goals
Fraction of savings goal met 2,464 0.050 0.006 -0.002 0.332
(0.006) (0.006)
Fraction of education savings goal met 2,464 0.017 0.003 0.002 0.877
(0.004) (0.004)
Panel B: Savings
Total savings (pesos, survey) 2,464 7,424 -356 -315 0.961
(575) (567)
PALFSI savings (pesos, survey) 2,420 6,010 -432 -273 0.825
(497) (493)
PALFSI savings (pesos, admin) 2,464 5,619 -465 -319 0.839
(477) (480)
Panel C: Loan accounts
Total loans (pesos, survey) 2,464 11,262 -1,734** -338 0.109
(745) (696)
PALFSI loans (pesos, survey) 2,424 7,842 -1,202** -328 0.267
(566) (543)
PALSFI loans (pesos, admin) 2,464 9,318 -1,257* -272 0.331
(760) (767)
Number of loans (survey) 2,464 1.347 -0.121** -0.110** 0.889
(0.055) (0.053)
Number of PALSFI loans (survey) 2,462 0.990 -0.087 -0.130** 0.564
(0.054) (0.052)
Number of PALSFI loans (admin) 2,464 1.049 -0.084 -0.095* 0.874
(0.051) (0.051)
Notes: Each row (dependent variable) reports results from a separate regression. Columns (3) and (4) report regressions coefficients 
from estimation Equation (1), where the treatments are pooled together into two categories (Aspirations = T1 or T3, and Knowledge = 
T2 or T3). All regressions include a constant and dummies for the sampling strata. Robust standard errors clustered at the center level 
are reported in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.
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Figure 2.1 Distribution of savings goals met, by treatment 
 
Individuals in the control group report having 7,424 pesos in total savings, 6,010 of which is they 
report holding at PALFSI. The corresponding administrative data on PALFSI savings in the 
control group has a mean (5,619 pesos) very close to the survey-reported outcome, which provides 
confidence in the survey-reported data. Corresponding figures for loan balances are 11,262 in total, 
7,842 at PALFSI, and 9,318 in the administrative data. For loan balances, it appears that there is 
slight underreporting of loan balances in the survey compared to the administrative data. 
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Neither treatment has large or statistically significant effects on savings, in either survey or 
administrative data. Point estimates are in fact slightly negative. These findings concord with the 
absence of treatment effects on meeting savings goals in Panel A.  
 
By contrast, we find that the aspirations treatment leads individuals to have smaller outstanding 
loan balances. The aspirations treatment lowers survey-reported total loan balances by 1,734 pesos 
(a 15.4 percent reduction from the control mean) and PALFSI loan balances by 1,202 pesos; both 
these coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level. The coefficient 
estimate for PALFSI loan balances calculated from administrative data is very similar, -1,257 
pesos (statistically significant at the 10% level).  
 
Similar patterns emerge when looking simply at the number of outstanding loans respondents have, 
in the last three rows of Panel B. In the control group, respondents have 1.35 loans in total, about 
1.0 of which is at PALFSI (in either survey or administrative data). The aspirations treatment leads 
to 0.12 fewer total loans, and about 0.087 or 0.084 fewer PALFSI loans (in the survey and 
administrative data respectively). The treatment effect on total loans is significant at the 5% level.  
2.5 Mechanisms and channels of impact 
The aspirations treatment led participants to raise their savings goals, but most individuals failed 
to meet those goals.  The aspirations treatment did not lead to higher savings, and in fact led 
respondents to borrow less. These results are consistent with possibilities highlighted in the models 
of Genicot & Ray (2020) and Dalton et al. (2016). If people set aspirations too high, they may fail 
to reach their goals, and become frustrated or discouraged. As a result, they subsequently reduce 
their economic investments. In light of these models, our finding that our small-entrepreneur 
respondents reduce their borrowing could be due to discouragement stemming from the failure to 
reach one’s goals.17 
 
 
17 Genicot & Ray (2020) and Dalton et al. (2016) would also predict that people respond to failure by reducing their 
aspirations, so as to reduce the pain of frustration. While we do not have the data to explore how aspirations have 
changed over time, we speculate that savings goals could have been even higher immediately after the aspirations 
treatment, in which case the aspirations treatment effects on savings goals in Table 1 will be lower bounds on the 




That said, other explanations for these results are possible. We conducted the endline survey two 
years after treatment. One might speculate that perhaps savings did increase at some point after 
treatment, and respondents withdrew these savings at some point prior to the endline survey to 
invest in their businesses. We would thus see no increase in savings in the endline survey, and a 
reduction in borrowing because entrepreneurs were now able to finance their investments via 
savings instead of credit. In what follows, we conduct additional analyses to further understand 
the impact of the aspirations treatment and use this to rule out this competing explanation.  
 
2.5.1 Dynamic impacts on savings and borrowing  
To address the alternative hypothesis that savings did increase (and then was withdrawn) prior to 
the endline survey, we examine administrative data on saving at PALFSI from before and after 
treatment. Appendix Figure 2.5 shows that savings held in PALFSI accounts evolve similarly for 
the clients in treatment and control groups. In January 2014, the first month after all training was 
completed, average savings in the aspirations group was 5,837 pesos, compared 5,829 in the 
control group and 5,637 in the information group (the differences are not statistically significant). 
Similarly, savings in August 2015, the last month for which administrative data are available, are 
similar for the two treatment groups and control. It is thus not the case that treated individuals built 
up large savings that they then withdrew before the endline.  
 
Appendix Figure 2.5 also shows the corresponding administrative data on PALFSI loan balances 
over the same time period. This examines a related hypothesis that perhaps individuals receiving 
the aspirations treatment increased their borrowing immediately after treatment, achieved their 
investment goals, and so subsequently decreased their borrowing by the time of the endline survey. 
Relative to the control group, there are no substantial differences in outstanding loan balance for 
the treatment groups. Consistent with the regression results, borrowing declines closer to the 
endline period.  
 
Further, if treated respondents were able to finance their investments through increased savings 
between treatment and endline, we might observe positive impacts on business and non-business 
investments at endline. In Appendix Table 2.8, we show that the treatment did not lead individuals 
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to start new businesses. There are no differences in total business value or household assets. In 
sum, there is no evidence for the alternative hypothesis that respondents in the aspirations 
treatment achieved their savings and investment goals in the time period before the endline survey.  
 
2.5.2 Impact on expenditures 
Mean monthly household income reported by households in our follow-up survey is 11,283 pesos 
($267), which is less than mean monthly household expenditures of 13,124 pesos ($311). Even 
allowing for some underreporting of incomes, this suggests households are typically spending all 
they earn. Both training programs emphasized that a key way to increase savings was through 
reducing expenditure. The knowledge training highlighted the value of forgoing typical temptation 
goods like lottery tickets, cigarettes, alcohol and soft drinks, while the aspirations training 
emphasized the value of delaying gratification in the short-term to build long-term opportunities.  
We examine in Table 2.3 whether individuals followed this advice by modifying their spending 
habits. We examine impacts on total household expenditure, as well as expenditure subcategories: 
food consumed outside the home, temptation goods, celebrations, durable goods, and education. 
Estimated effects of both the aspirations and knowledge treatments are small in magnitude, and 
none are statistically significantly different from zero. 
 
Given that both aspirations and knowledge treatment encourage clients to reduce temptation 
spending, the absence of a resulting reduction in temptation spending is striking. This is despite 
clients saying they do spend on goods that they regret later. In the control group, 84 percent of 
clients said they regretted spending on alcohol, 84 percent on tobacco, and 63 percent on gambling 
and lotteries. That we find no effect of the aspirations treatment on temptation spending suggests 
that consumption habits are very “sticky” and hard to break (Berry et al., 2018; Bruhn et al., 2014).  
 
The last row of Table 2.3 does show one area in which spending significantly fell: there is a 
negative effect of the aspirations treatment on business investments. The aspirations treatment 
leads business investments in the last six months to be lower by 630 pesos (37 percent below the 
control group). PALFSI’s microloans are typically made with business uses in mind, so this finding 
concords with interpreting our negative treatment effects on loans as due to less desire on the part 
of individuals to invest in their businesses.  
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Table 2.3 Impact on household expenditures 
 
 
This analysis helps explain why households are not saving more: they spend almost all of what 
they earn, and were not able to cut back on spending, despite saying they regret some of the 
spending that they do. Instead, they reduce borrowing and investments in their business. All told, 
these results are quite consistent with the Genicot & Ray (2017) and Dalton et al. (2016) models, 
in which frustration stemming from not achieving goals leads individuals to scale back their 
economic investments. 










2,376 13,221 -659 422 0.202
(602) (567)
2,463 89.8 -11.56 0.70 0.483
(13.1) (13.1)
2,446 593 -47.36 0.8 0.548
(63.2) (57.4)
2,461 2,494 8.30 289 0.458
(261) (252)
2,455 1,481 -20.7 217 0.336
(183) (165)
2,457 1,805 40 -149 0.273
(140) (139)
2,463 1,692 -630** -91.6 0.140
(293) (276)
Notes: Each row (dependent variable) reports results from a separate regression. Columns (3) and (4) report regressions coefficients 
from estimation Equation (1), where the treatments are pooled together into two categories (Aspirations = T1 or T3, and Knowledge = 
T2 or T3). All regressions include a constant and dummies for the sampling strata. Robust standard errors clustered at the center level 
are reported in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.
Total monthly household expenditures 
(pesos, monthly)
Food consumed outside home (pesos, 
monthly)
Temptation goods - alcohol, tobacco, 
gambling, etc. (pesos, monthly)
Celebrations - fiesta, birthday, wedding 
etc. (pesos, six-monthly)
Durable goods - clothing, appliances, 
furniture, etc. (pesos, six-monthly)
Education (pesos, six-monthly)
Business investment (pesos, six monthly)
 
 59 
2.5.2 Impacts on locus of control and time preferences 
We now explore an additional reason why individuals may reduce their economic investments: 
their preference parameters or beliefs may change in such a way as to lead them to be less willing 
to invest. This mechanism is separate from but complementary to the mechanism outlined in 
Genicot & Ray (2020) and Dalton et al. (2016). Neither of those models contemplate any additional 
effects resulting from changes in individuals’ preferences or beliefs. In our endline survey, we 
measured two such factors: locus of control and present bias. We consider these in turn. 
 
Locus of control measures how strongly people believe they have control over the situations and 
experiences that affect their lives (Rotter, 1954, 1966). Those who believe that events in their lives 
are primarily a result of their own actions have higher scores and are referred to as having “internal 
locus of control”, whereas those who attribute life events to outside factors have “external locus 
of control.” Locus of control plays a central role in our aspirations treatment, as well as other 
mindset-based approaches to financial education. The aspirations treatment emphasizes that 
personal obstacles can be overcome through a positive mindset, seeking to convince individuals 
that they are in control of their future through their savings decisions. In Secrets of the Millionaire 
Mind, Eker (2005) argues that rich people believe “I create my life” while poor people believe 
“life happens to me”. This content is explicitly included in the culminating “rich mindset” session 
of the aspirations treatment (the last of eight sessions).  
 
In the endline survey, we use a seven-item set of questions that measure economic internal locus 
of control, derived from Furnham (1986). We ask individuals to say how much they agree or 
disagree on a Likert scale with statements like “Whether or not I get to become wealthy depends 
mostly on my ability” and “If I become poor, it’s usually my own fault”.18 We code each of the 
seven items so that higher scores indicate higher internal locus of control and sum the total. Table 
2.4 shows that the aspirations treatment has a negative effect on internal locus of control that is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The knowledge treatment also has a negative effect, also 
 
 
18 The full set of questions can be found in Appendix. 
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significant at the 5% level. Both treatments significantly reduce the extent to which individuals 
believe their own actions determine their financial lives.  
 
Table 2.4 Impact on locus of control and time preferences 
 
 
Why did training have the opposite effect on locus of control than intended? We have seen that 
training resulted in clients setting substantially higher savings goals than individuals in the control 
group, but that the average individual had only saved a tiny fraction (5 percent) of this goal, and 
that treatment did not make individuals any more likely to achieve their goals. It is possible that 
encouraging people to have big dreams and set ambitious goals in a context where they are not 
able to meet these goals might have eventually demotivated or frustrated them and lead them to 
conclude that their actions do not much determine their financial outcomes.  
 
Taking the above evidence as a whole, we then speculate that the fall in loans and in business 
investment in the treated groups may be explained as follows: training caused participants to set 
ambitious savings goals and make budgets, but they did not change their spending behavior, and 
as a result, they were far from meeting these savings goals. This led to frustration, and reductions 
in economic investments. These effects could have been compounded by individuals in the 
aspirations treatment coming to believe that their own actions would have little influence in 
determining their financial success (lower internal locus of control). Such a change in beliefs could 










2,463 41.8 -0.776** -0.584** 0.682
(0.325) (0.295)
2,464 0.134 0.010 -0.015 0.180
(0.012) (0.011)
Notes: Each row (dependent variable) reports results from a separate regression. Columns (3) and (4) report regressions 
coefficients from estimation Equation (1), where the treatments are pooled together into two categories (Aspirations = T1 
or T3, and Knowledge = T2 or T3). All regressions include a constant and dummies for the sampling strata. Robust 




Internal locus of control
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have reinforced the discouragement effect, further lowering individuals’ desire to invest in their 
businesses.  
 
We also explore whether the treatments affect present bias. Alan and Ertac (2018) show that an 
educational intervention that gets children to better imagine their future selves was able to increase 
patience. The aspirations treatment explicitly tries to get individuals to be less present-biased. The 
fourth aspirations session presented participants a video of the “marshmallow” experiment to 
highlighting the gains from making current sacrifices in return for future gains. The knowledge 
intervention gets individuals to think of their future selves through lifecycle planning and an 
emphasis on reducing temptation spending. 
 
We measure present bias using by asking individuals to make hypothetical choices between 
different money amounts tomorrow versus in one month, and in two months versus three months, 
and seeing whether there are preference reversals.19 Table 2.4 shows that 13 percent of individuals 
in the control group make a present-biased choice, and that neither the aspirations nor the 
knowledge treatment has a large or statistically significant effect on present bias. This lack of 
impact on time preferences is consistent with individuals not changing their temptation spending 
and suggests that while high discount rates may help explain why individuals undersave, the 
treatments were not able to change this preference parameter. 
2.6 Conclusions 
Encouraging small-scale entrepreneurs to increase their financial aspirations did lead individuals 
to set higher savings goals, but most individuals failed to achieve their goals. Two years after the 
treatment, treated individuals had no higher savings, and – strikingly – were borrowing 
substantially less (in total and from the partner microfinance institution). The aspirations treatment 
also led to lower business investment. Genicot & Ray (2020) and Dalton et al. (2016) emphasize 
that, in theory, setting higher aspirations may lead to higher economic investments, but failure to 
achieve aspirations may lead to frustration, and a decline in economic investments. Our results 
 
 
19 Our procedures for measuring present bias are detailed in Appendix III. 
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provide empirical support for this theory. Aspirations should therefore be set high, but not too 
high. The aspirations treatment we study may have set individuals’ goals too high to be achievable, 
leading to discouragement and a decline in investments. We also find that the aspirations treatment 
reduced internal locus of control. This is an outcome of interest in itself, and it may also be an 
additional mechanism through which the ultimate negative impacts on investment arose.  
 
This study suggests several avenues for future research. Perhaps most prominently: would an 
intervention that encouraged individuals to set more modest aspirations have had a more positive 
impact? Aspirations that were more modest would have been more achievable, reducing the 
negative consequences from frustration and discouragement. Future studies could investigate 
multiple treatment arms where individuals are encouraged to set different-sized financial goals, to 




2.7 Appendix: Additional Results 
Figure 2.2 Randomization and treatment assignment 
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Figure 2.5 Evolution of PALFSI savings and loans over time, by treatment 
 
Panel A: Savings 
 




Table 2.5 Sample description and balance 



























Panel A: Sample description
Endline completed (1=yes) 2,593 0.956 -0.007 0.007 0.287 -0.018 -0.003 -0.000 0.402 0.229 0.869
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Client is female (1=yes) 2,459 0.923 -0.005 0.026** 0.078 -0.015 0.016 0.022 0.060 0.023 0.733
(0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015)
Age of client (years) 2,460 47.1 -0.270 -0.648 0.671 -0.411 -0.785 -0.921 0.794 0.501 0.870
(0.565) (0.571) (0.752) (0.834) (0.708)
Client is married (1=yes) 2,464 0.805 -0.017 0.006 0.312 0.020 0.042** -0.010 0.051 0.175 0.015
(0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
Client is high school or more educated 2,464 0.562 0.017 -0.026 0.280 0.033 -0.011 -0.009 0.432 0.283 0.966
(0.029) (0.027) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039)
Total savings (in pesos) 2,464 8,320 788 347 0.657 909 464 1,138 0.787 0.828 0.502
(705) (735) (1,005) (1,001) (1,043)
Savings in PALFSI accounts (pesos) 2,464 4,905 37 59 0.968 416 425 104 0.728 0.521 0.496
(344) (342) (477) (456) (424)
Savings deposit frequency is at least weekly 2,464 0.387 0.038 -0.027 0.338 0.092 0.024 0.012 0.444 0.220 0.840
(1=yes) (0.045) (0.046) (0.065) (0.064) (0.061)
Panel C: Administrative data at baseline (July 
Total savings (pesos) 2,464 5,589 -39 -274 0.679 -180 -410 -316 0.919 0.782 0.852
(350) (347) (460) (475) (409)
Outstanding loan balance (pesos) 2,464 8,693 73 81 0.988 -291 -271 147 0.688 0.436 0.476
(400) (388) (525) (535) (540)
Net savings (pesos) 2,464 -3,158 -125 -337 0.560 121 -99 -457 0.237 0.091 0.343
(269) (268) (372) (403) (393)
Notes: Each row (dependent variable) reports results from two separate regressions. The first regression result is in Columns (3) and (4) where the main independent variables are binary indicators of receiving aspirations or knowledge treatments  
(Aspirations = T1 or T3, and Knowledge = T2 or T3). The second regression is in Columns (6)-(9), with three treatments (T1, T2 and T3) as separate independent variables. All regressions include a constant and dummies for the sampling 
strata. Robust standard errors clustered at the center level are reported in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.
Panel B: Demographic characteristics and savings at baseline
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Panel A: Training concepts retention
Financial literacy: Inspiration related questions 2,464 22.151 3.738*** 1.677 2.019 0.189 0.161 0.775
(3 questions) (1.192) (1.152) (1.235)
Financial literacy: Knowledge related questions 2,464 39.736 -1.781 2.084 2.299 0.011 0.006 0.876
(5 questions) (1.535) (1.484) (1.461)
Panel B: Savings goals
Has savings goals (1=yes) 2,464 0.486 0.087** 0.065 0.020 0.238 0.096 0.269
(0.042) (0.042) (0.041)
Total savings goals (pesos) 2,464 29,643 11,533** 5,697 5,241 0.488 0.273 0.937
(5,845) (5,800) (5,769)
Savings goal as share of annual income 2,454 0.240 0.197** 0.080* 0.083 0.502 0.276 0.959
(0.099) (0.046) (0.052)
Has savings goals for education (1=yes) 2,464 0.224 0.098*** 0.077*** 0.054** 0.389 0.174 0.460
(0.032) (0.029) (0.027)
Education savings goals (pesos) 2,464 14,753 8,905** 530 5,952 0.096 0.551 0.147
(4,372) (3,308) (4,260)
Notes: Each row (dependent variable) reports results from the regression of individual binary indicators for the three treatments (T1, T2 or T3). All regressions include a constant and dummies for 
the sampling strata. Robust standard errors clustered at the center level are reported in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.
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Table 2.7 Impact on financial outcomes, long-form 
  






















Panel A: Meeting savings goals
Fraction of savings goal met 2,464 0.050 0.008 -0.001 0.004 0.591 0.674 0.525
(0.010) (0.007) (0.008)
Fraction of education savings goal met 2,464 0.017 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.884 0.650 0.741
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Panel B: Savings
Total savings (pesos, survey) 2,464 7,424 183 207 -660 0.477 0.314 0.283
(784) (738) (754)
PALFSI savings (pesos, survey) 2,420 6,010 222 358 -690 0.249 0.177 0.136
(654) (672) (663)
PALFSI savings (pesos, admin) 2,464 5,619 369 488 -766 0.089 0.074 0.058
(637) (661) (615)
Panel C: Loan accounts
Total loans (pesos, survey) 2,464 11,262 -1,612 -220 -2,069* 0.102 0.633 0.048
(1,118) (1,023) (1,153)
PALFSI loans (pesos, survey) 2,424 7,842 -461 384 -1,514** 0.050 0.179 0.015
(780) (732) (771)
PALSFI loans (pesos, admin) 2,464 9,318 -1,444 -453 -1,532 0.566 0.927 0.354
(942) (1,160) (1,145)
Number of loans (survey) 2,464 1.347 -0.070 -0.061 -0.230*** 0.023 0.028 0.015
(0.084) (0.078) (0.077)
Number of PALSFI loans (survey) 2,464 1.347 -0.070 -0.061 -0.230*** 0.023 0.028 0.015
(0.084) (0.078) (0.077)
Number of PALSFI loans (admin) 2,464 1.049 -0.009 -0.023 -0.178** 0.030 0.018 0.026
(0.072) (0.069) (0.072)
Notes: Each row (dependent variable) reports results from the regression of individual binary indicators for the three treatments (T1, T2 or T3). All regressions include a constant and 
dummies for the sampling strata. Robust standard errors clustered at the center level are reported in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.
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Table 2.8 Impact on business investments and assets 
 
  



























Owns a business (1=yes) 2,464 0.743 -0.008 0.009 0.567 -0.028 -0.011 0.001 0.551 0.278 0.692
(0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028)
Started a new business in the post 
training period
2,457 0.1 0.016 0.005 0.514 0.028 0.016 0.021 0.796 0.719 0.775
(0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018)
Value of business(es) today (pesos) 2,446 40,139 -2,505 4,545 0.292 -2,488 4,561 2,039 0.575 0.529 0.701
(4,915) (4,797) (7,108) (6,293) (7,057)
Asset index (PCA of 11 household 
goods)
2,463 -0.063 0.004 0.026 0.883 -0.006 0.016 0.030 0.970 0.806 0.922
(0.105) (0.103) (0.154) (0.147) (0.148)
Notes: Each row (dependent variable) reports results from two separate regressions. The first regression result is in Columns (3) and (4) where the main independent variables are binary indicators of receiving aspirations or knowledge 
treatments  (Aspirations = T1 or T3, and Knowledge = T2 or T3). The second regression is in Columns (6)-(9), with three treatments (T1, T2 and T3) as separate independent variables. All regressions include a constant and dummies for 
the sampling strata. Robust standard errors clustered at the center level are reported in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.
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Total monthly household expenditures 2,376 13,221 -192 871 -225 0.329 0.968 0.181
(pesos, monthly) (848) (800) (802)
Food consumed outside home 2,463 89.8 -14.6 -2.28 -10.93 0.775 0.804 0.631
(pesos, monthly) (18.2) (20.8) (19.6)
Temptation goods - alcohol, tobacco, gambling, etc. 2,446 593 -98.2 -48.3 -47.9 0.717 0.491 0.996
(pesos, monthly) (75.6) (84.3) (90.4)
Celebrations - fiesta, birthday, wedding etc. 2,461 2,494 -75.7 208.3 295.9 0.547 0.292 0.818
(pesos, six-monthly) (357) (374) (347)
Durable goods - clothing, appliances, furniture, etc. 2,455 1,481 30.7 266.4 197.0 0.570 0.470 0.804
(pesos, six-monthly) (210) (242) (245)
Education 2,457 1,805 -132.1 -315.5 -111.8 0.473 0.903 0.276
(pesos, six-monthly) (202) (218) (220)
Business investment 2,463 1,692 -703* -162 -723* 0.283 0.955 0.184
(pesos, six-monthly) (389) (430) (439)
Notes: Each row (dependent variable) reports results from the regression of individual binary indicators for the three treatments (T1, T2 or T3). All regressions include a constant and dummies for the 
sampling strata. Robust standard errors clustered at the center level are reported in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.




Table 2.10 Impact on locus of control and time preferences, long-form 






















Locus of control 2,463 41.8 -1.17** -0.969** -1.37*** 0.649 0.661 0.353
(0.475) (0.418) (0.406)
Present bias (fraction of choices) 2,464 0.134 0.010 -0.014 -0.005 0.388 0.340 0.590
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
Notes: Each row (dependent variable) reports results from the regression of individual binary indicators for the three treatments (T1, T2 or T3). All regressions include a constant and 
dummies for the sampling strata. Robust standard errors clustered at the center level are reported in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.
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2.8 Appendix: Contents of the two training programs 
Often the content of training programs is a black box, making it difficult to compare across studies. 
We provide session-by-session details here to enable the reader to more clearly see what was 




Session 1: Calculating Your Net Worth Part 1 
 
Session goal: introduce clients to a structured framework for understanding their financial status, 
and advise clients to save more as it will add to their assets and increase their net worth. 
 
This session introduces the clients to the general notion of Assets, Liabilities and Net worth by 
asking the clients to write down their assets and liabilities and estimating their total values. Assets 
were defined as ‘something you own that you could resell’; Liabilities as ‘something you owe’; 
and Net Worth as ‘how much is left after deducting your liability from your assets’. This session 
emphasized that one could increase her net worth by saving and that the PALFSI Flexible Savings 
Account is one of their options to accumulate savings. 
 
Session 2: Calculating Your Net Worth and Understanding PALFSI’s Flexible Savings 
Account 
 
Session goal: teach clients how to calculate their net worth by methodically estimating the value 
of each asset and liability. 
 
This session is a continuation of the previous session. The clients were asked to assign values to 
their assets and liabilities which they listed in the previous session.  They were then asked to 
subtract the value of their assets from the liabilities to come up with their net worth. 
In this session the advantages and the disadvantages of formal and informal savings were also 
discussed and the clients were given the handout about the comparison. In addition the PALFSI 
Flexible Savings Account Fact Sheet handout was also distributed so that the client will better 
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understand the PALFSI Flexible Savings Account. The clients were also asked to create an 
inventory of their assets and liabilities by filling out the handout Asset and Liabilities calculation. 
 
Session 3: Calculating Savings 
 
Session goal: introduce clients to the concept that saving a little bit everyday can turn into a lot of 
money, to the idea that saving in a bank account is preferable to saving at home because it rewards 
people with interest, and to simple math on savings accumulation. 
 
The interest rate was introduced as ‘a financial reward for saving in a bank (or a formal institution 
like PALFSI) or a cost for taking out loan. Saving at home vs. saving in an interest-bearing account 
was also discussed in this session. The clients were given the ‘Computing for Savings’ handout. It 
was stressed that forgoing with some typical temptation goods (like ‘Jueteng’ [a local lottery which 
is illegal], cigarettes, alcoholic beverages and soft drinks) can be a source of money for savings. 
Saving a little a day will accumulate savings if done regularly, was also emphasized in this session.  
 
Session 4: Calculating Simple Long Term Financial Goals 
 
Session goal: create knowledge and awareness of long-term expenses like retirement, education 
and marriage, and of the importance of saving a little bit everyday to help reach these expenses. 
 
The clients were given a copy of the ‘Simple Long Term Financial Goals Calculator’ handout. As 
an example, retirement was discussed as a long term financial goal. They were asked to compute 
for the amount they should save daily or weekly to successfully retire. It was emphasized in this 
session that if they save in an interest bearing account they would have to set aside smaller amounts 
daily or weekly for their long term financial goals such as retirement, education etc., compared to 
saving at home.  The clients were advised to save more on PALFSI savings account where their 
savings can grow. 
 
Session 5: Introduction to Budgets 
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Session goal: Introduce clients to the concept of budgeting, help them understand where they are 
spending their money, their flow of income, and where opportunities lie to cut down on spending 
and increase savings. 
 
Clients were introduced to the concept of Budgeting. They were taught how to compare their 
earnings from their expenses using the Budget Table Handout. Clients were asked to identify 
where they could cut down on certain spending and translate it into savings. They were also asked 
to check if their expenses are greater than their income and what expenses they could forgo to at 
least equalize their income and expenses or better yet cut on expenses to save. It was emphasized 
in this session that in order to save effectively they should first set aside a portion of their income 
for savings as opposed to spending first and save whatever is left from their income. Setting aside 
an amount from the income will make sure that they can save and PALFSI Flexible Savings 
Account is a place to accumulate these savings. 
 
Session 6: Budgets and Savings 
 
Session goal: Delve deeper into the concept of budgeting introduced in previous session, and help 
identify opportunities to cut down on spending and increase savings. 
 
This session is the second part of the topics on budget. The clients were asked to fill out the Last 
Week’s Budget and the Next Weeks’ Budget Handout. They were asked to recall all their expenses 
in the past week to help them think about their expenses for the coming week. It was emphasized 
in this exercise that knowing about where they spent on in the last week will help them plan for 
the succeeding week and make adjustments on their expenses so that they can save. This exercise 
will help them identify opportunities to cut down on expenses to increase savings. 
 
Session 7: Budgets Part 3 
 
Session goal: Continue to learn more about budgeting, and help clients understand how hindsight 
and foresight can differ. 
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This is part 3 of the budgeting sessions. The loan officers reviewed the concept of budgeting as a 
‘financial plan for a long term and short term future’. The clients were asked to fill out another 
Last Week’s Budget Handout and ask them to compare the Next Week’s Budget handout they 
filled out in the preceding week. The disparities between the two were highlighted as the difference 
between hindsight and foresight. 
 
The difference between hindsight and foresight was emphasized in this session. It was also 
emphasized that if their carefully plan and practice more on budgeting they could have a better 
control of their future expenses and this would help them identify opportunities for saving. 
 
Session 8. Financial Knowledge Quiz 
 
Session goal: Reinforce learning of first seven sessions and review contents. 
 
In this session, the clients were asked to take a simple quiz about what they learned in the previous 
7 session as a review. The loan officers clarified question with regards to the concepts which were 
introduced in the previous sessions. It also discusses savings in general and savings at PALFSI 




Session 1: Overcoming Limiting Beliefs 
 
Session goal: intended to teach clients that personal obstacles can be overcome through a positive 
mindset, an optimistic outlook, and a willingness to try again. The goal is to boost each individual 
client’s sense of self and confidence in overcoming obstacles in life.   
 
Participants were paired and were asked to stack up Styrofoam cups (In the form of a pyramid). 
This was done 3 times per client. In the first and second try, the cups were scattered on the table, 
but on the 3rd try each client were told that they can pre-arrange the cups in a way that will make 
it easier for them to stack it later to improve their time. 
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The learning emphasized was ‘positive mindset and confidence can help overcome personal 
obstacles and planning ahead would help them better overcome obstacles. It was emphasized that 
savings through the PALFSI Flexible Capital Build Up is a way to prepare for emergencies and 
build up capital for investments. 
 
Session 2: Dream Collage 
 
Session goal: intended to help clients to focus on their long term goals and organize their thoughts 
about how they can reach these goals. 
 
Participants were asked to make a Dream Collage by cutting out pictures from newspapers or draw 
representations of what they want to have or achieve in the future and paste it in an illustration 
board. They were then asked to make a list of the dreams in the Dream List handout from the 
Dream Collage they made. They also presented their Dream Collage to the group. At the end of 
the session the clients were told to bring home their dream map and post it on their wall to remind 
them of what they should work towards.  
The learning emphasized was to focus on their long term goals and organize their thoughts about 
how they can reach these goals. It was also emphasized that achieving long term goals requires 
planning and financial preparations and PALFSI’s Flexible Savings Capital Build Up is a good 
place to save one’s money. 
 
Session 3: Dream Timeline and Financial Matrix 
 
Session goal: intended to help clients organize their financial plans and structure their approaches 
towards reaching their goals.  
 
Based on their Dream list from the previous session, the clients were asked to create a Dream Goal 
by selecting a business goal that they could achieve in 6 months to 1 year. They were then asked 
to articulate this business goal by filling out clear goals.  They have to make their goal measurable, 
assign dates on when they want to start and achieve their goals, and visualize it. 
They were also asked to fill in the Dream Map handout by sorting their dreams as to whether the 
dreams are related to their business or family by writing the dreams above or below the ladder. It 
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was also emphasized that the PALFSI Flexible Savings Account can help clients work towards 
their financial goals and meet the plans detailed in the Dream Map and Financial Matrix. 
 
Session 4: Delaying Gratification “Marshmallow” Experiment 
 
Session goal: intended to motivate clients to avoid immediate gratification that can be costly to 
long term gratification and inspire clients to think longer into the future. 
 
The clients were shown a video presentation, the “Marshmallow” experiment which was dubbed 
in Filipino. In this session it was emphasized that delaying gratification in the short term will create 
opportunities in the long term. Like forgoing with purchasing of a new TV set and investing the 
money instead in their business will give them long term benefits or opportunities in the future.  
The movie was a tool to inspire clients to think farther into the future. It was also a tool to bring 
across the idea that the values of patience, self-discipline and focus will help them achieve their 
long term goals. 
 
Session 5: Overcoming Limiting Beliefs II 
 
Session goal: intended to teach clients that personal obstacles can be overcome through a positive 
mindset, an optimistic outlook, and a willingness to try again. 
 
This session is the same as Session 1 but instead of 10 cups they were asked to use 15 cups. It was 
emphasized in this session that situations may change, oftentimes beyond their control, but they 
could always adjust to the new situation by changing their negative attitudes to positive ones. By 
saving in the PALFSI Flexible Savings Account they could also prepare for any unforeseen events 
in the future. 
 
Session 6: Understanding Your “Why” 
 
Session goal: encourage clients to think deeper about their future business goals and inspire a more 
future oriented mindset. 
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The clients were asked to fill out the Understanding Your “Why” Handout by identifying one of 
their business goals. They were then asked to pair with another group mate and discuss why the 
goal was important to them. They were asked to visualize their dream. It was emphasized in this 
exercise that if they want to pursue their goal they should be persistent in achieving it and that they 
should have a more future oriented mindset. 
 
Session 7: Review of Dream Timeline and Financial Matrix 
 
Session goal: bring together the lessons learned from previous trainings and inspire the clients to 
move forward with their dreams. 
 
This is a review of Sessions 1, 3, and 6 with the objective to inspire the clients to move on with 
achieving their dreams. Believing in oneself was also emphasized in this session. PALFSI Flexible 
Savings Account was again mentioned as a way to help clients save money to help them in their 
future plans. 
 
Session 8: Rich Mindset 
 
Session goal: intended to finalize the inspiration training with a discussion of how to think 
positively and powerfully about one’s finances. The take away from this session is that positive 
thoughts lead to positive results. Furthermore, if a poor man saves his money and plans for the 
future, he can turn into a rich man.  
 
For this session, the loan officers discussed the statements in the Rich Mindset Handout while 
asking the clients to give examples to the group when they acted with a rich mindset or a poor 
mindset. When they give examples of when they acted with a poor mindset the loan officer they 
were asked how to change it into a rich mindset. It was emphasized in this session how positive 
thinking can lead to positive results. In addition, a poor man saving money can turn into a rich 
man. For the clients, saving in PALFSI Flexible Savings Account is a part of the rich mindset. 
 
  




Figure 2.6 The Aspirations Training Stressed Setting Big Goals 
 




Ask a fresh graduate what kind of home he wants:  often the answers are:  Big house, with garage, three 
bedrooms, big yard, with maybe a swimming pool.  This person has no income, yet he dreams big! 
 
Ask a working person what kind of home he wants:  often the answer will be, “ung simple lang po na kaya ng 
pag-ibig fund”. 
   
1. A person without a dream does not have any barriers.  His future is also uncertain because he has no 
direction. 
2. A person with a small dream will always only see barriers blocking his way into achieving his dreams. 
3. A person with a big dream will see his dream and not his barrier.  Because the barrier is too small 
compared to his dream. 
  
   
 
 80 
2.9 Appendix: Measurement 
 
Survey Questions Related to Training Retention 
 
Aspirations training related questions 
 
1) Which of the following is/are examples of “Limiting Beliefs”? 
i) I can’t sing well, but if I try or go to singing lessons, I can improve my ability 
ii) I did not finish my studies so I will never be rich 
iii) I am a housewife, but I can also be an entrepreneur if I want to  
iv) All of the above 
v) Other (specify) 
vi) Don’t know 
 
2) What is a “Dream Collage”? 
i) A collection of images of goals you wish to experience in reality 
ii) A tool designed to help you visualize your dreams 
iii) A tool to help you create a picture of what you want 
iv) All of the above 
v) Other (specify) 
vi) Don’t know 
 
3) What is a “Dream Timeline”? 
i) A tool that can help you organize your dreams in a structured and a realistic framework 
ii) A collection of images of goals you wish to experience in reality 
iii) A list of all upcoming incomes and expenditures 
iv) All of the above 
v) Other (specify) 
vi) Don’t know 
 
Knowledge training related questions 
1) What is a budget? 
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a) A tool to calculate future loan payments 
b) A tool to compare how much you earn to how much you spend 
c) A tool to calculate interest on your loan 
d) All of the above 
e) Other (specify) 
f) Don’t know 
 
2) What are assets? 
i) Savings minus loans at PALFSI 
ii) How much you own that you could resell 
iii) How much you owe 
iv) All of the above 
v) Other (specify) 
vi) Don’t know 
 
3) What are liabilities? 
i) Savings minus loans at PALFSI 
ii) How much you own that you could resell 
iii) How much you owe 
iv) All of the above 
v) Other (specify) 
vi) Don’t know 
 
4) What does net worth mean? 
i) The amount you owe 
ii) How much you own minus how much you owe 
iii) The money in your bank account 
iv) All of the above 
v) Other (specify) 
vi) Don’t know 
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5) What is an interest rate? 
i) Monthly fees to maintain a bank account 
ii) How much you own that you could resell 
iii) A financial reward for saving with the bank or an extra cost for taking out a loan 
iv) All of the above 
v) Other (specify) 
vi) Don’t know 
 
Locus of Control 
 
For each of the 7 items, the following statements are read to the respondent. Then they are asked 
to respond to what extent they agree or disagree using a 7-point scale: 1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = 
Moderately disagree, 3 = Slightly disagree, 4 = Neutral/ neither disagree nor agree, 5 = Slightly 
agree, 6 = Moderately agree, 7 = Strongly agree.  
 
1) Saving and careful investing is a key factor in becoming rich 
2) Whether or not I get to become wealthy depends mostly on my ability 
3) In the long-run, people who take very good care of their finances stay wealthy 
4) If I become poor, it’s usually my own fault 
5) I am usually able to protect my personal interests 
6) When I get what I want, it’s usually because I worked hard for it 
7) My life is determined by my own actions 
 
Time Preferences and Present Bias 
 
We measure present bias using by asking individuals to make hypothetical choices between 
different money amounts tomorrow versus in one month early in the survey, and in two months 
versus three months later in the survey and seeing whether there are preference reversals (see 
modules below) 
 
Respondents are given 20 tokens each worth 20 pesos (400 pesos total) and asked to allocate tokens 
to the two time periods. To incentivize respondents to allocate tokens honestly, they were told that 
   
 
 83 
a randomly chosen respondent’s allocation will be implemented after all the surveys have been 
completed. The interest rate is held constant in both time periods (10 percent, 25 percent, 50 
percent, 75 percent, 100 percent). For a given interest rate, we consider a choice present biased 
when respondents allocated more to the nearer period when choosing between tomorrow and one 
month versus tomorrow compared to when choosing two months from tomorrow versus three 
months from tomorrow.  
 
 
Section 3: Time Preference A 
Surveyor instructions: Let the respondent rearrange tokens as many times as he/she likes. Write down the final answer 
here and on the index card for each question 
1 
Tokens that you redeem tomorrow are worth 20 pesos each. Tokens that 
you redeem one month from tomorrow are worth 22 pesos each. How 







Tokens in one month 
2 
Tokens that you redeem tomorrow are worth 20 pesos each. Tokens that 
you redeem one month from tomorrow are worth 25 pesos each. How 







Tokens in one month 
3 
Tokens that you redeem tomorrow are worth 20 pesos each. Tokens that 
you redeem one month from tomorrow are worth 30 pesos each. How 







Tokens in one month 
4 
Tokens that you redeem tomorrow are worth 20 pesos each. Tokens that 
you redeem one month from tomorrow are worth 35 pesos each. How 







Tokens in one month 
5 
Tokens that you redeem tomorrow are worth 20 pesos each. Tokens that 
you redeem one month from tomorrow are worth 40 pesos each. How 







Tokens in one month 






Section 8: Time Preference B 
Surveyor instructions: Let the respondent rearrange tokens as many times as he/she likes. Write down the final answer 
here and on the index card for each question 
1 
Tokens that you redeem tomorrow are worth 20 pesos each. Tokens that 
you redeem one month from tomorrow are worth 22 pesos each. How 








Tokens three months 
from tomorrow 
2 
Tokens that you redeem tomorrow are worth 20 pesos each. Tokens that 
you redeem one month from tomorrow are worth 25 pesos each. How 








Tokens three months 
from tomorrow 
3 
Tokens that you redeem tomorrow are worth 20 pesos each. Tokens that 
you redeem one month from tomorrow are worth 30 pesos each. How 








Tokens three months 
from tomorrow 
4 
Tokens that you redeem tomorrow are worth 20 pesos each. Tokens that 
you redeem one month from tomorrow are worth 35 pesos each. How 








Tokens three months 
from tomorrow 
5 
Tokens that you redeem tomorrow are worth 20 pesos each. Tokens that 
you redeem one month from tomorrow are worth 40 pesos each. How 








Tokens three months 
from tomorrow 




Chapter 3 Poverty and Well-Being of the Elderly in Latin America: The Role of Health, 




As the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region undergoes rapid demographic and 
epidemiological transformations, policymakers and governments are facing new challenges to 
meet the health and social insurance needs of the elderly population. Universal health coverage 
(UHC) and social insurance of the poor and vulnerable populations are two of the main Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) for the eradication of poverty and achieving good health and well-
being.20 While many LAC countries have recently adopted policies to enhance UHC and social 
protection, no country has so far achieved UHC, and only 45 percent of the population is enrolled 
in contributory pensions’ schemes (Dmytraczenko & Almeida, 2015; ILO, 2018; OECD/IDB/The 
World Bank, 2014; Wagstaff et al., 2015). In most countries, employment-based health and 
pensions systems were adopted in the first half of the 20th century, which assumed that over time 
most of the population will enter formal employment. Nevertheless, 53 percent of the population 
remains employed in the informal sector and without access to contributory health insurance and 
pensions coverage (Salazar-Xirnachs & Chacaltana, 2019). In the meantime, the fraction of 
population 65 years or above has nearly doubled in the last three decades reaching 8.7 percent of 
population, and the share of disease burden from non-communicable diseases (NCDs) has 
increased from 47.9 percent to 70.5 percent (IHME, 2015; World Bank, 2020b). These shifts have 
increased fiscal pressures on governments to cover the needs of the elderly population. Combined 
 
 
20 Universal Health Coverage means that all people have access to the health services they need, when and where 
they need, without financial hardship. It includes the full range of essential health services, from health promotion to 
prevention, treatment, rehabilitation, and palliative care (WHO, 2020). The SDG related to UHC is Goal 3.8: 
Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health care 
services, and access to safe, effective, quality, and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all. The social 
protection related SDG is Goal 1.3: Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, 
and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable.  




with reduced revenues due to the economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, LAC 
countries need urgent reforms to ensure adequate health and social insurance coverage of their 
vulnerable populations.21   
 
The importance of access to health services and social protection for the well-being of the elderly 
cannot be overstated. Relative to other types of shocks, health shocks are idiosyncratic and more 
common, they involve responses from the entire household, they often trigger more coping 
strategies, and lead to declines in consumption (Adhvaryu & Nyshadham, 2017; Wagstaff, 2007; 
Wagstaff & Lindelow, 2014). In addition to increased health care expenditures due to old age, the 
elderly also suffer a significant decline in consumption following retirement (Haider & Stephens, 
2007). Social security benefits and non-contributory pension schemes have the important effect of 
preserving quality of life of the elderly and ensuring they do not fall into poverty (Bando et al., 
2020; Engelhardt & Gruber, 2004). These benefits also generate positive spillovers for other 
members of the family (Duflo, 2003). Not surprisingly, in opinions’ surveys in Latin America, 
people consistently rate the availability and quality of social services as their highest priority (Pew 
Research Center, 2016).  
 
Given this background for LAC, the goal of this chapter is to document the patterns and evolution 
of poverty among the elderly in the LAC region. The main questions for this analysis are – what 
is the extent of poverty among the elderly in LAC countries? To what extent do they have adequate 
access to health care? What is the incidence and burden of out-of-pocket health expenditures 
(OOPE) for the elderly? Do these push them into poverty? On the social protection side, what 
fraction of the older population are covered by pensions, and what role, if any, do pensions play 
in reducing poverty among the elderly? In countries where pensions are less prevalent, do private 




21 LAC is also hit the hardest by COVID-19. Five of the top 20 countries with most COVID-19 cases are in LAC. 
According to the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects, expected GDP decline for the LAC region was 7.2 
percent for 2020, which is higher than any other region and the world average of 5.2 percent. 




To answer these questions, I build on the existing literature in economics and other social sciences. 
Rather than diving deep into one country, I cover a broad set of countries to document the extent 
of the challenges in those countries.22 I look at two time periods – 2006 and 2015 – to document 
the evolution of key outcomes over time. A special emphasis is placed on understanding health 
care utilization, the levels of OOPE and its impact on old-age poverty, and the role of social 
transfers (public and private) in reducing the burden of poverty. Finally, I also analyze living 
arrangements of the elderly to explore complementarities and spillovers within the household. 
 
My analysis uses data from 44 national and special purpose household surveys from the LAC 
region. Most countries in Latin America administer frequent (annual) nationally representative 
household surveys to enumerate socio-economic characteristics, demographics and labor and 
employment histories of their populations. Some of the survey data utilized in this study comes 
from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC), a joint 
initiative between World Bank and the Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies 
(CEDLAS) at the National University of La Plata, Argentina to harmonize household surveys 
across LAC countries. These datasets contain harmonized and standardized values of individual 
and household incomes, labor force participation etc. However, for 11 out of 17 countries, these 
surveys do not contain information on households’ health seeking behavior and OOP expenditures, 
and in the remaining countries, the variables are not yet harmonized. Similarly, the individual 
components of incomes are also not harmonized. I undertook a separate exercise to locate health 
related surveys and construct and harmonize key health and income variables for the same 17 
countries. Together these data sets allow me examine health care expenditures and social transfers 
for all countries.  
 
Consistent with previous findings from Latin America and other regions, I find that the elderly 
population is almost half as likely to be in poverty as the non-elderly population, although there is 
substantial variation across countries (Cotlear & Tornarolli, 2011; Li & Dalaker, 2019). Part of the 
 
 
22 There are 33 countries in the LAC region. The 17 countries included in the analysis are – Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. Together these countries accounted for 91 percent of LAC 
population in 2018.  




poverty among the elderly could be due to the high burden of OOP expenditures on them. Older 
people have greater health care needs and I find that they are 1.5 times more likely to utilize 
outpatient consultations than the non-elderly population, and twice more likely to be hospitalized. 
However, the ratio of OOPE between the elderly and non-elderly is nearly three times. This 
translates into the elderly facing much greater risk of incurring catastrophic health expenditures 
(2.6 times the non-elderly population) and impoverishing health expenditures (2.3 times the non-
elderly population). Insurance coverage has a significant role to play in improving access to health 
services and providing financial risk protection from OOPE. In almost all 17 countries studied, the 
elderly access more care when they are covered by contributory health insurance, and they are 
much less likely to incur catastrophic or impoverishing risk.  
 
Pensions (and private transfers to a lesser degree) play a similar role in improving the well-being 
of the elderly. The good news is that pension coverage of the elderly has increased substantially 
between 2006 and 2015, and the incidence of poverty among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries 
is substantially different – 1.9 percent and 8.8 percent. Similarly, pensions may also be enabling 
the elderly to retire early. The average labor force participation rate for those with pensions is 23.3 
percent while for those without pensions it is 53.0. These patterns vary significantly across 
countries with poorer countries demonstrating much lower coverage. Finally, I show that like in 
other countries, there is an increasing tendency among the elderly to live on their own (alone or 
with a spouse). Higher income, availability of pensions and private transfers are positively 
correlated with the likelihood of the elderly living alone in almost all countries. The large 
reductions in poverty and the expansion of pension coverage are therefore consistent with the 
observed patterns of an increasing tendency of the elderly to live on their own. 
 
This chapter makes two main contributions to the literature and research agenda on aging. First, it 
contributes to our understanding of health care utilization patterns, OOPE and their impacts on the 
elderly population. Several studies have examined the patterns and correlates of health care 
utilization and OOP expenditures across countries, but few have focused on the elderly population, 
who constitute the majority of the population facing financial risk due to health expenditures 
(O'Donnell et al., 2008; WHO, 2019). In the development literature, the focus in cross-county 
studies is on population-level results, or on maternal and child health, mainly because 




internationally comparable datasets such as Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) focus on 
these conditions (Vollmer et al., 2014; Wagstaff et al., 2015). This chapter is among the few to 
leverage existing routine survey data sets to construct age-profiles of health care utilization and 
OOP expenditures among many countries in the LAC region. Results from this chapter will be 
useful for policymakers and governments to understand the extent of the issues in their countries, 
benchmark their performance with that of their regional peers, and to generate momentum towards 
policy reforms.  
 
The second key contribution of the chapter is that in delivering the age-profiles for health variables, 
the chapter produces a public good in the form of algorithms and standardized datasets across 
countries. The 18 different surveys23 related to health in this chapter are routine surveys that are 
administered annually in most countries. As such, the algorithms and code for the purpose of this 
chapter will be useful to researchers undertaking similar analyses or extensions in the future. Since 
surveys and their contents differ across countries, estimating health care utilization and OOP 
expenditures in a consistent manner across countries also requires careful treatment of data and 
methodological issues such as different recall periods in surveys, reporting at the household vs. 
individual level, etc. This chapter includes a discussion of these issues and applications of simple 
techniques to address those issues.  
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, I summarize the health and 
protection systems in place in LAC and the main challenges facing the region in these areas. 
Section 3.3 describes the surveys and data utilized, methodology used to estimate poverty and to 
estimate the burden of OOP expenditures. Section 3.4 presents poverty results for the elderly and 
non-elderly populations. In Section 3.5, I present patterns in health care utilization, OOP 
expenditures and their contribution to poverty of the elderly. Section 3.5 also discusses the 
availability and size of pensions and private transfers to the elderly and their role in alleviating 
poverty. In section 3.6, I explore the role of family and living arrangements of the elderly in LAC. 
Section 3.7 concludes with a discussion of policy implications and avenues for future research.  
 
 
23 In the case of Brazil, data comes from two different surveys. 





3.2 Health and social protection systems in Latin America 
Health and social protection systems in Latin America are segmented and fragmented (Frenk & 
Gomez-Dantes, 2018). In many countries, these systems were designed in the first half of the 20th 
century and have since been changed to keep up with the changing nature of the economy and 
needs of the population. Social Security Institutions (for example, Chile’s Compulsory Insurance 
Fund, Mexican Institute of Social Security, etc.) are well funded and provide the health and social 
protection needs of the salaried population. These institutions operate independently of the state, 
and main their own finances and operate their own health provider networks. In the meantime, the 
unsalaried (or non-formally employed population) are covered by Ministries of Health and services 
financed from general governments’ budgets. This results in dissimilar rules and unequal benefits 
(in both health services provide and access to pensions). Ministries of Health also operate their 
own network of health facilities and provide poorer quality of care to the predominantly poor and 
vulnerable population that depend on them. The public sector operates with no separate of 
functions (financing and provisions) and has been shown to be inefficient in many different 
contexts (Dmytraczenko & Almeida, 2015). 





Table 3.1: Health insurance and pensions systems in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
 
While health system reform has been on the agenda for more than half a century for most countries, 
only a few countries have managed to make progress towards integration of segmented health 
systems (Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, for example). Other countries such as Peru (Integral Health 
Insurance) and Mexico (Popular Health Insurance) introduced insurance schemes to improve 
efficiency of the public sector and increase coverage of the poor and vulnerable population, 
however, progress has been limited. Access to care and quality of available from these systems is 
still substantially worse than that available from the health networks of social security institutions 
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65 18.0%
Honduras Ministry of Health -
Mexico Seguro popular 65 y mas 65 5.0%
Nicaragua Ministry of Health -
Panama Ministry of Health 100 a los 70 70 12.6%
Paraguay Ministry of Health Pension alimentaria 65 29.3%
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On the social protection side, only 45 percent of the population is covered by mandatory 
contributory pensions schemes. Almost all countries in LAC (and 15 out of 17 in this study) have 
in recent years introduced non-contributory social pensions to cover the poor and informally 
employed population, and there exists significant variation in eligibility and benefits level across 
countries. The age of eligibility ranges between 57 years for males and 52 years for females in 
Colombia to 70 years in Argentina, El Salvador, Panama, and Uruguay. Benefits level similarly 
vary between 4.3 percent of median income per capita in Colombia and 29.3 percent of income 
per capita in Paraguay (Table 3.1). Given this heterogeneity, we expect there is to be substantial 
differences in the relative impacts of health insurance and pensions coverage on the poverty status 
and well-being of the elderly. 
 
3.3 Data and methodology 
3.3.1 Surveys used  
The data used in this paper comes from routine household surveys. All countries included in this 
analysis implement annual population-level income and expenditures surveys of households. Since 
the focus of these surveys is on household finance, detailed information is available on labor force 
participation, sector of employment, hours worked, income at the individual level and sources of 
income. For this paper, I utilize data from two points of time, circa, 2006 and 2015. Table 3.10 in 
the Appendix describes the data sets utilized for each country and year pair, the level of 
representativeness of the data and sample sizes. All surveys are representative at the national level 
except for Argentina, where the data are representative for 31 urban cities. For 14 out of the 17 
countries, the exact years 2006 and 2015 are available. For Colombia and Ecuador, the first time-
period is different from 2006 (2008 and 2007, respectively) and for Guatemala, the second time-
period used is 2014 instead of 2015. In the case of Costa Rica, the same household survey is not 
available for the time periods. However, both surveys used have similar characteristics in terms of 
coverage, sample sizes and variables included. These surveys are the main source of data for the 
analysis of poverty, incomes, pensions, and private transfers.  
 
Only 8 out of the 17 countries’ surveys include a health module that contain information on health 
care utilization and expenditures (Appendix Table 3.11). For the remaining countries, I did a 




detailed search to find and carefully select the latest and most suitable surveys for analysis of health 
variables. In countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador, the data come from specially 
implemented health surveys. In the case of Dominican Republic and Honduras, the data comes 
from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). The latest available year varies between 2006 
and 2015, and the modal year is 2014 (6 countries). For three countries, the data are from 2015, 
four countries they are from 2013, and for the remaining countries, they are from before 2012 or 
earlier. The data sets used for health care analysis are representative at the national level for all 
countries except for Colombia, where it is representative for the department of Cundinamarca 
(representing 6 percent of the population in 2018).24 For Brazil, I use two separate surveys. The 
national household survey contains information on OOP expenditures but not health care 
utilization. Conversely, the health survey contains information on health care utilization but not 
OOP expenditures. For this reason, I use both surveys.  
 
3.3.2 Estimating Income and poverty 
Previous research has advocated for a consumption-based measure of household well-being, rather 
than an income-based measure (Deaton & Zaidi, 2002). This is because current consumption is 
closer to permanent income (or consumption), than current income (assuming people can lend and 
borrow), misreporting is generally a bigger concern for income than consumption, and incomes 
are frequently reported before taxes, while consumption is an after-tax concept. Despite the 
benefits of using consumption in lieu of income, studies evaluating household welfare in LAC 
almost always use the income measure. This is because only a few household surveys measure 
consumption in LAC, while most measure individual and household income.  
 
The SEDLAC database constructs and reports aggregate individual and household income, as well 
as breakdowns by labor and non-labor incomes. For this paper, I need the non-labor income 
component disaggregated to capture incomes from pensions and private transfers as well. For this 
reason, I re-construct aggregate income variable for each of the 17 countries, and incomes from 
 
 
24 Colombia is made up of 32 departments. Cudinamarca as a department is highly urbanized and contains the 
national capital of Bogota. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the results.  




different sources including pensions and private transfers. In most surveys, the questions related 
to income use a one-month recall period. From this estimate, I calculate a measure of monthly 
income which is later converted to annual income. All income and related data reported in this 
paper are in 2013 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) dollars. A related caveat in using income as a 
measure of welfare or estimating income-based poverty is that income is volatile and can vary 
from one month to another. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the results.  
 
While income per capita based measures of poverty are simple to estimate, they also ignore the 
effects of household size and demographic composition and consumption. People live in 
households and share resources, and economies of scale maybe present in bigger households which 
allows them to reach same levels of consumption with lower income per capita relative to smaller 
households (Deaton & Paxson, 1998). Needs may also differ between households as children need 
to consume less than adult. Adjusting for these factors can therefore affect poverty rates. I address 
both these considerations and adjust the poverty estimates for the size of the household and its 
composition. I follow the approach of and Deaton & Paxson (1997) by assuming a parametric form 
for an “adult equivalence” and household economies of scale. Specifically, I assume that the living 
standard of an individual 𝑖 living in household ℎ is given by: 
 
𝑥𝑖ℎ =  
𝑌ℎ
(𝛼1𝐶1 + 𝛼2𝐶2 + 𝐴)𝜃
 
where, 𝐶1 is the number of children under age 5, 𝐶2 is the number of children aged 6–14, and 𝐴 is 
the number of adults. Parameters α allow for different weights for younger and older children 
compared with adults, while 𝜃 regulates the degree of household economies of scale. When 𝜃 =
1, there are no economies of scale, while at the other extreme, when 𝜃 = 0, there are full 
economies of scale, meaning that all goods in the household could be shared completely. In poor 
settings where people spend nearly all their income on food, there is not much scope for economies 
of scale. In developed settings where a much larger share of the budget is spent on housing, energy, 
heating, transportation, entertainment, and other goods that are easier to share, consumption 
economies of scale is more important. Following the suggestion of Deaton & Zaidi (2002) for 
middle-income countries such as those in LAC, I take intermediate values of the 𝛼𝑠 (𝛼1 =
0.50 & 𝛼2 = 0.75) and 𝜃 (𝜃 = 0.8) in reporting the benchmark figures in the next section. 





In practice, it is convenient to work with a transformation of the above equation to make poverty 
estimates comparable to those obtained with household per capita income and the US$3.20-a-day 
line. The need for an adjustment comes from the fact that by deflating by (𝛼1𝐶1 + 𝛼2𝐶2 +
𝐴)𝜃 instead of by just the number of family members (𝐶1 + 𝐶2 + 𝐴) the indicator of individual 
welfare 𝑥𝑖ℎ increases, and without any adjustment in the poverty lines, poverty estimates go down. 
However, since we are not trying to adjust the total percentage of people classified as poor; instead 
we want to compare the relative situation of different age groups. I alleviate this concern to some 
extent by following the procedure suggested by Deaton & Paxson (1997) and multiplying the 
above equation by (𝛼1𝐶1
0 + 𝛼2𝐶2
0 + 𝐴0)𝜃/ (𝐶1
0 + 𝐶2
0 + 𝐴0), where 𝐶1
0, 𝐶2
0 and 𝐴0 are the number 
of children under age 5, children aged 6–14, and adults in the “base” household, respectively. I 
take the average number of children and adults in each country to construct the base family.  
 
Finally, to report poverty rate or headcount ratio, a poverty line is needed. National poverty lines 
vary across countries in LAC. To allow for comparison, I report poverty figures based on $1.90 
per day and $3.20 per day, which are World Bank’s recommended lines for low-income countries 
and lower-middle income countries, respectively. While I report both measures, I focus on the 
$3.20 per day measure since most countries in LAC fall in the lower-middle income category. The 
poverty results, with and without adjusting for adults’ equivalence and economies of scale are 
reported in the next section.  
 
3.3.3 Estimating Health care utilization and out-of-pocket (OOP) health expenditures 
Details of the surveys used for estimating health care utilization and OOP expenditures are 
available in Appendix Table 3.11. A few conceptual issues merit discussion. First, the availability 
of data varies across countries. Given the focus of the paper is on the elderly, two measures of 
health care utilization are important – outpatient visits (or consultations) and inpatient visits (or 
hospitalizations). From the surveys used, it is possible to compute averages for consultations for 
all countries except Costa Rica, and it is possible to construct hospitalization rates for all countries 
except Ecuador. Together with utilization measures, I also report on OOPE and OOPE as a 
percentage of income. For Chile, the OOPE measure is not available. And for two countries – 




Argentina and Honduras – an income aggregate cannot be constructed due to limitations in the 
health specific surveys used (Appendix Table 3.12 details the variables available in the surveys). 
 
Second, surveys’ typically ask households about the last time they used health services within a 
specified timeframe, and this timeframe (or the recall period) varies across countries. For 
outpatient visits, it ranges from 15 days to 3 months, and for in-patient visits it ranges from 1 
month to 12 months. These differences could have different impacts for comparability of estimates 
across countries. Out-patient visits occur relatively frequently, and thus using a longer recall period 
can understate true utilization estimates. Conversely, hospitalizations are relatively rarer episodes, 
and using a shorter recall period can fail to capture the true extent of utilization. This issue is well-
documented in the literature and unfortunately, there are no easy solutions to the problem (Das et 
al., 2012). Further, in the case of Mexico, instead of using a defined timeframe, the survey asks 
respondents to report actual dates of last consultation and hospitalization episodes. I compute 
utilization estimates using the modal recall periods of 1 month for outpatient and 6 months 
inpatient visits for the case of Mexico. I circumvent the limitations faced for cross-country 
comparisons by reporting ratios of utilization between the elderly and non-elderly population 
within countries. This utilization ratio for country i  is defined as  URi =
Ui65+
Ui65−
. When examining 
utilization across the entire age distribution, I use the utilization rates of 15-24 year-old population 
(considered the healthiest group) as the denominator. Addressing this issue more rigorously should 
be an important area for future research. 
 
The third conceptual issue is in the estimation of the level OOPE and OOPE as a share of income 
due to the source of data and the level of reporting. In household surveys, information about health 
expenditures is either enumerated together with outpatient and inpatient visits (health modules of 
the surveys), or in the households’ expenditure modules. When data is collected in the health 
module, they are usually attributable to specific morbidity episodes and specific individuals and 
correspond to the same recall period. When they are collected in expenditures modules, they are 
collected at the household level and may utilize different recall periods (see Appendix Table 3.12 
contains information at the country level). As for income, while they are reported at the individual 
level for most countries, they are recorded at the household level in Mexico. Which measure of 
OOP expenditures – individual or household – is relevant, depends on the policy question that 




needs to be answered. Since households tend to pool resources, at the aggregate level, a household 
measure of per capita OOP may be more relevant. On the other hand, if the policy question is to 
examine differential OOP expenditures and their impacts on the elderly and to design interventions 
to reduce these expenditures for the elderly, the individual measure may be more suitable. In this 
paper, to allow for comparability across countries, I focus on the household-based per capita 
measure (for both OOP expenditures and incomes). In the future, more research is needed to clearly 
understand the implications of using one measure versus the another.  
 
In addition, the levels of OOP expenditures as a share of income, I use two threshold approaches 
of OOP expenditures as suggested in the literature (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003). The first is 
“catastrophic risk” measure which captures the intensity of catastrophe as well as its incidence and 
by estimating the degree to which catastrophic payments occur disproportionately among poor 
individual and households. This measure categorizes the household or individual as experiencing 
catastrophic expenditures in health when expenditures exceed a pre-defined threshold percentage 
of income. A difficulty with this measure is that it cannot distinguish the degree of hardship faced 
by households. A 5 percent level of expenditure on health would be more concerning for a 
household that makes 3 dollars a day in comparison to a household that makes 300 dollars a day. 
Another measure that is used in parallel as proposed by Wagstaff & van Doorslaer (2003) is 
“impoverishing risk.” The fundamental idea here is that health care expenditures should not be so 
severe that it pushes households into poverty. A household is categorized as experiencing 
impoverishing risk if their income net of health expenditures is sufficient to push them below the 
poverty line. While catastrophic measure reports the percentage of population at risk of such 
expenditures, impoverishing measure reports the additional increase in poverty that occurs due to 
health expenditures. The popularly used threshold levels of catastrophic risk are 10 percent and 25 
percent of income, while for impoverishment risk, the poverty lines used are $1.90 per day and 
$3.20 per day. I report results using both thresholds but considering that most countries in my 
sample are middle-income countries, I focus the discussion on 25 percent income threshold for 
catastrophic risk and $3.20 per day poverty line for impoverishment risk. 
 




3.4 Poverty at different ages 
I start by documenting the rapid progression in the share of elderly among the 17 countries included 
in the analysis. Table 3.2 reports the percentage of population that is 60 years or older in 2006 and 
2015. At the regional level, the share of elderly population increased from 10.1 percent in 2006 to 
12.1 percent in 2015. There is however substantial heterogeneity across countries. The greatest 
increases are observed for countries such as Brazil, Costa Rica and Mexico which were in the 
middle of the aging process in 2006. For countries such as Argentina which already had more than 
14.2 percent of the population over 60 years in 2006, the increase is small - 0.6 percentage points. 
In Uruguay, where 19.5 percent of the population was over 60 years in 2006, the figure even 
declined to 18.6 percent. In less developed countries of the region such as Guatemala, Honduras 
and Paraguay, the growth rate of the aging population is faster. These countries are relatively 
younger, and the demographic divided is yet to be realized (Rofman & Apella, 2020). Table 3.2 
also reports the share of population that is 80 years or older. At the LAC level, the share of this 
population increased from 1.6 percent to 2.0 percent. As expected, richer countries like Argentina, 
Chile and Uruguay have a greater share of population that is 80 years and older.  
 




Table 3.2: Percentage of population that is elderly, 2006 and 2015 
 
  







Argentina 14.2 14.8 4.7*** 2.3 2.5 11.3***
Bolivia 7.5 10.3 37.4 0.7 1.2 62.1
Brazil 10.1 14.3 41.2*** 1.3 2.0 50.0***
Chile 12.9 17.5 35.8*** 1.9 3.0 58.8***
Colombia 9.6 11.4 18.8*** 1.4 1.7 24.3***
Costa Rica 9.1 13.1 44.2*** 1.4 2.2 56.3***
Dominican Rep. 9.7 12.0 23.7*** 1.5 2.2 42.5***
Ecuador 10.3 9.8 -4.5 1.6 1.6 4.8
El Salvador 9.6 12.0 24.9*** 1.6 2.2 33.2***
Guatemala 6.7 7.7 14.9 1.0 1.1 7.2
Honduras 7.3 8.9 22.5 1.2 1.4 14.9
Mexico 9.1 10.5 15.6*** 1.4 1.5 9.8***
Nicaragua 7.4 8.1 9.8*** 1.2 1.5 26.7***
Panama 10.4 12.6 21.2 1.7 2.1 27.0
Paraguay 8.7 8.8 1.2 1.4 1.2 -11.9
Peru 10.7 13.9 30.8 1.6 2.4 53.4
Uruguay 19.5 18.6 -4.7*** 3.5 3.7 5.0***
LAC average 
(unweighted)
10.1 12.0 19.9 1.6 2.0 28.0
Country
Population 60+ (%) Population 80+ (%)
Notes: Country averages are weighted by survey weights, LAC average is the unweighted average of country 
means. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.




Figure 3.1: Poverty headcount ratio by age, 2015 
 
I now turn to reporting absolute and relative poverty rates for the elderly populations. Before that, 
it worth noting that between the two years surveyed, at the population level, poverty headcount 
ratio reduced by more than half – from 8.6 percent in 2006 to 19.6 percent in 2015. Poverty was 
reduced for all ages in most countries although the improvements across countries have been 
heterogenous (Figure 3.1). Richer countries such as Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay 
which had low levels of poverty in 2006 reduced poverty by more than 60 percent. Among the 
countries that had high rates of poverty in 2006, Bolivia, El Salvador and Nicaragua have been 
more successful in reducing poverty (by over 60 percent) while countries like Guatemala and 
Honduras have been less successful (poverty rates decreased by less than 25 percent).  
 




Table 3.3: Poverty among the elderly, 2015 
 
 
Table 3.3 then reports unadjusted and adjusted absolute poverty headcount ratio for the elderly 
population as well as the relative poverty ratios using the $3.20 per day poverty line for the year 
2015. There is significant variation across countries in elderly poverty levels. Countries in the 
southern cone, which are also more developed, have poverty levels well below 1 percent – 
Argentina 0.51 percent; Chile 0.69 percent, and Uruguay 0.07 percent. On the other hand, less 
developed Central American countries such as Guatemala (17.8 percent) and Honduras (29.04 
percent) have elderly poverty levels that more than twice the regional average of 6.87 percent. In 
all countries, poverty rates for the elderly compares favorably to that of the overall population, the 
relative ratio at the regional level is 0.51 which means that the elderly are half as likely to be poor 
as the non-elderly population. Once again, the countries in the southern cone have lower relative 
poverty among the elderly. The ratio is Argentina is 0.15, Chile 0.29 and Uruguay 0.09. In 
countries such Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, which has higher national poverty rates, the 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
60+ (%) 60+/<60 60+ (%) 60+/<60 60+ (%) 60+/<60 60+ (%) 60+/<60
Argentina 0.51 0.15 0.61 0.21 0.65 0.21 0.69 0.26
Bolivia 8.83 0.73 12.05 1.06 13.69 1.17 16.11 1.43
Brazil 1.15 0.13 1.14 0.14 1.17 0.14 1.18 0.15
Chile 0.69 0.29 0.87 0.37 0.81 0.33 0.93 0.39
Colombia 8.39 0.68 9.46 0.82 9.74 0.81 10.46 0.94
Costa Rica 1.24 0.28 1.39 0.36 1.45 0.35 1.59 0.42
Dominican Rep. 4.05 0.55 4.50 0.65 4.58 0.64 5.38 0.79
Ecuador 4.95 0.50 5.92 0.65 5.98 0.62 7.14 0.79
El Salvador 6.93 0.67 7.88 0.81 7.81 0.77 8.57 0.93
Guatemala 17.79 0.72 19.82 0.83 19.89 0.82 22.83 0.96
Honduras 29.04 0.89 30.72 0.96 30.21 0.93 32.25 1.00
Mexico 7.90 0.63 9.20 0.80 9.38 0.78 10.42 0.94
Nicaragua 11.65 0.90 12.98 1.09 12.06 0.94 12.90 1.08
Panama 2.41 0.33 2.55 0.39 2.51 0.37 2.73 0.44
Paraguay 3.82 0.53 4.14 0.63 4.22 0.61 4.33 0.67
Peru 7.28 0.67 8.98 0.86 10.05 0.93 11.82 1.13
Uruguay 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.14
LAC average
(unweighted)
6.87 0.51 7.78 0.63 7.90 0.62 8.79 0.73
Notes: Poverty line = US$3.20-a-day purchasing power parity. Equivalence scales: a1 = 0.5, a2 = 0.75, theta = 0.8
Country
Per capita income 
measure
Household income adjusted for
Adult equivalents Economies of scale Both




relative poverty levels of the elderly are also higher, with the ratio being 0.72, 0.89 and 0.90, 
respectively.  
 
These patterns suggest that countries that are richer are better at protecting the elderly in both 
absolute and relative sense. In addition to national wealth, is it also possible that differences in 
demographic structures maybe explain the variation in absolute and relative poverty levels across 
countries? Poorer countries tend to have relatively younger populations and bigger households and 
adjusting for adult equivalency and household economies of scale may reduce the gap between 
countries. Table 3.3 also reports absolute and relative poverty ratios adjusting for adult equivalency 
and economies of scale individually, and both together. In all countries, adjusting the income 
measure yields higher absolute and relative poverty rates for the elderly population. This is partly 
because the elderly in Latin America tends to have greater incomes than the non-elderly (discussed 
in the next section). The increases in relative poverty ratios are higher for richer countries like 
Argentina where the ratio increases by 70 percent, 51 percent in Costa Rica and 60 percent in 
Uruguay. The increase in relative poverty is also substantial for Bolivia and Peru where the ratio 
is increased by 95 percent and 70 percent, respectively. In the case of Argentina, Bolivia, Costa 
Rica, and Uruguay, this is due to family size. These countries occupy four out of the top five spots 
in terms of small family size.  
 
3.5 Understanding poverty and well-being of the elderly 
In this section, I examine the impacts of health care expenditures, pensions, and private transfers 
on the well-being of the elderly. I begin by documenting patterns of health care utilization of 
outpatient and inpatient services and OOP expenditures. I then describe coverage of health 
insurance and examine the correlations between insurance coverage and utilization and 
expenditures. Then I turn to estimating the availability of pensions and social transfers and their 
impacts on the well-being of the elderly.  
 




3.5.1 Health care utilization, expenditures, and the role of insurance 
Health care utilization over the lifetime follows a J-curve pattern, with greater needs at the younger 
ages (ages 0 to 5), which declines through the middle ages (6 to 24) and tends to increase again 
thereafter. Figure 3.2 plots the J-curves for outpatient services use, hospitalization, and OOP 
expenditures for all countries for which data are available. To make comparison across countries 
easier, the figure plots utilization rates relative to the healthy group of 15-to-24-year-old 
population. The first pattern to note is that the J-curve for utilization is visible for all countries. 
Second, in most countries, the curve is steeper for OOP expenditures than for utilization. This is 
consistent with the fact that the services needed at older ages tend to be costlier. Nevertheless, 
these patterns are also alarming to the extent that OOP expenditures reduce the well-being of the 
elderly.  
 
Figure 3.2: Health care utilization patterns and OOPE by age and country, 2014 
 




Table 3.4 then reports absolute and relative health care utilization and OOP expenditures levels 
for the elderly population. At the LAC level, 40.3 percent of the elderly reported using outpatient 
services’ and 7.0 percent reported using inpatient services. This regional measure averages 
annualized country estimates that are constructed from data using different recall periods and 
should be interpreted with caution. Across countries that use a one-month recall window for 
consultations, Argentina and Nicaragua are at the higher end with utilization rates of 53.9 percent 
and 58.0 percent, respectively. Utilization rate is higher in more developed countries such as Chile 
(50.6 percent using a 3-month recall period), Costa Rica (82.2 percent using a 1-year recall period) 
and Uruguay (58.5 percent using a 3-month recall period). The less developed countries are at the 
lower end of utilization distribution, with a rate of 9.2 percent for El Salvador and 22.2 percent for 
Guatemala. The patterns for hospitalization are similar. The use of inpatient services is highest for 
Argentina (12.5 percent), Chile (10.4 percent) Colombia (11.8 percent) and lowest for Guatemala 
(0.9 percent) and Nicaragua (3.0 percent). Overall, these patterns suggest that access to health care 
services for the elderly varies greatly across countries, with far greater access in more developed 
countries.  
 




Table 3.4: Utilization of health care services and OOP expenditures 
 
In relative terms, the elderly population use outpatient services 1.5 times more than the non-elderly 
population and they utilize inpatient services twice as often as the non-elderly population. In 
contrast, the elderly face OOPE that are 2.9 times higher than the non-elderly population. Even in 
more developed countries, and countries with greater levels of insurance coverage, OOPE are 
relatively higher – 3.3 times in Brazil, 2.9 times in Uruguay. These high OOPE expenditures also 
pose a high risk of incurring catastrophic and impoverishing expenditures in health for the elderly. 
Figure 3.3 plots the incidence or catastrophic and impoverishment risk as defined earlier over the 
age distribution for all 14 countries where data are available. The risk of catastrophic and 
impoverishing expenditures is higher for the elderly in all countries. On average, the risks are 2.6 
times and 2.3 times greater for the elderly population, respectively.   
 






60+ 60+/<60 Level 60+ 60+/<60
Argentina 1 month 53.9 1.4 1 year 12.5 1.6 Ind 539.7 2.3
Bolivia 1 year 78.3 1.2 1 year 3.1 1.6 Ind 171.5 2.4
Brazil 2 weeks 25.0 1.8 1 year 10.2 1.9 Ind 629.3 3.3
Chile 3 months 50.6 1.5 1 year 10.4 1.8 - - -
Colombia 1 month 47.0 1.6 1 year 11.8 2.0 Ind 436.1 3.3
Costa Rica 1 year 82.5 1.4 1 year 7.4 1.3 HH 499.6 2.9
Dom. Rep. 1 month 12.2 1.0 6 months 8.1 1.4 Ind 138.8 1.8
Ecuador 1 month 40.1 1.7 - - - HH 363.0 2.4
El Salvador 1 month 9.2 1.3 - - - Ind 68.9 2.8
Guatemala 1 month 22.2 1.5 1 month 0.9 3.3 Ind 248.3 3.5
Honduras 1 month 24.9 1.5 1 year 7.8 1.4 Ind 283.2 3.7
Mexico 1 month 20.0 1.2 - - - HH 508.9 2.2
Nicaragua 1 month 58.0 2.0 1 month 3.0 2.1 Ind 486.2 3.9
Panama 1 month 32.4 1.6 1 month 3.5 3.0 Ind 556.6 3.3
Paraguay 3 months 30.6 1.7 3 months 5.9 3.0 Ind 218.1 2.5
Peru 1 month 39.6 1.3 1 year 7.0 1.6 Ind 215.7 2.4
Uruguay 3 months 58.5 1.8 3 months 6.4 2.2 HH 527.1 2.9
LAC average 
(unweighted)
40.3 1.5 7.0 2.0 368.2 2.9
Notes: Country averages are weighted by survey weights, LAC average is unweighted and is computed by averaging over country averages.
Out-patient visits Hospitalization Out-of-pocket expenditures




Figure 3.3: Risk of catastrophic and impoverishing expenditures by age and country 
 
Table 3.5 then examines the absolute and relative levels of catastrophic and impoverishment risk 
for the elderly population. Using the 25 percent threshold, I find that 6.8 percent of the elderly 
population in LAC is at risk of incurring health expenditures that exceed 25 percent of their 
income. These figures vary substantially across countries. In El Salvador, only 2.0 percent of the 
elderly population are at risk of catastrophic health expenditures, however, this is also due to low 
use of outpatient services (9 percent) and lack of data on hospitalization. Brazil (10.3 percent) and 
Nicaragua (14.1 percent) have the highest proportion of elderly population at risk of catastrophic 
expenditures, as these are also the countries that have among the highest rate of utilization of 
outpatient services. The fraction of elderly at risk of impoverishing expenditures in health is 2.2 
percent for LAC using the $3.20 a day threshold. Once again there is substantial variation across 
countries with the levels ranging from 0.8 percent in Uruguay to 5.3 percent in Nicaragua.  
 




Table 3.5: Catastrophic and impoverishing health expenditure risk by age and country 
 
 
As discussed earlier, countries in LAC differ substantially in the types and levels of health 
insurance coverage available to the population. Almost all countries operate a contributory public 
health insurance for the formally employed, and parallelly operate separate insurance systems for 
police and military institutions. In most countries, there is also the option of private insurance, 
which is subscribed to by the richer segments of the population. For the non-formally employed 
population, there are generally two type of schemes available. The first is a tax-funded insurance 
system, such as the Integral Health Insurance (Seguro Integral de Salud, in Spanish) in Peru and 
Popular Insurance (Seguro Popular, in Spanish) which provide health services through a network 
of Ministry of Health or public facilities. In other countries such as Ecuador and Paraguay, there 
is no provision of insurance and health services are delivered directly by Ministries of Health and 
public network of facilities. In general, each insurance system within countries operates their own 
network of facilities, and thus access and quality differ substantially by type of insurance coverage.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
60+ 60+/<60 60+ 60+/<60 60+ 60+/<60 60+ 60+/<60
Argentina - - - - - - - -
Bolivia 9.8 2.1 4.1 2.2 1.5 2.8 1.3 1.8
Brazil 25.6 2.6 10.3 2.8 1.9 1.9 2.6 1.9
Chile - - - - - - - -
Colombia 15.7 2.7 8.0 3.4 1.8 2.9 2.1 2.2
Costa Rica 17.3 2.6 4.8 2.5 0.6 1.6 1.4 3.1
Dom. Rep. 7.6 1.4 3.4 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.8
Ecuador 18.1 2.8 8.4 4.2 2.2 4.2 2.2 3.2
El Salvador 3.6 1.7 2.0 2.3 0.8 2.6 1.1 2.5
Guatemala 11.3 2.1 8.7 2.7 3.3 2.9 3.4 2.9
Honduras - - - - - - - -
Mexico 19.2 1.6 9.1 2.0 2.9 1.7 3.7 1.8
Nicaragua 21.2 3.6 14.1 4.0 4.2 4.1 5.3 4.1
Panama 17.3 2.0 8.6 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.2
Paraguay 10.7 2.7 5.0 2.9 2.0 2.7 2.1 2.5
Peru 10.0 2.1 4.1 2.4 0.9 2.1 1.2 2.1
Uruguay 18.5 1.8 4.1 1.5 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.7
LAC average 
(unweighted)
14.7 2.3 6.8 2.6 1.9 2.4 2.2 2.3
Notes: Country averages are weighted by survey weights, LAC average is unweighted and is computed by averaging over country averages
$3.20 per day threshold
Catastrophic risk Impoverishing risk
Country 10% threshold 25% threshold $1.90 per day threshold




To examine the role of insurance on improving access and reducing OOP expenditures across 
countries, I categorize the insurance schemes available to the population in each country into two 
categories – contributory, or non-contributory and uninsured. Before I describe the results, it is 
important to note that all relationships reported are correlational, and therefore should not be 
interpreted as causal relationships between access to insurance and health outcomes. The key issue 
in that of omitted variable bias. As it is well established in the literature, those who select into 
insurance are typically in better health, and any differences in outcomes between the insured and 
uninsured could reflect selection on the basis of baseline health status (Einav & Finkelstein, 2011; 
Newhouse, 1993). Similarly, if co-pays are present, access to insurance can also increase OOPE 
because of increases in care utilization (Bernal et al., 2017). For this reason, I examine the 
correlation between insurance status and OOP expenditures as a share of income, in addition to 
outpatient and inpatient care utilization.  
 
Column 2 of Table 3.6 reports the percentage of elderly population enrolled in contributory 
insurance across countries. The levels of contributory insurance coverage vary across countries 
ranging from 0.80 percent in Guatemala and 5.79 percent in Honduras to 91.55 percent in 
Argentina. For the level of progress towards UHC, Chile also has low participation of the elderly 
into contributory insurance at 9.64 percent. Nevertheless, this is because the elderly is covered 
through the non-contributory part of Chile’s main insurance fund, the FONASA, and have access 
to similar levels of coverage as those with contributory insurance in the same fund. To investigate 
the relationship between insurance coverage and outcomes, I estimate the following linear 
regression: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑗 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝜃1 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is the outcome of interest for elderly member j in country 𝑖 , 𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑗 is a binary indicator 
that takes the value of 1 if the elderly member is enrolled in contributory insurance, 0 otherwise. 
𝑋𝑖𝑗 is a vector of individual characteristics including age, gender and a binary indicator for urban 
living. 𝜖𝑖𝑗 is the idiosyncratic error term which is clustered at the sampling unit level. 𝛽1 is the 
coefficient of interest, which represents the average difference in outcome 𝑌𝑖𝑗 between those with 
contributory insurance and those without contributory insurance controlling for individual 




characteristics. Of course, for 𝛽1 to be identified, we need 𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑗 and 𝜖𝑖𝑗 to be uncorrelated. As 
discussed earlier, there may be several unobservables that determine enrollment into insurance and 
thus correlated 𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑗. Hence, the coefficients can only be interpreted as correlation.  
 
Table 3.6: Insurance coverage and its impact on health care access and poverty 
 
 








Argentina 91.55 18.16** 3.21 - - -
(7.66) (5.15)
Bolivia 27.80 10.17*** -0.10 0.01 1.33 -0.19
(1.52) (0.70) (0.01) (0.90) (0.44)
Brazil 26.90 4.67*** 2.34*** -0.02 -0.54 -1.62***
(0.60) (0.43) (0.02) (0.52) (0.28)
Chile 9.64 6.22*** 3.48*** - - -
(0.77) (0.47)
Colombia 69.14 8.80*** -0.63 -0.02 -0.53 -0.05
(0.79) (0.52) (0.03) (0.55) (0.23)
Dom. Rep. 70.77 4.47*** 4.69*** 0.01 0.26 0.17
(1.54) (1.27) (0.01) (0.81) (0.59)
Ecuador 20.19 2.15* - -0.16*** -9.90*** -2.73***
(1.14) (0.04) (0.72) (0.40)
El Salvador 15.88 -0.72 - -0.02*** -2.00*** -1.47***
(0.86) (0.01) (0.46) (0.35)
Guatemala 0.80 -2.46 -0.73 0.15 4.42 0.10
(7.11) (1.59) (2.14) (5.00) (3.24)
Honduras 5.79 -1.05 3.84*** - - -
(2.14) (1.32)
Mexico 48.90 2.96*** - -0.04*** -5.50*** -3.60***
(0.97) (0.02) (0.67) (0.45)
Nicaragua 26.69 10.44*** 0.40 -0.76 -4.45*** -1.46
(2.26) (0.78) (0.85) (1.52) (0.98)
Panama 61.23 8.53*** 0.81 -0.13*** -5.63*** -1.90***
(1.75) (0.72) (0.04) (1.11) (0.61)
Paraguay 41.90 -1.58 1.82* -0.03*** -4.13*** -1.50**
(2.04) (1.04) (0.01) (0.98) (0.67)
Peru 32.33 5.89*** 4.82*** -0.02*** -1.60*** -1.10***
(0.82) (0.42) (0.00) (0.32) (0.18)
Uruguay 68.28 15.74*** 0.49 -0.01 -1.01 -0.52**
(1.64) (0.81) (0.01) (0.67) (0.26)
Has contributory 
insurance (%)
Coefficient on contributory insurance
Notes: Regressions are weighted by survey weights, robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 
10%.




Column 2 reports the coefficient on the contributory insurance variable with the likelihood of 
realizing an outpatient utilization in the given recall period for the country (described in Table 
3.4). The coefficient is large, positive, and statistically significant for 12 out of 16 countries. In 
countries such as Argentina and Uruguay, which have high coverage rate of contributory 
insurance, the elderly population with insurance coverage are 18.2 and 15.7 percentage points 
more likely to have utilized outpatient services. Therefore, in these countries, those that are not 
covered may be at the highest disadvantage compared to their covered counterparts. Conversely, 
the coefficient is smaller (but still statistically significant) in countries like Brazil and Dominican 
Republic (4.7 percentage points and 4.5 percentage points respectively). In these countries, the 
difference in access between those covered and not covered are smaller. In the remaining 4 
countries, the coefficient is small and statistically insignificant. These countries are El Salvador, 
Honduras, Guatemala, and Paraguay, where the health system overall is generally weaker and there 
are smaller differences between different sub-systems.  
 
Column 3 then reports the coefficients on hospitalization for 13 countries where data is available. 
Overall, the differences in hospitalization are smaller and statistically significant for 4 countries 
only. This make sense as hospitalizations typically correspond to acute and emergency care needs 
and delaying treatment may not be an option. Overall, these patterns suggest that there are 
substantial differences in access to outpatient care and some differences in inpatient care by 
insurance status. Note however that these differences only reflect differences in access and not the 
differences in quality that may be available to the subscribers of the different insurance schemes. 
Examining the differences in quality care or effective access should be an agenda for future 
research.  
 
The remaining columns of Table 3.6 report average differences in OOP as a share of income, 
catastrophic expenditure risk and impoverishing expenditure risk for 13 out of 17 countries for 
which data are available. I find that the correlation is negative and statistically significant for OOP 
expenditures as a share of income for 6 countries. These are – Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, 
Panama, Paraguay, and Peru. In the remaining countries, the coefficients are small and statistically 
not significant. Since the concept of catastrophic expenditure risk and impoverishing expenditure 
risk builds on OOP as a share on income, and the patterns are similar for those variables. In 




summary, the results suggest that the elderly population that is not covered by contributory 
schemes may face a greater burden of OOP expenditures.  
 
3.5.2 Access to pensions and their impact on poverty 
The earlier discussion of poverty we found that poverty incidence among the elderly varies across 
countries in LAC. In this section, I examine the drivers behind this heterogeneity. Since the concept 
of poverty is income-based, it is first useful to examine the importance of several sources of income 
for the elderly, since the heterogeneity in poverty is likely to relate to these. Table 3.14 in the 
Appendix examines the relative importance of various sources of income – labor and non-labor 
income. The latter includes pensions, transfers and capital or rents. As people age, labor force 
participation declines and labor income evidently becomes a smaller contributor of overall income. 
At the regional level, labor income makes up for 84 percent of all income for those between 24 
and 59 years of age (92 percent for males and 75 percent for females). For the elderly population, 
the figure drops to 33 percent, 44 percent for males and 21 percent for females.  
 
The drop in the labor share of income is compensated by an increase in the share of income from 
pensions – 31 percent for the elderly population (2 percent of the adult population in comparison).25 
The share of income from private transfers also increases, at the regional level it is 11 percent for 
adults compared to 30 percent for the elderly population. Table 3.14 also shows the heterogeneity 
in the shares of pensions and transfers income shares of the elderly population across countries. In 
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, which arguably have stronger social protection systems for the 
elderly, pensions as a share of total income for the elderly population are greater than 70 percent. 
In other countries such as Bolivia, Dominican Republic and Honduras, the share of transfers 
dominates, exceeding 40 percent of total income. Finally, at all ages, females are more dependent 




25 In all countries except Chile (53 percent to 44 percent) and Peru (20 percent to 18 percent), the fraction of the 
elderly receiving pensions has increased between the two reference time periods. The highest increases were in 
Argentina (59 percent to 75 percent), Costa Rica (36 percent to 56 percent), and Nicaragua (10 percent to 19 
percent). 





Figure 3.4: Labor force participation by age and gender, 2015 
 
 
I now analyze in more detail the impact of pensions and private transfers on the incidence of 
poverty and labor force participation (LFP) among the elderly. While LFP declines with age, the 
fraction of elderly who are still working is still 38.7 percent at the regional level (25.2 percent for 
females and 54.4 percent for males). For males, this rate varies across countries and ranges from 
36.1 percent in Uruguay to 70 percent in Guatemala. For females, the lowest LFP rate is observed 
in Argentina (16.9 percent) and the highest in Peru (49.1 percent). To examine the impact of 
pensions and private transfers on poverty, I estimate and compare poverty rates among the elderly 
with and without transfers. Column 1 of Table 3.7 reports the percentage of elderly who reported 
receiving pensions in household surveys. At the regional level, 42.6 percent of the elderly receiving 
pensions in 2015. The countries with the highest coverage are Bolivia (92.1 percent), Uruguay 
(77.7 percent) and Argentina (76.9 percent). Columns 2 and 3 then report the incidence of poverty 
with and without accounting for pensions income, respectively, and Column 4 reports the 
difference. Across all 17 countries included in the analysis, the incidence of poverty is 8.8 percent 




among those who do not receive pensions but falls to 1.9 percent among the elderly population 
covered by pensions. In all but six countries, poverty rates of aging population who live in pension-
earning households are less than 1 percent. One of the exceptions is Bolivia where the poverty rate 
among those receiving pensions is 8.3 percent despite near universal coverage. This is partly 
because of the small size of the transfer amount, but also because of high poverty levels in the 
country. In contrast, the poverty rate among the non-beneficiaries is 15.4 percent. In Table 3.7, 
Columns 5 and 6 report LFP rates of the elderly with and without pensions, and Column 7 reports 
the difference. At the regional level, LFP rate for pension beneficiaries is 23.3 percent which 
increases to 53 percent among non-beneficiaries. The differences are large and statistically 
significant for all countries. These results suggest that pensions play a significant role in alleviating 
poverty among the elderly and allowing them to retire. 
  





Table 3.7: Poverty and LFP with and without pensions and private transfers, 2015 





















Argentina 76.9 0.1 1.9 -1.9*** 12.1 70.7 -58.6*** 3.6 0.8 0.5 0.3 15.6 26.0 -10.4***
Bolivia 92.1 8.3 15.4 -7.1*** 56.1 79.9 -23.7*** 17.1 7.4 9.1 -1.7 60.6 57.5 3.1
Brazil 75.8 0.3 3.9 -3.6*** 20.0 47.4 -27.4*** 1.9 9.3 1.0 8.3*** 32.3 26.5 5.8***
Chile 73.0 0.3 1.8 -1.5*** 18.5 59.9 -41.4*** 36.2 0.4 0.8 -0.4*** 20.9 34.7 -13.8***
Colombia 24.9 0.2 11.1 -10.9*** 21.9 44.6 -22.7*** 17.4 10.3 8.0 2.3*** 28.0 41.2 -13.3***
Costa Rica 54.8 0.2 2.5 -2.4*** 12.6 42.1 -29.5*** 15.8 2.0 1.1 0.9** 18.9 27.3 -8.4***
Dominican Rep. 13.6 0.8 4.6 -3.8*** 9.1 37.2 -28.1*** 54.3 5.0 2.9 2.0*** 21.8 47.2 -25.4***
Ecuador 21.3 0.2 6.2 -6.0*** 22.7 54.4 -31.6*** 41.0 5.2 4.8 0.5 41.5 51.9 -10.4***
El Salvador 12.1 1.0 7.7 -6.8*** 18.6 40.0 -21.4*** 33.0 5.7 7.5 -1.8*** 25.8 43.2 -17.4***
Guatemala 11.8 5.9 19.4 -13.5*** 24.2 49.9 -25.7*** 35.0 14.3 19.6 -5.3*** 46.2 47.2 -1.0
Honduras 11.4 5.2 32.1 -26.9*** 24.5 50.6 -26.2*** 41.2 27.6 30.1 -2.5 36.2 55.7 -19.4***
Mexico 24.7 0.9 10.2 -9.3*** 19.7 44.2 -24.4*** 40.2 8.4 7.6 0.8 30.8 43.1 -12.3***
Nicaragua 18.9 1.6 14.0 -12.4*** 26.8 44.0 -17.3*** 51.1 11.6 11.7 -0.1 47.8 33.4 14.4***
Panama 66.0 0.7 5.7 -5.0*** 23.5 54.4 -30.9*** 19.0 3.0 2.3 0.7 26.2 35.8 -9.6***
Paraguay 34.0 1.6 5.0 -3.4*** 25.2 53.8 -28.6*** 31.3 5.5 3.1 2.4*** 43.6 44.3 -0.7
Peru 36.4 5.1 8.5 -3.5*** 46.7 65.1 -18.4*** 18.4 7.4 7.2 0.2 52.5 59.7 -7.2***
Uruguay 77.7 0.0 0.3 -0.2*** 14.0 63.7 -49.7*** 11.0 0.2 0.1 0.2*** 22.9 25.4 -2.5***
LAC average
(unweighted)
42.6 1.9 8.8 -6.9 23.3 53.0 -29.7 27.5 7.3 6.9 0.4 33.6 41.2 -7.6
Notes: Country averages are weighted by survey weights, LAC average is the unweighted average of country means. *** Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.







Poverty rate Labor force participation Poverty rate Labor force participation
Country




3.5.3 The role of private transfers 
The remaining columns of Table 3.7 similarly examine the impact of private transfers on the 
incidence of poverty and LFP among the elderly. Across the region, 27.5 percent of the elderly 
received private transfers, with substantial variation across countries. In the Central American 
countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, which also have low coverage of 
pensions, over 40 percent of the elderly reported receiving private transfers. Relative to pensions, 
the impacts of private transfers are much smaller. The incidence of poverty with and without 
transfers is similar – 7.3 percent and 6.9 percent, respectively. In only three countries, private 
transfers are positively correlated with reduced poverty. In five countries, poverty rates are 
significantly higher for those receiving transfers than those who do not. These patterns suggest 
that private transfers may be targeted towards the poorer elderly population that is not covered by 
pensions. Figure 3.5 shows a scatter plot of the share of elderly receiving private transfers for each 
country against the share of elderly receiving pensions. There is a strong negative correlation 
between the two variables suggesting that in countries with lower coverage of pensions, private 
transfers may be filling in the gap. 
 
Figure 3.5: Complementarities between pensions and transfers, 2015 
 




3.6 Living arrangements of the elderly 
The final section of this chapter examines the living arrangements of the elderly. Cross-national 
comparisons of older people’s living arrangements reveal substantial differences across countries. 
One major difference is that older people in more developed countries tend to live on their own 
(alone or with their spouse), while in less developed countries, living children or with extended 
family is the norm. The elderly population also relies heavily on family members for their well-
being and survival (Bongarts & Zimmer, 2002; Kinsella & He, 2009; Zeng & George, 2000). The 
living arrangements of the elderly can have a profound impact on well-being and economic 
behavior. They have been shown to affect life satisfaction, health status, and health care seeking 
behavior. The choice of living arrangements also depends on individual characteristics including 
marital status, availability of family, personal wealth and income, health status and preferences. 
The availability of resources is also a key determinant of this choice (Cotlear & Tornarolli, 2011; 
Kinsella & He, 2009). In this section, I examine the determinants of the living arrangements of the 
elderly, focusing on the availability of children, age, gender, income, and access to pensions and 
transfers.  
 
In more developed countries, the incidence of multigenerational household is on the decline. In 
LAC, most of the elderly continue to live in multigenerational households, but patterns suggest 
that there is a trend towards living on their own (Figure 3.6). The fraction of elderly living alone 
in 2015 is lowest in countries with smallest shares of elderly population – Guatemala (28 percent), 
Honduras (23 percent), Nicaragua (21 percent). At the other extreme, in older societies, more than 
half the elderly live alone – Uruguay (67 percent), Argentina (53 percent) and Brazil (53 percent). 
Notably, older societies, by definition, have a smaller share of population in younger ages, so part 
of the variation on living choices of elderly could reflect variation in the availability of children to 
live with. To explore this dimension, in Figure 3.7, I plot the availability of adult population 
(defined as the ratio of population between 15-59 years and population 60 years or older) and the 
percentage of elderly living on their own. As expected, the likelihood of living alone increases 
drastically with the decline in the population ratio of the adults and the elderly. The tendency to 
live alone also varies by gender. Around 60 years of age, there are no significant differences 
between men and women, but around 80 years of age, women are less likely to live on their own 




relative to men. This difference is partly due to longevity – women tend to survive their spouses 
and rejoin the extended family after becoming widows.  
Figure 3.6: Percentage of elderly living alone or with a spouse 
 




Figure 3.7: Percentage of elderly living on their own and the national availability of children, 
2015 
 
Turning towards the income and wealth dimension, if these factors were to influence the decision 
of the elderly to live on their own, we would expect personal incomes among those living alone to 
be higher than that of those who live with their families. This would also suggest that the elderly 
may prefer to live alone if they had sufficient incomes to do so. In Table 3.8, I report the individual 
and household per capita incomes of the elderly by living arrangements. In all countries, household 
per capita income is substantially higher for the elderly living on their own in comparison to those 
who co-reside with their families. At the regional level, the difference is 31 percent, and the figure 
varies between 4.4 percent in Peru to 51 percent in Nicaragua. Differences are similar when using 
individual income. These patterns suggest that more elderly could live on their own if they had the 
means to do so.  




Table 3.8: Average income of the aging, 2015 
 
In countries with well-established pension and social security programs, there is evidence that 
many older adults provide support to their adult children and grandchildren. This support may 
include financial help, shelter, and care for spouses, older parents, and grandchildren. In Europe 
and the United States, older parents are more likely to provide time, money, and shelter to their 
children than to receive such transfers (Danielsbacka et al., 2019; Duflo, 2003; National Institute 
of Aging, 2009). In developing countries, it is less obvious if the elderly are net contributors to 
household income. The data available in the household surveys are not suitable for this analysis as 
they do not have information on unpaid work (or time-use), and they do not have sufficient 
information about how income is shared within the household. However, among the elderly that 
co-reside, a comparison of the individual income and household per capita incomes points to 
evidence that the elderly are net contributors. Comparing Column 1 and 4 of Table 3.8, in 15 
countries, the individual income of the elderly is on average greater than their household income. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)






Argentina 659.7 747.6 11.8*** 651.5 1,023.4 36.3***
Bolivia 537.0 453.4 -18.4 484.6 554.8 12.7
Brazil 742.8 806.9 7.9*** 669.1 988.5 32.3***
Chile 603.4 660.5 8.6*** 614.2 888.5 30.9***
Colombia 506.9 642.8 21.1*** 516.0 756.7 31.8***
Costa Rica 691.8 847.6 18.4*** 733.7 1,097.5 33.2***
Dominican Rep. 438.5 524.0 16.3*** 414.1 603.3 31.4***
Ecuador 475.8 494.2 3.7 497.3 706.1 29.6
El Salvador 324.6 437.7 25.9*** 333.8 517.2 35.5***
Guatemala 307.1 346.7 11.4 305.3 475.7 35.8
Honduras 285.9 317.2 9.9 262.6 402.8 34.8
Mexico 356.4 498.9 28.6*** 352.2 598.8 41.2***
Nicaragua 399.7 556.5 28.2*** 334.2 682.6 51.0***
Panama 761.1 823.0 7.5 793.9 1,077.8 26.3
Paraguay 591.1 604.1 2.1 574.7 747.4 23.1
Peru 472.9 403.1 -17.3 466.2 487.7 4.4
Uruguay 900.7 1,023.5 12.0*** 811.8 1,271.4 36.2***
LAC average
(unweighted)
532.7 599.3 518.5 757.7
Individual income Household per capita income
Notes: Values are in 2011 PPP dollars. Country averages are weighted by survey weights, LAC average is the unweighted average of 
country means. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.




Assuming income is shared equally across all members of the household, the elderly appears to be 
making net transfers to the other generations with whom they reside.  
 
Finally, I present econometric results to confirm the descriptive results discussed above. To do 
this, I estimate the following probit regression for each country separately: 
 
𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +  𝛽4𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠1
+ 𝛽5𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 +  𝛽6𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽7𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽8𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 + 𝜖𝑖 
 
where the outcome variable is an indicator of whether the elderly person lives on their own (alone 
or with a spouse). Poverty is dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the person is in poverty. 
Pension and Transfers are also dummy variables which take the value of 1 if the person received 
these transfers. Finally, the Urban variable is also a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
elderly person lives in an urban area. Income is measured in thousands of PPP dollars.  
  




Table 3.9: Probability of the elderly living on their own, 2015 












































































































Individual income 0.07*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.02** 0.01 -0.00 0.04*** 0.01 0.01** 0.01 -0.01 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Is poor (1=yes) 0.01 -0.15*** -0.18*** -0.28*** -0.02** -0.21*** -0.24*** -0.21*** -0.24*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.15*** -0.20*** -0.28*** -0.26*** -0.12*** -0.21**
(0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.07) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.10)
Receives pension (1=yes) 0.07*** -0.00 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05* 0.10*** 0.05*** 0.12*** 0.06** 0.09*** 0.04** 0.04** -0.01 0.09*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Private tranfers (1=yes) 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.09*** 0.03*** 0.19*** 0.26*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.11***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Is female (1=yes) -0.07*** -0.03 -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.01** -0.08*** -0.01 -0.04*** 0.02 -0.04*** -0.02 -0.03*** -0.04** 0.02 -0.03* -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Age 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.03** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.07*** 0.00 0.06*** 0.01 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age squared -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
In urban area (1=yes) -0.20*** -0.01** -0.06*** -0.13*** -0.10*** -0.02 -0.04*** -0.00 0.04*** -0.04** -0.04*** -0.05** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.22*** -0.04***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Number of observations 18,564 3,438 48,375 49,030 96,623 4,779 3,320 12,141 10,131 4,218 2,317 7,414 2,416 5,555 3,583 16,144 25,432
Probability of living alone (1=yes)
Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. Individual income is in thousands of PPP dollars. Observations are weighted by survey weight, robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 
1%




Table 3.9 reports the marginal effects obtained from the probit regression for each country. For 
the age variable, the signs are as expected in all countries, and the probability of living alone 
increased with age. The coefficient on age squared is negative confirming the tendency to move 
back with family at older ages. The coefficients on the age variable are statistically significant in 
15 out the 17 countries. The probability of the elderly living on their own is also lower in urban 
areas, and the result is statistically significant in 11 out of the 16 countries for which data are 
available. Worldwide, men are more likely than women to live on their own and this pattern also 
holds for LAC – the female dummy has a positive sign in all countries, and it is significant in 13 
of the 18 countries. 
 
Income is also positively correlated with the likelihood of the elderly living on their own. The 
coefficient of income is positive in most countries (except Honduras and Peru, but not significant) 
and is statistically significant for 11 countries. The coefficient on the binary indicator of poverty 
is negative and statistically significant in 13 countries. Finally, the coefficients on the binary 
indicators of pensions and private transfers are almost always positive and statistically significant 
suggesting that the elderly are more likely to live on their own when they receive pensions or 
private transfers.  
 
3.7 Conclusions, policy implications and avenues for future research 
Due to the rapid aging process, countries in the Latin America and the Caribbean region are facing 
new pressures to meet the health care and social protection needs of the elderly. On one hand, 
health and social protection systems are obsolete, fragmented, and segmented, thereby creating 
poor quality of access and inequality in access to health services. On the other hand, due to recent 
economic slowdowns, countries have limited resources to undertake reforms to improve the quality 
of coverage to the population. These factors have created an urgency for LAC countries to 
undertake reforms to improve coverage of health and social protection services to improve the 
well-being of the elderly population.  
 
The results and analysis of this chapter aim to contribute to this reform agenda. In this chapter, I 
undertook an extensive exercise to standardize and harmonize 44 survey datasets from 17 countries 




in LAC and examined patterns in poverty, health care utilization, and the incidence and role of 
pensions and transfers for the elderly population vis-à-vis the non-elderly population. The results 
should help policymakers and governments understand better the living conditions and the well-
being of the elderly population in their own countries and make case for reforms. In developing 
the analysis, the chapter also contributes to public goods in research in the form of code and 
algorithms for survey data harmonization. Most households’ survey data used in the chapter are 
implemented regularly, and thus the code and algorithms can be utilized again for researchers 
undertaking similar exercise in the future.   
 
This chapter also points to several areas when more research is required in the future. First, my 
analysis looks at the breadth of issues form a policy point of view, and as such can establish 
correlations between well-being and health care access, pensions, and private transfers. There exist 
several research papers from developed countries that examine the impacts of health insurance, 
social protection policies and social security on poverty and well-being (Engelhardt & Gruber, 
2004; Newhouse, 1993). From Latin America as well, there is increasing evidence on the role of 
health insurance and social protection on pensions (Bando et al., 2020; Bernal et al., 2017; Celhay 
et al., 2019; Thornton et al., 2010). These studies are more prevalent for higher income countries 
such as Argentina, Chile, and Peru than for lower income countries such as El Salvador and 
Honduras. The studies in health also tend to focus on overall population, rather than the elderly, 
who as we saw are the largest user base of the health systems. In the future, more research 
estimating causal impacts of social policies on the well-being of the elderly could help shape public 
policy debates and advance the research agenda.  
 
Finally, measurement is another critical area where more research is required in the future. On the 
health side, we observed that due to differences in survey methodology and recalls period used, it 
is not easy to construct accurate estimates of utilization and expenditures for cross-country 
comparisons. Expenditures data can come from difference avenues (health utilization or household 
expenditures) and from different levels (individual versus household), which makes it difficult to 
estimate the burden the OOPE on the elderly accurately. Similarly, while survey data make it easy 
to comment on health care access, little is known about the quality of care available to the elderly 
population. On the social protection side, because of limitations in the data that are collected in 




household surveys, it is not possible to examine precisely if the elderly are net contributors to the 
household or not. Resolving these measurement issues in the future is another potentially fruitful 








3.8 Appendix: Additional tables and results 




Country Name of survey Acronym Year Field work Coverage Households Individuals
Argentina Encuesta Permanente de Hogares-Continua EPH-C 2006 Second half Urban-31 cities 37,521 129,410
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares-Continua EPH-C 2015 Second half Urban-31 cities 37,618 120,173
Bolivia Encuesta de Hogares - MECOVI EH 2006 November National 3,962 15,959
Encuesta de Hogares - MECOVI EH 2015 November National 10,060 36,905
Brazil Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios PNAD 2006 September National 116,986 404,589
Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios PNAD 2015 September National 116,478 352,248
Chile
Encuesta  de Caracterización Socioeconómica 
Nacional CASEN 2006 November National 72,515 263,910
Encuesta  de Caracterización Socioeconómica 
Nacional CASEN 2015 November National 83,743 266,428
Colombia Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares GEIH 2008 III quarter National 220,136 816,298
Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares GEIH 2015 III quarter National 230,728 781,558
Costa Rica Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EHPM 2006 July National 11,130 41,594
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares ENAHO 2015 July National 11,268 37,163
Dominican Rep. Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo ENFT 2006 October National 7,665 28,655
Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo ENFT 2015 October National 7,987 26,730
Ecuador Encuesta de Empleo, Desempleo y Subempleo ENEMDU 2007 December National 18,685 75,878
Encuesta de Empleo, Desempleo y Subempleo ENEMDU 2015 December National 29,919 112,423
El Salvador Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EHPM 2006 Jan-Dec National 16,350 68,312
Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples EHPM 2015 Jan-Dec National 23,670 88,184
Guatemala Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida ENCOVI 2006 Mar/Sep National 13,686 68,739
Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida ENCOVI 2014 Mar/Aug National 11,512 54,707
Honduras
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos 
Múltiples EPHPM 2006 May National 20,453 96,524
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos 
Múltiples EPHPM 2015 May National 5,968 26,458
Mexico
Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los 
Hogares ENIGH 2006 Aug/Nov National 20,532 82,237
Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los 
Hogares ENIGH 2014 Aug/Nov National 19,191 72,550
Nicaragua
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de 
Nivel de Vida EMNV 2005 Jul/Oct National 6,862 36,521
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de 
Nivel de Vida EMNV 2014 Jul/Oct National 6,777 29,090
Panama Encuesta de Hogares EH 2006 August National 12,865 48,762
Encuesta de Hogares EH 2015 September National 11,705 42,396
Paraguay Encuesta Permanente de Hogares EPH 2006 Nov06/Feb07 National 5,292 22,733
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares EPH 2015 Oct/Dec National 8,207 30,829
Peru Encuesta Nacional de Hogares ENAHO 2006 Jan/Dec National 20,541 88,654
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares ENAHO 2015 Jan/Dec National 32,182 119,489
Uruguay Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 2006 Year National 85,313 256,861
Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 2015 Year National 45,391 121,461
Source: SEDLAC, 2018.
















Encuesta Nacional de Utilizacion y Gasto en 
Servicios de Salud
ENUG No 2010 National 3,128 No Yes 1 Yes 12 Yes Individual Yes
2 Bolivia Encuesta de Hogares EH Yes 2015 National 37,364 No Yes 12/0.5 for kids Yes* 12 Yes Household Yes
3a Brazil Pesquisa Nacional de Saude PNS No 2013 National 205,546 Yes Yes 0.5 Yes 12 No - Yes
3b Brazil Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares POF No 2008 National 190,159 No No - Yes* 12 Yes Individual Yes
4 Chile
Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica 
Nacional
CASEN Yes 2015 National 266,968 Yes Yes 3 Yes 12 No - Yes
5 Colombia Encuesta Multiproposito EM No 2014 Cudinamarca 142,570 Yes Yes 1 Yes 12 Yes Individual Yes
6 Costa Rica
Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de 
los Hogares




Encuesta Demográfica y de Salud
ENDESA-
DHS
No 2013 National 20,769 Yes Yes 1 Yes 6 Yes Individual Yes
8 Ecuador Encuesta Condiciones de Vida ECV No 2013 National 109,694 Yes Yes 1/0.5 for kids No - Yes Household Yes
9 El Salvador Encuesta de Hogares de Propositos Multiples EHPM Yes 2014 National 80,164 Yes Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes Individual Yes
10 Guatemala Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida ENCOVI Yes 2014 National 54,822 Yes Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes Individual Yes
11 Honduras Encuesta Demográfica y de Salud
ENDESA-
DHS
No 2012 National 100,555 Yes Yes 1 Yes 12 Yes Individual Yes
12 Mexico
Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de 
los Hogares
ENIGH Yes 2014 National 73,592 Yes Yes From dates‡ Yes* From dates‡ Yes Household Yes
13 Nicaragua
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre 
Medicion de Nivel de Vida
EMNV Yes 2014 National 29,443 Yes Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes Individual Yes
14 Panama Encuesta de Niveles de Vida ENV No 2008 National 27,162 Yes Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes Individual Yes
15 Paraguay Encuesta Permanente de Hogares EPH Yes 2014 National 20,272 Yes Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes Individual Yes
16 Peru Encuesta Nacional de Hogares ENAHO Yes 2015 National 119,515 Yes Yes 1 Yes 12 Yes Individual Yes
17 Uruguay
Encuesta Nacional de Gastos e Ingresos de 
los Hogares
ENGIH No 2006 National 20,772 No Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes Household No
Notes: † Data are available for Caja Costarricense de Seguridad Social (CCSS) beneficiaries only. ‡ In the ENIGH in Mexico, respondents are asked to report the last date of out- and in-patient visits. We use this along with the date of survey to estimate need, utilization and hospitalization in the 
given recall period. * Instead of directly asking respondents if they were hospitalized in the past 12 months, these surveys instead ask to report expenditures due to hospitalization in the past 12 months. This could lead to underestimation of hospitalization episodes if respondents did not pay 
anything, (for example, they were fully covered by insurance). For Brazil, we use multiple surveys. The PNS contains utilization variables but not OOP. Here we use the POF for OOP expenditures. Similarly, in Colombia, the nationally representative survey ECV contains utilization variables but 




Out-patient visits In-patient visits
Out-of-pocket (OOP) 
expenditures
InsuranceS.No. Country Survey Name Survey ID SEDLAC? Year


































Argentina Ind Health 1 12 x x x x Ind x - - -
Bolivia Ind Health 12 12 x x x x Ind x x x x
Brazil Ind Expenditure 3 3 x x x x Ind x x x x
Chile N/A - - - - - - - Ind x x x x
Colombia Ind Health 1 12 x x x x Ind x x x x
Costa Rica HH Expenditure 1 1 x x x x Com x x x x
Dom. Rep. Ind Health 1 6 x x x x Ind x x x x
Ecuador HH Expenditure 3 3 x x x x Com x x x x
El Salvador Ind Health 1 1 x x x x Ind x x x x
Guatemala Ind Health 1 1 x x x x Ind x x x x
Honduras Ind Health 1 12 x x x x N/A - - - -
Mexico HH Expenditure 1 1 x x x HH x x x x
Nicaragua Ind Health 1 1 x x x x Ind x x x x
Panama Ind Health 1 1 x x x x Com x x x x
Paraguay Ind Health 3 3 x x x x Ind x x x x
Peru Ind Health 1 12 x x x x Ind x x x x
Uruguay HH Expenditure 1 1 x x x x Ind x x x x
Country
Out-of-pocket expenditures Income variables









PAMI, Obra social, Prepago atraves de OS, 
Programas/planes estatales de salud, Prepaga por 
contraraction voluntaria y emergencia medica
Uninsured
Bolivia Individual
Caja nacional de salud, Caja de la banca privada, Banca 
estatal, COSSMIL, Seguros privados
Seguro universitario, Seguros de salud del gobierno 
autonomo departamental o municipal, Prestaciones de 
servicios de salud integral, Uninsured
Brazil Household
Empresa de orgao publico, Municipal, Estadual, Militar, 
Private
Sistema unico de saude (SUS), Uninsured
Chile Individual FF.AA. Y del Orden, ISAPRE Sistema Publico FONASA (all groups), Uninsured
Colombia Individual
Contributivo, Fuerzas armadas, Ecopetrol, universidades 
publicas, Magisterio
Subsidiado (ARS, EPS-S), Uninsured
Costa Rica Not available
Dom. Rep. Not available
Ecuador Individual
IESS general, IESS voluntario, Seguro privado, Seguro 
ISSFA o ISSPOL
IESS campesino, Seguro comunitario, Uninsured
El Salvador Individual ISSS cotizante, ISSS beneficiario, ISSS retirado, privado Bienestar magisterial, IPSFA, Colectivo, Uninsured
Guatemala Individual Seguro privado IGSS, Uninsured
Honduras Individual Seguro privado, Seguro IHSS, Seguro militar Uninsured
Mexico Individual Seguridad social, Seguro privado Seguro popular, Uninsured
Nicaragua Individual
Seguro privado, Seguro social y privado, Seguro militar, 
Seguro social INSS
Uninsured
Panama Individual Seguro privado de salud, Caja de seguro social Uninsured
Paraguay Individual
Seguro privado individual, Seguro privado laboral, Seguro 
privado familiar, Sanidad militar, Sanidad policial, IPS
Uninsured
Peru Individual
EsSalud, Seguro privado de salud, Entidad prestadora de 
salud, Seguro de FF.AA./Policiales
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Table 3.14: Sources of income by age and gender, 2015 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Both sexes
Total Pension Transfer Total Pension Transfer
Argentina 21.0 79.0 76.3 1.5 86.2 13.8 4.9 8.4
Bolivia 31.7 68.3 58.0 5.7 90.6 9.4 0.0 7.4
Brazil 16.5 83.5 77.4 1.2 81.6 18.4 7.7 7.9
Chile 24.0 76.2 68.1 5.2 82.3 17.9 4.0 12.3
Colombia 34.4 65.8 26.7 14.3 83.3 16.8 1.5 5.6
Costa Rica 23.0 77.0 58.9 11.9 86.7 13.3 3.1 7.7
Dominican Rep. 33.0 67.0 13.1 49.2 79.5 20.5 1.0 17.4
Ecuador 38.2 61.8 21.5 37.0 84.0 16.0 2.1 12.9
El Salvador 43.8 56.3 12.8 33.7 84.5 15.5 0.7 11.7
Guatemala 50.8 49.3 12.8 33.2 79.5 20.5 0.7 19.1
Honduras 46.5 53.7 8.9 40.0 80.7 19.4 0.3 17.9
Mexico 33.1 66.9 25.6 38.5 84.8 15.2 2.1 12.0
Nicaragua 42.3 57.7 17.5 37.8 85.1 14.9 1.2 13.1
Panama 25.5 74.7 62.5 10.6 87.9 12.2 1.8 8.2
Paraguay 39.2 60.9 33.9 20.3 86.3 13.7 0.6 10.9
Peru 40.1 60.2 27.3 9.3 80.3 19.9 0.6 9.4
Uruguay 18.5 81.5 73.9 3.7 82.8 17.2 4.7 9.9
LAC average
(unweighted)
33.0 67.1 39.7 20.8 83.9 16.2 2.2 11.3
Males
Total Pension Transfer Total Pension Transfer
Argentina 32.5 67.5 64.6 1.2 95.0 5.0 3.0 1.6
Bolivia 44.2 55.8 47.8 4.5 96.6 3.4 0.0 1.9
Brazil 24.3 75.7 70.7 0.6 91.7 8.4 4.9 1.1
Chile 36.1 64.1 58.1 3.4 92.4 7.8 3.4 3.2
Colombia 46.1 54.2 27.4 7.6 93.3 6.8 1.2 1.5
Costa Rica 31.2 68.8 54.8 8.6 94.0 6.0 2.3 1.8
Dominican Rep. 49.6 50.4 15.8 29.5 91.4 8.6 1.2 5.3
Ecuador 51.0 49.0 22.9 22.8 93.7 6.3 0.8 4.6
El Salvador 56.3 43.7 13.0 20.1 92.4 7.6 0.4 3.2
Guatemala 63.7 36.4 12.0 21.5 94.4 5.6 0.6 4.4
Honduras 66.1 34.0 9.0 21.5 95.2 4.8 0.2 4.0
Mexico 45.7 54.3 30.6 21.3 95.8 4.2 1.5 1.9
Nicaragua 52.7 47.3 17.4 27.5 88.4 11.6 1.0 10.0
Panama 36.5 63.5 57.3 4.3 93.9 6.1 1.4 2.3
Paraguay 50.0 50.0 28.4 15.3 93.4 6.6 0.5 3.9
Peru 47.1 53.2 24.5 3.7 87.1 13.1 0.5 1.1
Uruguay 26.0 74.0 66.7 2.6 89.9 10.1 4.0 3.9
LAC average
(unweighted)


















Total Pension Transfer Total Pension Transfer
Argentina 12.7 87.3 84.8 1.7 76.1 23.9 7.1 16.3
Bolivia 20.2 79.8 67.5 6.7 82.0 18.1 0.0 15.3
Brazil 9.7 90.4 83.2 1.7 70.7 29.3 10.7 15.2
Chile 14.3 86.0 76.3 6.7 72.1 28.2 4.6 21.5
Colombia 22.5 77.7 26.1 21.1 72.0 28.1 1.9 10.2
Costa Rica 13.6 86.4 63.6 15.7 77.3 22.7 4.2 15.3
Dominican Rep. 15.4 84.6 10.2 70.2 65.7 34.3 0.7 31.3
Ecuador 23.8 76.3 20.0 53.0 71.5 28.6 3.7 23.5
El Salvador 30.6 69.5 12.7 47.9 76.1 24.0 1.0 20.8
Guatemala 32.3 67.9 14.0 50.2 61.0 39.1 0.8 37.5
Honduras 26.2 74.0 8.8 59.2 64.5 35.8 0.4 33.7
Mexico 19.8 80.2 20.2 56.6 71.2 28.8 2.8 24.5
Nicaragua 27.9 72.1 17.7 51.9 80.8 19.2 1.3 17.2
Panama 13.9 86.6 67.9 17.3 80.7 19.6 2.3 15.4
Paraguay 26.6 73.6 40.4 26.1 77.5 22.7 0.8 19.8
Peru 32.4 68.0 30.5 15.5 72.7 27.6 0.7 18.8
Uruguay 12.5 87.5 79.6 4.6 75.3 24.7 5.5 16.1
LAC average
(unweighted)
20.8 79.3 42.6 29.8 73.4 26.7 2.9 20.7
Notes: Estimated from household surveys using data from SEDLAC. Country averages are weighted by survey weights, LAC average 
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